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The inevitable closure and remediation phase of a mine’s lifecycle routinely causes 
negative socio-economic and environmental impacts for nearby communities. For mines 
operating on Indigenous territories, where communities have complex and nuanced connections 
to land and varying levels of jurisdiction, these issues are further exacerbated by the exclusion of 
Indigenous voices from planning and decision-making. Using qualitative document analysis and 
semi-structured interviews, this research sought to understand company approaches to socio-
economic closure planning and community engagement across the North, and then examined 
Nunavik, Québec, as a case study to explore mine closure governance. The results show that 
mine companies across the North are inadequately addressing the socio-economic aspects of 
closure and inconsistently involving communities in the closure planning process. In Nunavik, 
government policies do little to regulate these aspects of mine closure, which has allowed for 
considerable variation in closure planning strategies between the companies operating in the 
region. These shortcomings in closure policies and industry practices mean governments and 
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Since its inception, Canada has been a country reliant on resource extraction – 
particularly minerals and metals – and the separation of Indigenous peoples from the land where 
those resources exist. During the post-war economic boom of the 1950s and 60s, Canada’s settler 
government began to reimagine its provincial and territorial North1 as a site for vast economic 
gains through mineral extraction from lands they saw as largely uninhabited and open for 
exploitation. During this time, the federal government heavily subsidized industrial development 
to stimulate what they hoped would be a Northern mineral boom, bringing more projects and 
more development (Loo, 2017). Major mining developments in the North introduced economic 
and environmental changes to areas characterised by Indigenous populations practicing 
community systems of subsistence harvesting and mutual aid (Boutet, Keeling, & Sandlos, 
2015).  
This development agenda would, the government hoped, have the dual benefit of 
generating wealth for the country’s new settler population and bringing Euro-centric social and 
economic systems to remote lands and the Indigenous peoples who have lived there (Coates, 
1985; Keeling & Sandlos, 2009). Keeling and Sandlos (2009) succinctly explain that Northern 
mineral development “was one of the primary means … by which the Canadian government 
attempted to advance a modernization agenda in the North, in effect colonizing the region 
through the subsidized provision of infrastructure and capital … to support the development of 
 
1 There are many definitions of “North” in Canada and internationally. For the purpose of this thesis, the North 
refers to the three territories (Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut) and the two provincial northern regions 
where Inuit are the demographic majority (Nunavik and the northern portion of Labrador). 
2 
 
private sector and strategic military mega-projects” (p. 122). The state extended its reach into 
Northern Indigenous territories to experiment with what they believed to be an underdeveloped 
region. Canada attempted to bring the North (both its land and its peoples) into the modern age 
by introducing wage labour, imposing European health and education services on communities, 
and encouraging non-Indigenous settlement in the North. 
Many of the mines opened in the 20th century ended up abandoned and/or poorly 
remediated, leaving behind harmful legacies that continue to cost Canada billions of dollars 
(Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2002). Mining is a volatile boom-bust industry, and 
the closure of a mine site is more often the result of economic and technical circumstances that 
make extraction unprofitable, as opposed to the exhaustion of an orebody (Laurence, 2006). 
Closure and remediation have also historically been an afterthought for both industry and 
government (Laurence, 2006; Mackasey, 2000). This means closure frequently happens abruptly, 
with little warning or time for impacted communities to prepare. Mines are simply abandoned 
with minimal or no remediation efforts (Dance, 2015; Mackasey, 2000). While Canada did not 
see the northern mineral boom that the government had hoped for,2 the mines that did operate in 
this era went on to cause decades, even generations of environmental, social, and economic harm 
to northern peoples due to loose regulations and virtually non-existent closure laws (Dance, 
2015; Mackasey, 2000). Over 150 abandoned mine sites have been identified in Yukon, 
Northwest Territories, and Nunavut, and the Northern Abandoned Mine Reclamation Program 
has a multi-billion dollar budget to address just 8 of the most severe cases (CIRNAC, 2019; 
Mackasey, 2000).  
 
2 In the Northwest Territories, for example, only six mines operated between 1950 and 1997 (Buell, 2006). 
3 
 
When a mine closes, nearby communities may experience a multitude of negative 
impacts ranging from environmental contamination and subsequent health risks to economic 
decline, outmigration, and community-wide disruptions, even collapse. These kinds of impacts 
have been observed across the globe and can last for decades. Mine wastes and degrading 
infrastructure can cause dangerous chemicals to leach into the receiving environmental, harming 
aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems (Franks, Boger, Ote, & Mulligan, 2011; Hudson-Edwards, 
Jamieson, & Lottermoser, 2011; Kossoff et al., 2014; Ripley, Redmann, & Crowder, 1996). For 
remote communities with few industries, the closure of a major mine site can leave them without 
adequate financial resources to support their families or maintain critical infrastructure and 
services (Bradbury & St‐Martin, 1983; Burns & Church, 2018; Lapalme, 2003). Contracts end, 
travel to the region is reduced, and demand for goods and services declines (Bowes-Lyon, 
Richards, & McGee, 2009; Edwards & Maritz, 2019). Families may leave their homes to find 
work elsewhere, severing important social ties and further exacerbating community financial 
hardships (Archer & Bradbury, 1992; Kendall, 1992; Rodon & Lévesque, 2015). In the absence 
of alternative industries to absorb labour and fill investment gaps, the benefits a community may 
have experienced during the mine’s life are unlikely to contribute meaningfully to long-term 
community sustainability (Bowes-Lyon et al., 2009; Rodon & Lévesque, 2015).  
These impacts are more complex for mines operation on Indigenous lands, where 
Indigenous peoples have varying levels of jurisdiction and whose food security, sovereignty, and 
cultural practices are often tied to the environment. Indigenous communities can suffer the same 
economic and social hardships as southern and non-Indigenous peoples, especially if many 
community members are working for the mine and/or a significant amount of mining royalties 
are being collected by residents and local governments. Additionally, though, Indigenous peoples 
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suffer additional impacts due to the integral role that land and water play in not only their 
survival but also their cultural well-being. For many Indigenous peoples, the land, all of its 
human and non-human inhabitants, and the activities that occur on it are critical components of 
their culture, identity, and social organization (Richmond, 2009; Scott, 2001; Todd, 2014; Willox 
et al., 2012). Toxic leaching can contaminate a community’s source of drinking water, and the 
physical alterations to the landscape can inhibit their ability to hunt, trap, and harvest on the land 
and therefore hinder important cultural activities (Buell, 2006; Horowitz et al., 2018; Keeling & 
Sandlos, 2017). To degrade Indigenous lands via resource extraction is to degrade important 
place-based connections that form the basis of many Indigenous peoples’ social and cultural 
identities. Thus, not only is the physical landscape changed in this context, but social and cultural 
landscapes are also altered in dramatic ways (Bainton & Holcombe, 2018; Cohen, 2017). 
Furthermore, Indigenous peoples have historically been left out of conversations about resource 
policy and mineral development on their lands, leaving them with little say in the matter 
(Hipwell, Mamen, Weitzner, & Whiteman, 2002). 
Tighter regulations, scientific advances, and increased political pressure on the industry 
over the last 30 years have improved mine closure practices in Canada. International industry 
organizations have increasingly recognized the importance of mine closure as well, resulting in 
best practice guidelines that emphasize early planning, community engagement, and socially and 
culturally appropriate remediation techniques (International Council on Mining & Metals, 
2019b). However, significant gaps remain in mine closure governance. Closure and remediation 
still tends to focus more on physically cleaning up the land and containing wastes, while the 
social and economic impacts of closure on nearby communities are neglected (Bainton & 
Holcombe, 2018; Beckett & Keeling, 2019; Laurence, 2006; Stacey, Naude, Hermanus, & 
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Frankel, 2010). Within Canada, closure and remediation governance are also inconsistent across 
provincial and territorial borders and little federal guidance exists, leaving some places and 
peoples more vulnerable than others (Dance, Monosky, Keeling, & Sandlos, in press). 
Indigenous peoples have gained greater access to decision making with regard to resource 
development on their lands through the settlement of land claims and signing of Impact and 
Benefit Agreements (IBA), but engagement is often based on southern, settler expectations, 
attitudes, and beliefs that tend to tokenize Indigenous Knowledge (IK) to facilitate development 
(Baker & Westman, 2018; Dokis, 2015; Sandlos & Keeling, 2016a). IBAs and processes like 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIA) also tend to focus on the development 
and operational issues, rather than closure. Furthermore, there are few successful examples of 
community engaged closure planning, and so literature on the topic is limited to descriptions of 
past failures or consultant reports without clear, demonstrable examples (Bainton & Holcombe, 
2018; Morrison-Saunders, 2019; Stacey et al., 2010). Finally, despite the increase in both the 
quantity and authority of local and Indigenous agencies to control their lands and resources, 
ultimate decision making power still typically falls to the federal government regardless of IBAs 
or Indigenous land rights, limiting the potential for true local control over mining (Christensen & 
Grant, 2007; Nadasdy, 2003; White, 2002). 
Many of the shortcomings of mine closure governance and industry practices can be 
observed in mine closure plans. Mine closure plans are the official documents submitted to and 
approved by provincial or territorial governments that outline exactly how a mine site will be 
closed and remediated. They describe the methods used for ceasing operations, decommissioning 
infrastructure, containing and removing wastes, and, sometimes, rehabilitating the surrounding 
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environment.3 Broadly, these plans are meant to ensure post-closure environmental quality and 
human safety.  
Only in the late 20th century, as they confronted a growing list of abandoned and poorly 
remediated mine sites, did the provinces and territories begin implementing regulations that 
required mine companies to produce closure plans early in the mine’s life. These regulations 
vary across jurisdictions, but typically companies are required to submit a preliminary closure 
plan before the mine receives authorization and must submit interim closure plans every five 
years to account for any changes in operations or the physical and social environments. These 
routine revisions allow for the incorporation of new knowledge as it is developed or collected, 
potentially creating space for Indigenous peoples to suggest changes that reflect the particular, 
evolving needs of their communities and lands. This rarely occurs, as will be discussed in 
Chapter Three, but it does offer opportunities for reflection and improvement if utilized 
effectively. More often, these revisions are limited to changing financial costs and incorporating 
new research about the site. 
Depending on the location of the mine site, community consultations may or may not be 
required in mine closure planning. In cases where this is required, the consultants hired or the 
company employees responsible for consultations for closure planning will not necessarily be 
knowledgeable about good community engagement practices or the socio-economic aspects of 
closure. Legislation dictating what exactly these plans must contain, when they must be written 
and updated, and the processes for producing them vary considerably across the provinces and 
 
3 Closure plans also usually explain methods for progressive closure or progressive reclamation – closure processes 
that occur while the mine is still in operations that facilitate the efficiency of closure later on at the end of the mine’s 
life. For example, when one mine pit is depleted of valuable minerals steps may be taken to begin remediation for 
that pit despite the mine, as a whole, still being in operation.   
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territories. Consequently, there is little consistency in important components of mine closure 
plans, such as environmental assessment processes and financial commitments (Dance et al., in 
press). Furthermore, there are few legal obligations for mine companies to address socio-
economic issues or conduct socio-economic impact assessments (Kabir, Rabbi, Chowdhury, & 
Akbar, 2015). As a result, closure planning in Canada continues to be more about finding 
engineering solutions to physical problems, while crucial socio-economic, cultural, and historical 
aspects of mine closure are left out of the conversation (Bainton & Holcombe, 2018; Beckett & 
Keeling, 2019; Roberts, Veiga, & Peiter, 2000). 
1.2. Research Purpose and Questions 
The purpose of this research was to understand the challenges and opportunities for 
incorporating Indigenous Knowledge (IK) and the negative socio-economic impacts of mine 
closure in closure plans in northern Canada. This was done by examining industry practices for 
mine closure planning across Canada’s three territories (Yukon, Northwest Territories, and 
Nunavut) and two provincial regions of Inuit Nunangat4 (Nunavik and Nunatsiavut), and then 
focusing on Nunavik, Québec, as a case study in mine closure governance. Much of the research 
that has occurred on northern mine closure has sought to document the legacies left behind after 
closure has already occurred, whereas this research was a unique opportunity to examine (and 
contribute to) mine closure planning as it is happening. While the socio-economic impacts of 
mine closure experienced by many northern communities are fairly well documented in 
academic literature (Bainton & Holcombe, 2018; Bowes-Lyon et al., 2009; Gibson & Klinck, 
2005; Horowitz et al., 2018; Sandlos & Keeling, 2016c), it is yet to be seen how closure planning 
is accounting for those impacts and how Indigenous peoples’ contributions to remediation 
 
4 Inuit homelands, which stretch across northern Canada from Yukon to Labrador.  
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planning could influence closure outcomes (Haalboom, 2014). Furthermore, although closure 
plans are critical documents that outline exactly how closure and remediation will happen and 
must be approved by the respective territorial or provincial government, they are rarely the 
subject of public or academic scrutiny. 
This research aims to contribute to a greater understanding of the scope of issues being 
addressed in closure planning, how extractive industries are consulting with Indigenous 
communities, and if and how those consultations are integrated into closure plans. Beyond 
contributing to academic knowledge about mine closure, a primary objective of this research was 
to produce knowledge that was valuable for Nunavimmiut5 and Closure Plan Sub-Committee for 
the Glencore Raglan Mine in Nunavik. This project was designed in consultation with the Raglan 
Mine Closure Plan Sub-Committee to ensure that outcomes contributed positively to and 
facilitated their work, which will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
Based on these objectives, this research sought to answer the following questions: 
(1) How do mine closure plans differ across Northern Canada in terms of community 
engagement and the inclusion of non-technical issues and local/Indigenous knowledge?  
(2) What knowledge and attitudes do government and industry actors in Nunavik have 
about mine closure impacts and Inuit engagement? And 
 (3) How do these different knowledge and attitudes shape the process of mine closure 
planning and Inuit engagement in Nunavik?  
 
5 Inuit of Nunavik 
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To answer these questions, I used participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and 
document analysis to understand mine closure practices in the North and to map out the closure 
regulatory framework in Nunavik. By engaging with government and industry actors and 
participating in the work of the Raglan Mine Closure Plan Sub-Committee, this research can 
contribute to improvements in the industry and government’s ability to produce mine closure 
plans that protect Indigenous land, resources, and communities. Furthermore, by uncovering 
gaps in knowledge, regulations, and closure planning practices in Nunavik, this research 
contributes to the expertise of the Raglan Mine Closure Plan Sub-Committee so its members are 
better equipped to design a mine closure plan that meets the needs, values, and priorities of the 
Inuit communities of Salluit and Kangiqsujuaq. Secondary to those goals, this research 
contributes to both academic and industry knowledge about best practices for community 
engagement to ideally facilitate a shift from knowledge about the negative impacts of closure to 
improving applied methods for mine closure planning so those impacts can be avoided entirely.  
1.3. Background: Resource Development in Nunavik 
Mines are unique in that the location of extraction is based primarily on where valuable 
mineral deposits exist, and less so on proximity to other resources like transportation 
infrastructure and large labour pools. As a result, they are often located away from population 
centres and draw employment from rural communities. In the Canadian North, where small 
populations are spread over a vast geographic region, mines provide relatively high wages and 
infrastructure improvements to communities that may otherwise struggle to diversify and sustain 
formal economies (Gibson & Klinck, 2005). This makes the region especially susceptible to the 
impacts of mine closure. Communities that rely on mining then often struggle to diversify after a 
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mine closes, and few mining communities manage to do this successfully (Veiga, Scoble, & 
McAllister, 2001). 
Mines in the North operate within a unique social, economic, and political environment. 
The region has a higher Indigenous population and a much younger overall population than the 
south (Southcott, 2014). There are also complex governance structures that can include federal, 
provincial, territorial, local, and Indigenous governments as well as a mosaic of historic treaties, 
modern land claims agreements, and IBAs. As stated, the Canadian government did not get the 
Northern mineral boom that they had hoped and subsistence livelihoods were not entirely 
eliminated by wage labour (Buell, 2006; Keeling & Sandlos, 2016). Despite this, the industry 
continues to play a major role in the Northern economy. Resource-related employment makes up 
a higher percentage of total jobs in the North than in the south, and mineral exploration, 
extraction, and processing contribute to much of the region’s economic growth (Marshall, 2019; 
Northwest Territories Department of Industry Tourism and Investment, 2014; Southcott, 2014). 
The North is also characterized, though, by the leakage of mineral profits out of the region 
(Morgan, 2015). Technology and labour is brought in from the south, and the owners of mines 
and exploration companies are rarely northerners (J. N. Larsen & Fondahl, 2015). Recent 
institutional changes, like federal devolution and the growing authority of Indigenous 
governments, have increased local control over resources, but human and financial capacity 
challenges make it difficult for Northern authorities and organizations to effectively govern the 
mine industry (Coates et al., 2014; J. N. Larsen & Fondahl, 2015). 
1.3.1. Case Study: Nunavik, Québec 
Nunavik is Québec’s northern region, covering one-third of the province from the 55th 




Figure 1.1: Map of Northern Villages and mines in Nunavik, Québec. Map produced in ArcGIS 10.7.1 
using Statistics Canada (2016) data and contains information licensed under the Open Government 
License – Canada. 
12 
 
in this region for thousands of years, while European contact occurred only a few hundred years 
ago (Fabbi, Rodon, & Finke, 2017). Today, it is home to over 13,000 people, 11,800 of whom 
(85%) are Inuit (Statistics Canada, 2016). The population resides in 14 communities that trace 
the coast of Hudson’s Bay and Ungava Bay, with Kuujjuaq being the largest community and 
administrative centre. The communities range in population from 224 to 2862 (Institut de la 
statistique du Québec, 2020). Households typically engage in a combination of wage labour and 
subsistence hunting and fishing (Chabot, 2003; Ready & Power, 2018), with the majority of 
employment coming from public sector service provisions (Statistics Canada, 2016). Despite the 
increasing prevalence of wage employment in these communities, country foods remain an 
integral part of the region’s food security (Chabot, 2003; Makivik Corporation, 2014b). The two 
active mines in the region (Raglan Mine and Nunavik Nickel) employ a relatively small number 
of Inuit, approximately 200 (Séguin, 2018), however the industry contributes significantly to the 
region’s economic growth (Rogers, 2015), while IBAs6 bring in additional money and 
opportunities through profit sharing agreements, trust fund payments, preferential hiring, and 
training and education programs (Natural Resources Canada, 2007; Séguin & Larivière, 2011). 
Mine closure planning in Nunavik occurs within a landscape of multi-level and ever-
evolving governance systems and a unique commitment by Raglan Mine to community-engaged 
closure. Nunavik is not officially a self-governing region, but instead is a treaty territory with 
some self-governing structures but that Québec and the Crown still have significant authority 
over (Rodon, 2014). The region is governed by a complex web of provincial and regional 
authorities and private agreements. Provincially, the Ministère de l'Environnement et de la Lutte 
 
6 Much of the benefits from IBAs are directed to the three communities that have signed IBAs with mining 
companies (Salluit, Kangiqsujuaq, and Puvirnituq), although Makivik Corporation uses the money they receive as a 
signatory on both IBAs to invest in projects throughout the region. 
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Contre les Changements Climatiques (MELCC) and Ministère de l'Énergie et des Ressources 
Naturelles (MERN) play the greatest role in regulating mine closure. Regionally, Makivik 
Corporation, the Kativik Regional Government (KRG), the Kativik Environmental Advisory 
Committee (KEAC), and the Kativik Environmental Quality Commission (KEQC) all have 
varying roles in regulating the mine industry and ensuring Inuit participation in decision making 
and planning. The two operating mines in Nunavik, the Glencore Raglan Mine7 and Canadian 
Royalties’ Nunavik Nickel, are also governed by their respective IBAs signed between the 
companies, Makivik Corporation, and the communities most impacted by their activities.8 These 
agreements outline a variety of environmental, employment, financial, and engagement 
requirements that the companies must meet, in addition to provincial regulatory requirements. 
Raglan Mine’s IBA laid the groundwork for the company’s current unique closure planning 
strategy. It required the establishment of the Raglan Committee, a group comprised of three Inuit 
and three Raglan Mine representatives that meet multiple times each year to discuss mine 
operations and ensure the enforcement of the Raglan Agreement. In 2018, in response to 
community members’ concerns and questions about Raglan Mine’s tailings storage facility, the 
company established the Raglan Mine Closure Plan Sub-committee9 (which reports to the Raglan 
Committee) to work exclusively on reviewing the mine’s closure strategies.  
The Raglan Closure Plan Sub-committee has committed to meeting at least two times per 
year for the duration of the mine’s lifecycle to create a space for the company and two 
communities to develop a closure plan that meets the needs and priorities of the communities. 
 
7 The full, official name is Raglan Mine, a Glencore Company. For the sake of simplicity and ease of reading, 
Raglan Mine will be used throughout this thesis. 
8 Salluit and Kangiqsujuaq are signatories of the Raglan Mine IBA, called the Raglan Agreement. Salluit, 
Kangiqsujuaq, and Puvirnituq are signatories of the Nunavik Nickel IBA, called the Nunavik Nickel Agreement. 
9 Hereafter referred to as the Raglan closure sub-committee 
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Members include Raglan Mine employees specializing in environmental remediation and 
community relations, mine-community liaisons from Salluit and Kangiqsujuaq, leaders and 
landholding corporation (LHC) employees from the communities, the Mining Development 
Manager from Makivik, and experts in physical and social aspects of mine remediation 
(including my supervisor). Together, members have been meticulously reviewing the entirety of 
Raglan Mine’s existing closure plan to determine what is missing or needs improving to ensure 
that the next version of the closure plan has adequate safeguards for Inuit land use, resources, 
and ecological integrity, while maximizing community benefits. It allows community 
representatives consistent and long-term access to the company to ask important closure-specific 
questions, learn about and become experts on closure and remediation, and push the company to 
address topics that are frequently left out of the closure planning process.  
1.3.2. Political History of Nunavik 
The history of Nunavik’s path to self-governance10 is tied to Québec’s desire to expand 
its reach northward and secure its own independence from the federal government. To 
Qallunaat,11 Nunavik was a vast, untouched hinterland to be used and extracted from to suit the 
needs of the new settler population. Not only does Nunavik contain physical resources that 
benefit Québec in terms of financial capital and meeting energy needs, but it has also offered an 
opportunity for Québec to demonstrate its self-reliance and independence from the rest of 
Canada by solidifying its vast borders and uniting its (non-Indigenous) population through 
energy and resource development (Hervé, 2017; Wera & Martin, 2008). However, resource 
development in “Nouveau Québec” also resulted in the dramatic alteration and often destruction 
 
10 Self-governance within the province of Québec as defined by the government. Inuit of course governed 
themselves before the arrival of Europeans.  
11 People who are not Inuit. 
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of traditional Inuit and Cree lands and has historically occurred with little or no consultation with 
the people who have occupied and sustained themselves on that land for thousands of years. In 
response to this lack of consultation, Cree and Inuit in Québec have worked to assert their rights 
to this land to protect their culture and livelihood activities, and to secure a future for themselves 
and their children.  
Throughout the 20th century, Nunavik shifted between being under territorial, provincial, 
and federal governance regimes. Before the province became interested in the region in the early 
1900s, Nunavimmiut had relationships with Europeans mainly through Christian missionaries 
and trade activities with the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC). The HBC became active in the 
region after being granted ownership over it by King Charles II in 1670 and later establishing 
trade posts (Kirkey, 2015). Originally included in the NWT, the Québec government acquired 
the region through an agreement with the federal government in 1912, without consulting any 
Inuit (Nungak, 2017; Rodon, 2014). Nevertheless, the Québec government continued to neglect 
Nunavik and eventually argued in court that Inuit fell under the Indian Act and therefore were 
the responsibility of the federal government (Rodon, 2014). The federal government agreed to 
assume responsibility for the region in 1939 and began providing services like RCMP (the first 
physical government presence in the region), family allowances, old age pensions, and 
rudimentary housing (Nungak, 2017). By the mid-1950s governing in Nunavik occurred 
primarily through the newly created federal Department of Northern Affairs and Natural 
Resources, whose main priority was to encourage Inuit society to adapt to modern Canadian 
society and give up their traditional livelihoods entirely to participate in the formal capitalist 
economy (Hervé, 2017). Around the same time, community councils were established in the 
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villages to stimulate civic engagement and develop initiatives at the local level,12 but these were 
largely Qallunaat creations that went underutilized by Inuit (Hervé, 2017).  
Québec would not substantially enter the governance picture until the 1960s when it 
became clear that there were significant opportunities for energy and resource development, at 
which point the province suddenly reimagined their Northern region as a vast site of resources 
waiting to be utilized for southern gain (Gombay, 2013). Stoked by growing Québec separatism 
and nationalism in the 60s and 70s, Quebecers believed the potential for natural resource 
development in Northern Québec would help the province meet its rapidly growing energy 
demands from its expanding southern population and increase its independence from the rest of 
Canada (Desbiens, 2004; Wera & Martin, 2008). The province quickly established the Direction 
General du Nouveau Québec (DGNQ) to provide services to Inuit, began giving Inuit 
communities French names, and negotiated an agreement with the federal government that 
would return governance responsibilities to Québec (Hervé, 2017; Nungak, 2017). 
As part of its mission for autonomy, in the 1960s the provincial government in power 
nationalized Hydro-Québec and gave it full access to all rivers within Québec’s borders (Wera & 
Martin, 2008). In 1971, premier Robert Bourassa announced the James Bay hydroelectric 
project, which would require flooding thousands of square kilometres of traditional Cree and 
Inuit lands without any Indigenous consultation (Gossage & Little, 2012). Bourassa promised the 
project would create tens of thousands of jobs, advance the economy, and bring Québec into the 
modern era (Ma, Hipel, & De, 2005). While the court case and subsequent negotiations would be 
a defining moment for Inuit to have their demands heard and assert their rights to their traditional 
 
12 Inuit communities have always had their own forms of governing and systems for solving community problems. 




territory, the hydro project itself was an important part of the assertion of settler Québécois 
identity (Desbiens, 2004). 
In response to the James Bay project, Québec Cree and Nunavik Inuit began to formally 
organize. The Cree established the Indians of Québec Association (IQA) and Nunavik Inuit 
formed the Northern Québec Inuit Association (NQIA), which would later become Makivik 
Corporation. In the same year, the Québec government moved forward with their plans and 
began blasting large sections of land to facilitate dam construction (Gossage & Little, 2012). The 
IQA and NQIA quickly developed a partnership and took the government to court for violating 
Indigenous rights (Desbiens, 2004; Nungak, 2017). Throughout this court case Cree and Inuit 
had to teach Qallunaat about their relationships with and use of the lands affected, as well as 
their historic occupation of the land that covered thousands of years (Grand Council of the Crees, 
2020; Nungak, 2017). No settler government nor the British Crown had ever signed treaties with 
the Indigenous peoples of this region, and Cree and Inuit argued that the hydroelectric project 
directly impacted their ownership and use of the affected land (Desbiens, 2004; Kirkey, 2015). 
After six months, Justice Albert Malouf sided with the Cree and Inuit. Malouf’s ruling was 
quickly overturned in order to continue work on a project that was deemed to be in the 
province’s best interest, but it forced the provincial government into treaty negotiations (Grand 
Council of the Crees, 2020; Nungak, 2017). 
Compared to the many several-decades-long treaty negotiations seen in other parts of the 
country in the decades since, the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement (JBNQA) 
negotiations were short. They were challenging, though, because Indigenous leaders had to learn 
to navigate a foreign court system while simultaneously trying to bridge the gap between settler 
and Indigenous understandings of nature and land (Nungak, 2017). Where Cree and Inuit view 
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natural resources as part of larger social and cultural relationships, Québec officials saw the 
region’s water as a resource to meet financial and political needs (Desbiens, 2004). An 
agreement was reached after only one year, though, due to the importance of the James Bay 
project to the government (Rodon, 2014).  
On November 11, 1975 the Government of Québec and the Cree and Inuit of Northern 
Québec signed Canada’s first modern land claims treaty (Fabbi et al., 2017). The JBNQA 
provided Inuit with many provincial services that should have already been present in the region 
once it joined Québec, including health, education, justice, environmental, and economic 
services (Nungak, 2017). Inuit gained other benefits like monetary wealth, job opportunities, and 
the creation of Inuit governing bodies like Makivik Corporation, the KRG, the Nunavik Regional 
Board of Health and Social Services, and the Kativik School Board13 (Bird & Nixon, 2004; Fabbi 
et al., 2017; Rodon, 2014). These organizations had a greater level of influence over the region 
than the previously underutilized community councils and were more appropriately geared 
towards addressing Inuit issues than the poorly managed DGNQ that prioritized modernization 
and settler culture (Fabbi et al., 2017; Nungak, 2017). Infrastructure development and Inuit 
contracts with southern companies also increased, bringing greater wealth to the region (Bird & 
Nixon, 2004). In return, Québec gained access to water systems necessary for their power project 
and saw the extinguishment of Indigenous claims to the vast majority of the resource-rich 
territories in the North.  
These benefits came at a cost. As Zebedee Nungak notes, settlers in this country have 
always been entitled to government services like those gained from the JBNQA, whereas Inuit 
had to “trade the essence of their identity to gain access to public services” (Nungak, 2017, p. 
 
13 Now called Kativik Ilisarniliriniq. 
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79). The agreement resulted in a land regime that divided Nunavik’s 444000 square kilometres 
into three categories. Category I lands are Inuit owned, Category II are provincially owned but 
with exclusive hunting, fishing, trapping, tourism, and forestry rights for Inuit, and Category III 
lands are Crown land (table 1.1). Inuit had to relinquish their rights entirely to 85% of the region, 
where Qallunaat could hunt and fish, and private companies could extract resources without Inuit 
consent or consultation (Roy-Grégoire, 2013; Wera & Martin, 2008).  
Table 1.1: Nunavik land regime1 
 Category I (1% of land) Category II (14% of land) Category III (85% of land) 
Ownership Community owner (LHC) Québec Québec 
Surface only (LHC) Surface (Qc) Surface (Qc) 
Sub-surface (Qc) except 
soapstone 
Sub-surface (Qc), permit at 
no cost for acquisition of 






Exclusive harvesting rights Exclusive harvesting rights No exclusive harvesting 
rights 
Exclusive trapping rights Exclusive trapping rights Exclusive trapping rights 
Land use No mineral obtained or 
extracted without consent 
from LHC and 
compensation payment 
Development possible with 
compensation or land 
replacement 
Development possible 
LHC authorize use and 
occupation per applicable 
terms and regimes 
(construction, development, 
residential, etc.) 
Québec authorizes use and 
occupation 
Québec authorizes use and 
occupation 
 1Adapted from Séguin and Larivière (2011). 
The JBNQA contributed significantly to Nunavik’s ability to self-govern, despite the 
limitations imposed by the land regime and their continued status as a region within Québec. 
Four major authorities came from the JBNQA that are directly relevant to mineral development 
in Nunavik: Makivik Corporation, KRG, KEQC, and KEAC.14 The establishment of these 
organizations provided Nunavimmiut with funded, locally operated organizations to advance 
their own agenda on the provincial and federal stage. The KRG is a supra-municipal government 
 
14 Several other governing bodies came from the JBNQA relating to health, education, social, and other services. 
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with jurisdiction over all of Nunavik15 and answers only to the Québec government (Rodon, 
2018). Makivik Corporation is a land claims organization that represents the interests of 
Nunavimmiut. It is an ethnic administrative authority responsible for negotiating and signing 
IBAs, promoting Inuit economic and social interests, and investing compensatory funds from 
IBAs and the JBNQA on behalf of Nunavik Inuit (Rodon, 2018; Séguin & Larivière, 2011; 
Wilson, 2017). The KEQC is co-managed by members from Nunavik and Québec. Of the nine 
members of the KEQC, four members and the chair are appointed by the Québec Government 
and approved by the KRG and four members are appointed by the KRG, of which two must be 
Inuit residents of Nunavik. It is responsible for reviewing the environmental and social impacts 
of proposed projects, setting conditions for developments, and approving or denying projects in 
Nunavik, although ultimate decision making power lies with provincial authorities for most 
projects (Jacobs, Berrouard, & Paul, 2009; Rodon, 2018; Séguin & Larivière, 2011). Lastly, the 
KEAC is a consultative body that works with other government authorities to study, highlight, 
and make recommendations concerning environmental and social issues important to Nunavik 
residents (Kativik Environmental Advisory Committee, n.d.).  
Each community also has a local-level municipal body referred to as the Northern Village 
(NV) and a local landholding corporation (LHC) that controls the use and protection of Category 
I and II lands. These local authorities do not play a direct role in mineral policy or activities 
unless occurring on Category I or II lands, but both the NVs and LHCs of Salluit, Kangiqsujuaq, 
and Puvirnituq are signatories of their respective IBAs. Together, these local and regional 
organizations have contributed significantly to Nunavik’s ability to self-govern despite their 
 
15 There are some areas, Category IA and IB lands, that are intended for the Cree community of Whapmagoostui, 
which is in Nunavik. The KRG does not have jurisdiction over these areas (Séguin & Larivière, 2011). 
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existence within the larger provincial government. They were also the first Inuit-centred self-
governing bodies in any of Canada’s four Inuit regions, leading the way for future Inuit 
governments (Wilson, 2017).  
Interest in development did not stop after the James Bay hydroelectric project was 
complete. Natural resource exploitation remained a priority for the province, especially as a 
means to develop its Northern regions. In 2011, the Québec Government released Plan Nord, a 
25-year economic agenda that outlines significant investments in energy, mining, forestry, 
tourism, and conservation in the Northern regions of Québec16 (Fabbi et al., 2017). This agenda 
was developed without consultation with the Indigenous peoples whose traditional lands were 
being discussed, and to many it represented the same colonial approaches to development as the 
James Bay Hydroelectric project. Plan Nord did present some benefits to Northern residents, like 
infrastructure improvements and jobs (Scales, 2017), but the positive impacts did not extend far 
beyond economic opportunities and neglected any planning for social and communities 
development (Fabbi et al., 2017). It also strictly defines sustainability as protecting 50% of the 
territory’s environment while leaving out any acknowledgement of the social and cultural 
dimensions of sustainability (Rodon & Schott, 2014). In response to these clear shortcomings, 
Inuit across Nunavik organized to communicate their dissatisfaction and produce a report in 
response. This report titled Plan Nunavik, later called Parnasimautik17, centred Inuit visions for 
the future that brought to light the important aspects of Inuit life and health that the original Plan 
Nord neglected (Fabbi et al., 2017). Parnasimautik did not outright reject Plan Nord, but instead 
asserted the need for careful planning to address the boom-bust cycles inherent in resource 
 
16 Plan Nord covers more land than just Nunavik. It extends from the 49th parallel to cover 72% of Québec’s surface 
area (Rodon, 2017). 
17 This Inuktitut word translates to “what you need to be prepared” in English. 
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economics, and to ensure that benefits need to address well-being instead of simply providing 
job opportunities (Rodon, 2014). Importantly, the report stresses the importance of supporting 
industries that are not reliant on non-renewable resources and reaffirms the desire and needs for 
greater autonomy to govern in Nunavik (Makivik Corporation, 2014b; Rodon, 2014). 
Parnasimautik was presented to the Plan Nord Ministerial Committee and in 2014 a new 
version of Plan Nord was announced. It included promises to be respectful of Inuit communities, 
but many Nunavik residents remain sceptical (Fabbi et al., 2017; Scales, 2017). Currently, 
government investment remains focused on mining infrastructure (Rodon, 2014). However, like 
the Raglan Agreement and the JBNQA before it, Parnasimautik demonstrates the ongoing Inuit 
political action to protect themselves against Qallunaat development priorities. The swift 
organization and unity that led to the Parnasimautik built on the lessons learned from many 
decades of Northern resource development. Parnasimautik also made it clear to the provincial 
government that Nunavimmiut want (and, many would argue, need) greater self-government to 
prevent the continued imposition of southern priorities onto Northern communities.  
1.3.3. Mining History of Nunavik 
In addition to the James Bay project, there was a growing interest by private companies 
in metal and mineral extraction in the region. Mining and politics have always been deeply 
connected in Nunavik, with each new project affecting future policies, attitudes, and 
development decisions. Nunavik has been the site of three major mining operations, although a 
large number of exploration activities also occur throughout Nunavik. These three mines are: 
Asbestos Hill (1972-1984, owned by Société Asbestos Limitée), Raglan Mine (1997-present, 
owned by Glencore), and Nunavik Nickel (2012-present, owned by Canadian Royalties). 
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Asbestos Hill began operations before the modern political landscape of Nunavik existed, 
most notably the land regime and regional authorities established by the JBNQA and the Mining 
Act, which requires companies to produce closure plans and provide financial guarantees for 
remediation.18 The company was not required to consult with nearby communities or ensure 
those communities saw benefits (such as preferential hiring, profit sharing, etc.) from the mine 
other than the wages earned by employees during the mines operations. Weak regulations also 
allowed the company to transport asbestos with minimal covering (Carney, 2016), and as a result 
the mine site, Deception Bay (where the company’s ships docked) and the area in between 
became contaminated with asbestos fibres (Carney, 2016; Poirier & Brooke, 2000). Asbestos 
contamination did not reach the communities themselves, but Inuit working for the mine were 
exposed to asbestos. Few policies existed for closure and remediation in the 1980s when the 
mine shut down (Dance, 2015). A 1992 report on the status of Asbestos Hill found that materials 
were left behind and began to weather and the asbestos contamination was extensive (Roche, 
1992). No post-closure monitoring occurred, and tailings, waste rock piles, and an ore dump 
remained on the abandoned site with minimal remediation (Carney, 2016).  
Shortly after the closure of Asbestos Hill, a new company entered the region, 
Falconbridge Ltd., and proposed a new nickel project approximately 20 km southeast of 
Asbestos Hill that would become Raglan Mine.19 Before its development, Falconbridge agreed to 
do some remediation work on Asbestos Hill, and in exchange the provincial government sold 
them infrastructure and equipment from the site (Carney, 2016). This remediation work 
 
18 Although originally adopted in 1987, the Mining act would not require closure plans or financial guarantees until 
it was amended in 1995. In 2013 it was further refined to require closure plans before the mining lease is given and 
financial securities that cover 100% of estimated remediation costs (Amos, Audoin, & Lapointe, 2009; Amyot, 
Paradis, & Gagnon, 2013). 
19 Falconbridge was the original owner of Raglan Mine. Xstrata acquired Falconbridge in 2006, and then in 2013 
merged with Glencore, who are now the parent company of Raglan Mine.  
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continued for seven years but was never completed. Inuit from Salluit and Kangiqsujuaq 
continue to have concerns about contamination and leaching from the site, and its impact on 
local wildlife and water systems (Carney, 2016). Some also feel that Falconbridge took money 
from the government for a project that was never finished (Lanari, Smith, & Okituk, 1999). 
Today, minimal additional clean-up has occurred and the tailings pile that was left appears to be 
eroding (Interview #6). In 2019, the provincial government finally took responsibility and added 
Asbestos Hill to its list of abandoned mines targeted for remediation. 
Asbestos Hill quickly became the example of what Nunavimmiut do not want to happen 
with future mine sites in Nunavik. In the 1990s, when Falconbridge was moving forward with 
the planning and development of Raglan Mine, community members had a greater understanding 
of what they should require from mine companies as well as experience in organizing to resist 
and influence development projects in Nunavik. The company, too, understood that Inuit had a 
negative perception of the industry because of Asbestos Hill. While Raglan Mine would be 
developed on Category III lands and therefore did not legally require Inuit consultation or 
compensation, the company was incentivized to work with Inuit communities and regional 
authorities to build strong, positive relationships so the Raglan Mine project could move ahead 
unimpeded (Dufresne, 1996). As a result, Falconbridge went through an extensive consultation 
process with Salluit, Kangiqsujuaq, and Makivik to come to a mutually beneficial agreement that 
would facilitate development and see benefits and protections for Inuit (Roy-Grégoire, 2013). 
The consultations leading up to the IBA were in addition to the consultation requirements for an 
ESIA. The result was the first IBA between a mine company and Indigenous community in 
Canada, named the Raglan Agreement and signed in 1995 between the company, the 
Landholding Corporations and Northern Villages of Salluit and Kangiqsujuaq, and Makivik. The 
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agreement included protections for sacred sites (identified by Makivik and KRG), employment 
and training opportunities and preferential hiring, Inuit-focused human resource strategies, 
literacy programs for communities, and requirements for the company to exceed Québec’s 
minimal environmental regulations (Bird & Nixon, 2004; Séguin & Larivière, 2011). 
Additionally, 4.5% of the mine’s profits go to the Salluit, Kangiqsujuaq, and Makivik (Rodon, 
2018).  
Like the JBNQA, the Raglan Agreement further contributed to Nunavimmiut self-
governance. The IBA created formal structures for Inuit to participate in decision-making for the 
mine. The Raglan Committee, for example, has members from the company and both community 
signatories who meet multiple times each year to discuss operations and collaboratively address 
challenges (Bird & Nixon, 2004). Equally important, though, was the precedent that was set by 
the Raglan Agreement. Canadian Royalties20 began planning for the development of the Nunavik 
Nickel mine in the early 2000s and, like Raglan Mine, had no legal requirements to consult with 
Nunavimmiut because the site would be located on Category III lands. The company followed 
the same path as Raglan Mine, however, and signed an IBA with Makivik and the Landholding 
Corporations of Salluit, Kangiqsujuaq, and Puvirnituq. The Nunavik Nickel Agreement also 
contains provisions for preferential hiring of Inuit, preferential contracting for local businesses, 
training programs, and profit sharing between the three communities and Makivik (Séguin & 
Larivière, 2011). The agreement was signed in 2008 and in 2012 Nunavik Nickel began 
operations.  
 




1.4. Methods and Ethics in Northern Research 
Academic research, and especially the field of Geography, is rooted in European 
imperialism and has been used intentionally as a tool for settler colonialism and the 
dispossession of land from Indigenous peoples. As Castleden et al. (2012) explain, “British 
common law designated much of the Canadian landscape as terra nullius, or empty lands, 
creating the necessary legal conditions for Indigenous communities to be forcefully excluded and 
marginalized from their traditional territories” (p. 161). Map-making confined Indigenous 
peoples and delegitimized their claims to traditional lands, health research used Indigenous 
peoples as subjects of experiment without their consent, and social science represented 
Indigenous cultures as being primitive, less than human, and relegated to the past (Brealey, 1995; 
Castleden et al., 2012; Coombes, Johnson, & Howitt, 2014). Academic research has also been 
conceptualized within a Western research paradigm that values claims of objectivity, separates 
humans from nature, and positions the researcher as the knowledge holder and Indigenous 
peoples as passive subjects of research (Battiste, 2014; Emilie Cameron, 2012; Koster, Baccar, & 
Lemelin, 2012). Research methods often reflect colonial systems and institutions that are 
oppressive to the Indigenous communities that many geographers wish to do research with/for/on 
(Coombes et al., 2014). In Northern Canada, small communities have long struggled with the 
burden of frequently hosting southern researchers, who consume limited resources and often 
come and go with minimal or no consultation with the community and without producing useful 
outcomes for them (Barker, 2017; Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, 2018; Moffitt, Chetwynd, & Todd, 
2015). Substantial social and economic inequities exist between Inuit and the research 
community, and countless researchers have built their careers off Indigenous subjects while 
producing few positive outcomes for communities that improve their material conditions 
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(Brunet, Hickey, & Humphries, 2016; Castleden et al., 2012; Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, 2018). 
Research that does not critically reflect on these failures risks reproducing them and thus 
reproducing colonial relations and power structures. 
As a non-Indigenous, southern Canadian I have spent most of my life with no social or 
cultural connections to northern Canada. As a youth growing up and attending grade school in a 
southern, predominantly white community I learned little about the histories and unique 
experiences of northern Indigenous peoples. I am an outsider to the North. I have lived most of 
my life in southern British Columbia where I developed an interest in learning about the issues 
facing Indigenous peoples through my undergraduate studies, but my ability to truly understand 
these issues has and will always be limited by my own background. Additionally, I am a 
researcher working within a system that has historically harmed many Indigenous peoples 
through unethical experimentation and misrepresentation. In reflecting on her own work in the 
North, Zoe Todd succinctly captures the feelings that I have as outsider and researcher, 
explaining that “[the North] is not my home, and I was not raised in its laws, lands, and stories. I 
am, and always will be, a visitor to Northern places, and I must be aware of the reciprocal duties 
I hold to Northern nations, laws, and governance” (Moffitt et al., 2015). It is my responsibility to 
carry the knowledge and implications of my own positionality and the shortcomings of the 
academy with me as I conduct research, and constantly reflect on the power that I wield as a 
researcher and mitigate potential harms as much as possible.  
While the purpose of this research was not to access information about IK or culture from 
Inuit communities, it does centre issues faced by Inuit and involved a partnership with Nunavik 
Inuit. The design of this research incorporates Indigenous and community-based participatory 
research (CBPR) methods. This kind of research works to shift power from the researcher to the 
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community and has emerged as a means of mitigating harm and producing research and 
relationships that are respectful, appropriate, and reciprocal. This shift from researcher-as-expert 
to community partnership and ownership has occurred largely due to the efforts of Indigenous 
peoples to regain control over their land, knowledge, cultures, and histories (Brunet et al., 2016). 
Wilson (2008) describes Indigenous research methodologies as being relational (within and 
between humans and non-humans) and emphasizes the need for research to be accountable to 
relationships above other metrics commonly used in academic work. Wilson explains, “right or 
wrong; validity; statistically significant; worthy or unworthy: value judgements lose their 
meaning. What is more important and meaningful is fulfilling a role and obligations in the 
research relationship” (p. 77). Bull describes the importance of developing authentic 
relationships, which requires researchers to actively reflect on the power that researchers wield 
and employ methods that return that power to Indigenous communities to promote community 
ownership, access, and control of information (Bull, 2010). In Fletcher et al.’s discussion of 
authentic relationships in research, they stress reciprocity as a key component of ethical research 
with communities (Fletcher, Hibbert, Hammer, & Labouceur, 2016). Specifically, they describe 
reciprocal capacity building, which involves co-learning and benefits for both researcher and 
community (Fletcher et al., 2016). 
Community based research aims to develop questions, priorities, methods, and outcomes 
with communities to produce mutual benefits; often this involves early engagement and 
answering questions that the community already has as opposed to questions that come from 
academic literature (Brunet et al., 2016; Castleden et al., 2012; Saxinger & First Nation of Na-
Cho Nyäk Dun, 2018; Tondu et al., 2014). The goals of community-based methodologies are to 
engage in reciprocal research, develop culturally appropriate methods, and honour the process of 
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doing research as much as the products that research may lead to (Shiu-Thornton, 2003). Here, 
research is judged more so on how communities are engaged with, their ability to influence the 
research process, and the contributions that research makes to community capacity building and 
social/political change, and less so on immediate research outputs and publications (Coombes et 
al., 2014; Pain & Francis, 2003). Just as I will argue throughout this thesis that Inuit must be 
involved in the process of planning for mine closure, it is also critical to give over control of the 
research planning process to the communities most impacted by my research to ensure they get 
value from it. 
1.4.1. The Raglan Mine Closure Plan Sub-committee 
This research emerged from an existing relationship between the Raglan closure sub-
committee, the Towards Environmentally Responsible Resource Extraction Network (TERRE-
NET, which facilitates mine remediation research and funded this work), and my supervisor (Dr. 
Arn Keeling) who is a member of both TERRE-NET and the closure sub-committee. One of the 
sub-committee’s goals established at their first meeting in 2018 is to increase members’ expertise 
in mine closure and remediation, and I was invited to attend these meetings as a guest and 
student to contribute to this goal through my research activities.  
I attended closure sub-committee meetings from December 2018-July 2020,21 where my 
role as a researcher was to develop and execute a research plan in consultation with sub-
committee members that would address questions they had about mine closure. My primary 
objective was to ensure that my research was not simply done for the sake of filling academic 
gaps or observing novel closure planning strategies, but that my work benefited the closure sub-
 
21 These are usually two to three day in-person meetings in Montreal, Québec City, or at the Raglan Mine site. 




committee, the communities of Salluit and Kangiqsujuaq, and the region of Nunavik in practical, 
demonstrable ways.  
In October 2018, I was introduced to some of the closure sub-committee members via 
conference call, during which we discussed possible research directions. In December 2018, I 
attended a closure sub-committee meeting and was formally introduced to all members. We 
again discussed possible research directions, and the input received was used to develop a 
research proposal that was then presented at the following meeting in February 2019, which 
received approval from the sub-committee. 
The initial discussion in 2018 focused on community workshops as a main method for my 
research, but it was explained to me by Inuit representatives that the communities were not ready 
to host more researchers. While all members were supportive of more research being done to 
facilitate their work, they explained that they host many researchers each year and it becomes a 
burden for these small communities. They cited limited housing resources, research fatigue, and 
the unequal benefits for Inuit who assist in research as reasons for being hesitant to welcome 
more researchers into their community. Based on this feedback, it was agreed that my work 
should occur outside of the communities and focus on the larger-scale government and industry 
practices instead of requesting participation and knowledge from community members.  
This shift in focus to industry and government inquiry allowed me to support a broader 
effort to build local capacity around mine remediation, rather than drawing on community 
resources. Investigating industry practices would provide insight into what other companies 
operating in the North are doing to address community engagement and the inclusion of socio-
economic factors in mine closure. This was of particular importance to sub-committee members, 
as the lack of imagination and engagement in closure planning has come up several times across 
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multiple meetings. The current closure plan for Raglan Mine is primarily an engineering 
document, and so it was sometimes difficult for sub-committee members to envision what this 
closure plan could look like with community input. Questions such as ‘where would community 
knowledge go’ and ‘what community knowledge is relevant to mine closure’ were raised several 
times with no clear answer given. Across Northern jurisdictions and between individual 
companies there are different requirements, agreements, practices, and philosophies for 
involving communities in closure planning. By collecting other mine closure plans it is possible 
to provide the sub-committee with a sense of what other engagement practices exist, and how 
other companies and communities have answered these kinds of questions. Regardless of 
whether the examples are objectively good or bad, they contribute to a greater understanding of 
what is possible.  
Once this new research approach was approved by the sub-committee, I moved forward 
with the data collection phase of the research and continued to attend closure sub-committee 
meetings. My attendance at subsequent meetings (December 2019, February 2020, and July 
2020, plus additional conference calls in between) was an opportunity to engage in ongoing 
conversation with the Inuit parties of the sub-committee to make sure that my work continued 
moving in a direction that suited their needs. I received guidance and could adjust my activities 
when necessary. We also discussed the best methods for communicating my results, both to the 
sub-committee and the communities. To further contribute to the sub-committee, I also provided 
some administrative assistance. I served as note taker during meetings, compiled meeting 
minutes, kept their file storage system up to date, and kept track of actions that needed 
completing. As part of a MITACS Accelerate internship, I completed additional report writing 
for the closure sub-committee from November 2019-January 2020.  
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While the ethics that underpin this research come from Indigenous and community-based 
research methodologies, the work I did does not look like standard community-based research. It 
did not take place within communities or with an Indigenous organization;22 rather, it only 
involved residents of Nunavik who are members of the sub-committee, and there was minimal 
travel to the North. The design of this work reflected an act of refusal by the Inuit parties of the 
closure sub-committee based on the knowledge they have about their own communities. Tuck 
and Yang (2014) describe refusal not as simply saying no, but shifting to questions or ideas that 
have not yet been acknowledged. It is an act of agency that takes the focus and pressure off of 
individuals who are marginalized, oppressed, or lacking power (Tuck & Yang, 2014; Zahara, 
2016). Involving communities in every stage of research can be labour intensive, and there may 
not be room to shift human capacity and resources into a research project, in which case the best 
thing to do may be for the researcher to step away from the community and the ideals promoted 
by institutional research ethics boards (Desbiens, 2010; Koster et al., 2012).  
In addition, research that sought interviews from residents of Salluit and Kangiqsujuaq 
with regard to their values and priorities for mine closure had previously been conducted in 2018 
by another TERRE-NET student working with the closure sub-committee. Instead of returning to 
the communities to do additional interviews and workshops with residents, it made more sense to 
address the remaining need for information about closure governance and industry practices. 
Ethical and appropriate research, in this case, manifested as community oversight and approval, 
but not direct involvement or participation in data collection. Instead, I chose to ‘study up’ and 
focus my attention on systems, structures, and power relations (Becker & Aiello, 2013; Zahara, 
 
22 While the closure sub-committee has Inuit representatives, it is not an Inuit organization. It is a private partnership 
between Salluit, Kangiqsujuaq, Makivik, and Raglan Mine.  
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2016), and collect data from the plethora of information that exists in grey literature and with 
experts who do not necessarily live in the communities. Through such a strategy, research needs 
can be met by engaging with those in power and critical knowledge can be gained from a 
distance. 
1.4.2. Research Methods 
This research used qualitative methods, including participant observation, document 
analysis, and semi-structured interviews. Document analysis involved the comparison of ten 
closure plans from mines operating in Northern Canada. During closure sub-committee 
meetings, members expressed on multiple occasions that they have difficulty imagining how 
community knowledge could be incorporated into a closure plan, or if a closure plan is the right 
place for community knowledge and less technical, scientific topics at all. Practices and 
knowledge about community engagement in closure planning vary widely between companies 
and locations, and consultants hired for developing closure plans typically specialize in 
engineering and physical mine remediation, not community engagement and IK. Therefore, it 
was agreed during the February 2019 sub-committee meeting that it would be helpful to compare 
mine closure plans from multiple sites to learn from their successes, challenges, and 
shortcomings. Those lessons can then inform the ongoing review and development of Raglan 
Mine’s next closure plan. Additionally, semi-structured interviews with government and industry 
actors in Nunavik and an examination of policy documents was agreed upon to contribute to the 
sub-committee’s knowledge about the systems and regulations governing mine closure in 
Nunavik. The results are meant to contribute to the expertise of the closure sub-committee and 
assist in the closure planning process for Raglan Mine. Greater detail about these methods is 
provided in chapters three and four.   
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Participant observation supplemented my knowledge about the mining environment in 
Nunavik. This aspect of my research methods contributed to my own understanding of the 
relationships and attitudes relating to the mining industry in Nunavik. Participant observation 
allows a researcher to be directly involved in the activities of a particular group of people and 
provides valuable insight into how those activities are executed and why they occur, especially in 
cases (like the unique work of the sub-committee) where the task being observed is not well-
known and typically not observed by outsiders (Guest, Namey, & Mitchell, 2017; Jorgensen, 
1989). Actively participating in the activities of a group produces tacit knowledge, a type of 
knowing that is difficult to communicate verbally or in writing and is therefore challenging to 
access through other research methods like formal interviews or surveys (DeWalt & DeWalt, 
2010). This tacit knowledge about a group can act as data in its own right but can also inform 
other research activities and ensure the accuracy and effectiveness of other methods being used 
and questions being asked. It allows for a more nuanced and contextual understanding of how 
mine closure and remediation practices happen on the ground.  
In addition to the closure sub-committee meetings (December 2018, February 2019, 
December 2019, and July 2020) I attended the Nunavik Mining Workshop in April/May 2019.23 
The Nunavik Mining Workshop is an annual event held in Kuujjuaq that gathers local and 
regional authorities, community members, and representatives from mining and mine exploration 
companies active in the region. This event is meant to bring different parties together to discuss 
activities in the region, focusing on industry actors giving updates about their current and 
anticipated future projects. Employees from provincial and federal governments and university 
 
23 I had originally planned to attend this workshop again in 2020 to present my research findings, meet with 
participants again, and validate results. Unfortunately, due to the widespread shutdowns associated with COVID-19, 
the 2020 Nunavik Mining Workshop was cancelled. Results will still be provided to research participants and 
relevant authorities, but another method will be chosen that does not require in-person contact.  
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researchers may also present information on relevant projects. I attended as a researcher and 
presented my research proposal. I also used this event and my two-week stay in Kuujjuaq to 
meet industry and government representatives, learn about the mining context in Nunavik, and 
recruit interview participants. Some of my time was dedicated to conducting formal interviews, 
but much of the time was spent having informal conversations with people working in Nunavik 
who shared valuable information about the nuances of governance in the region. I did not record 
any of these events other than with hand-written notes, and quotations by any attendees or 
presenters are not included in this thesis. Names of most closure sub-committee members and 
Nunavik Mining Workshop presenters and attendees are publicly available, but they are not 
included in this thesis.  
1.5. Thesis Overview 
This research examines how mine closure is being planned for across Northern Canada 
and in Nunavik, Québec, focusing on the socio-economic aspects of closure and how Indigenous 
communities are being included in this process. The remainder of the thesis is separated into four 
chapters. In Chapter Two, I present a critical literature review and context for my research. I 
discuss the varied impacts that small and remote communities have experienced when a nearby 
mine closes, including those related to environmental change, social disruption, and economic 
decline. I then discuss the unique ways that Indigenous peoples in Northern Canada have 
experienced mine closure, which can negatively impact traditional land-based economies, social 
organization, and cultural reproduction. As will be discussed in Chapter Two, understandings of 
closure and remediation differ between scientists, companies, governments, and communities, 
but not all understandings and knowledge are given the same weight. Scientists and engineers are 
sought out for their expertise, while TK is tokenized, and community input is confined to 
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describing the natural environment. Because of the varied perspectives on closure and unequal 
power relations, community engagement and direct involvement in closure planning is critical. 
While few examples of community engaged closure planning exist, this chapter will discuss 
community engagement with Indigenous peoples broadly, why it is so important, the challenges 
that exist, and the benefits it can lead to if done well. Community engagement can ensure that a 
wider scope of issues is addressed in closure planning, but only if practitioners can overcome 
those challenges. 
Chapter Three uses a detailed document analysis of mine closure plans to examine 
closure planning strategies for mines operating in Northern Canada. More specifically, this 
chapter details the overlapping and diverging contents of ten closure plans from across the North, 
describing how each mine site is engaging with nearby Indigenous communities, incorporating 
their knowledge and concerns into the closure plan, and accounting for the socio-economic 
impacts of mine closure. Overall, these closure plans do not effectively describe how they are 
currently or have in the past engaged with communities, and it is unclear how engagement has 
led to practical changes in the closure plan. Socio-economic impacts are largely absent from 
these documents, despite the purpose of a closure plan being to explain how the company will 
mitigate risks to humans and the environment. Where socio-economic impacts are discussed, 
they may not be related to closure and remediation, or are deemed not significant, thus requiring 
no mitigation. There are differences between territorial and provincial closure plans, which are in 
part explained by differences in closure regulations between jurisdictions. However, even within 
the same territory there are substantial differences between closure plans from different 




In Chapter Four, I focus my analysis on Nunavik, using interviews with government 
employees and mine executives, and an examination of provincial and regional policy and 
guidance documents. This chapter explains how mine closure is governed in Nunavik, what 
knowledge influences closure governance and decision making, and what gaps exist that may 
limit the scope of issues being addressed and how effectively and consistently Inuit are able to 
participate in closure planning. I argue that provincial regulations do not adequately account for 
the socio-economic aspects of closure and are not explicit enough in their requirements for 
community engaged closure planning. Regional-level authorities have little influence over mine 
closure, which tends to be limited to front-end processes, like IBA negotiations and ESIAs. Few 
mechanisms exist to ensure the same level of regional and local government involvement later in 
a mine’s life. Interview participants expressed confidence in the KEQC’s role in impact 
assessments and closure plan reviews, as well as in newer regulations like financial security 
requirements. Furthermore, they explained past failures, like Asbestos Hill, as being the result of 
regulatory failures that have since been corrected. However, the closure plans for the two 
operating mines in Nunavik do little to engage with Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit24 (IQ) or address 
socio-economic impacts, and closure policies and guidelines focus almost exclusively on 
physical remediation at the neglect of social, economic, and cultural aspects of closure. The 
Raglan closure sub-committee has a strong potential to fill many of the gaps left by government, 
but other companies are not being held to these same standards.  
Finally, Chapter Five summarizes and connects the findings of this research to 
demonstrate that, despite the growing recognition of important socio-economic impacts of mine 
closure and the existence of international and national guidelines for social and community 
 
24 Inuit traditional knowledge, institutions, and technology 
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engaged mine closure, planning practices and governance still have many gaps that must be 
filled to produce better outcomes for Northern communities. Across the North, community 
engagement strategies are vague, and the socio-economic aspects of closure often go 
unacknowledged in closure plans and government regulations. Good examples of closure 
planning practices do exist: companies operating in the Northwest Territories appear to be 
putting effort in to engage community knowledge in closure planning, and the Raglan closure 
sub-committee has created a direct and consistent avenue for communities to be involved in the 
closure of Raglan Mine. While these strategies can influence other companies’ practices, the 
absence of clear and detailed guidelines from regulatory authorities means that it is left to private 
interests to decide whether or not, and to what degree, they wish to be good corporate citizens. 
For mine closure to be successful in a Northern context and to meet Inuit needs and visions of 
their future, it must incorporate Inuit knowledge and emerge from Inuit values and priorities. In 
Nunavik and in the North more broadly it does not appear that industry or government are 
guaranteeing this inclusion, despite all the claims made by both public and private actors on how 
closure planning has been improved.   
1.6. Co-authorship Statement 
 Chapter Three is co-authored by Dr. Arn Keeling and myself (Miranda Monosky) and 
was accepted for publication in the Journal of Environmental Management in August 2020. The 
research design was co-designed by both authors, and I was responsible for data collection and 
analysis with guidance from Dr. Keeling. I wrote the drafts of this chapter and Dr. Keeling 
provided revisions and approved the final manuscript for publication. The thesis version differs 
from the publication in some minor ways: the introduction and literature review was removed 
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from the thesis version to avoid repetition from other chapters, and the results and discussion 







To fully understand mine closure and remediation in northern Canada, the social, 
economic and cultural impacts to northern and Indigenous residents must be considered and put 
into a larger historical context that accounts for the ways that settler colonialism and 
environmental injustice has shaped, and continues to shape, northern environments and 
relationships. This literature review will do this by explaining the many definitions and 
perspectives on mine closure, paying particular attention to northern and Indigenous experiences 
and the nuanced and ever-evolving relationships between Indigenous peoples, government, and 
the mine industry. It will also identify gaps in this literature to highlight how this research 
contributes to mine closure scholarship. 
I will begin by tracing a synopsis of the ways in which mining and settler colonialism are 
inseparable in Canada. I will then provide an overview of the many possible environmental, 
social, and economic impacts of mine closure, as well as the particular impacts experienced by 
Indigenous peoples in Canada. Many Indigenous communities have collectively engaged with 
the mining industry to both resist (to protect their lands and peoples) and utilize (to benefit and 
improve their quality of life) new mining projects. A clear understanding of the myriad human 
impacts felt by mine closure is essential for framing the results discussed in Chapter Three, 
which explores whether or not and how the industry is accounting for these kinds of issues. 
Lastly, I will explore the kinds of relationships that exist between communities and industry, and 
the negotiations and formal agreements that come from these relationships. I account for the 
different challenges and opportunities that exist for community-engaged mine closure planning, 
and how mine closure planning could unfold in the future with the right resources and support 
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for northern and Indigenous communities. This latter section will provide the background 
necessary for Chapter Four, which explores how different levels of government in Nunavik, 
Québec are facilitating the involvement of Inuit communities in mine closure planning. 
2.2. Mining and Settler Colonialism 
In Canada, mineral extraction and settler colonialism are inextricably linked, with the 
former being a tool to facilitate the removal of Indigenous peoples from their land and assimilate 
Indigenous peoples into modern, western society. As discussed in the Chapter One, mining was 
also an important means of generating wealth for Canada’s settler population. As a result, mining 
largely fueled the government’s motivation to settle Indigenous land claims in order to remove 
uncertainty about land and resource use and attract development. Once the financial possibilities 
of northern mineral extraction became apparent, Canada quickly began negotiating Aboriginal 
rights and drafting land claims policies and agreements with northern Indigenous groups 
(Mitchell, 1996). In the press release formally announcing the signing of the Nunavut agreement 
explicitly states that the agreement will “enhance the climate in the territories for economic and 
political development by removing legal uncertainty on use and disposition of land and resource 
in the eastern NWT” (Mitchell, 1996, p. 360). The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, 
Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Project and later Mackenzie Gas Project in the NWT, and the 
Voisey’s Bay Mine in Labrador all facilitated the completion of land claims agreements with 
their respective Indigenous groups (Rodon, 2018). In doing so, the state aimed to establish clear 
rules and procedures for resource development in the North while simultaneously making 
northern Indigenous peoples into shareholders who had a stake in that development, as opposed 
to rightsholders with inherent rights to the land and its resources (Mitchell, 1996).  
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During this phase of land claim settlements, the federal government “focused on claims 
in which resource development was imminent” (Rodon, 2018, p. 122). They also dealt only with 
Indigenous groups that were deemed reasonable and who accepted the parameters of the 
Canadian Land Claims Policy (Rodon, 2018), therefore excluding those who were considered by 
the government to be too difficult to work with. Since 1973, Canada has settled 26 
comprehensive land claims agreements (Hodgkins, 2018). From Canada’s perspective, the goal 
of settling land claims has been to facilitate the separation of Indigenous peoples from their land, 
land-based economies, and relationships with their traditional territories (Mitchell, 1996). 
However, it is also important to note that many Indigenous groups see those land claims and the 
negotiations that lead to them as being a significant act of self-determination (Hodgkins, 2018). 
Settler colonial states depend on the dispossession of lands from Indigenous peoples to 
both make room for a new settler population and to exploit those lands to produce capital for that 
population (Tuck & Yang, 2012). In Canada, this often required forcibly relocating Indigenous 
peoples to marginal reserve lands, but has also taken shape as other traumatic forms of social, 
cultural, and spiritual colonization have sought to place Indigenous peoples in subjugated 
positions within society (Barker, 2009). This included: the widespread placement of Indigenous 
children into residential schools and foster homes; the systematic control of Indigenous peoples 
through educational and judicial systems; the transformation of traditional economies through 
the introduction of wage labour; and the resulting intergenerational separation between elders 
and youth that limits the transmission of culturally important knowledge (Ford, Smit, & Wandel, 
2006; Tuck & Yang, 2012). As Cameron (2011) eloquently explains, the Arctic has been 
“shaped by histories of imperialism and colonialism, by the racializations elaborated in Canadian 
settler societies, by historical and contemporary flows of capital and resources, by state and 
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missionary activities in the region, and by Inuit and other Indigenous political movements” (p. 
170).  
The plethora of abandoned pits, tailings impoundments, and contaminated soils and 
streams from mineral extraction is one of these socio-material manifestations of settler 
colonialism in Canada, materially embedded in the landscape.  As stated earlier, resource 
development was a tool explicitly used by the state to bring modern, Euro-centric development 
to the North to colonize and ‘develop’ the region (Boutet et al., 2015; Keeling & Sandlos, 2009; 
Loo, 2017; Rodon & Lévesque, 2015). It was a means by which the state could radically change 
the social and economic makeup of Indigenous societies to suit the needs of a foreign 
government (Keeling & Sandlos, 2016). In doing so, traditional lands were degraded, and 
Indigenous peoples were marginalized while creating a steady flow of valuable resources from 
the North to the south to benefit settlers.  
The dispossession, exploitation, and degradation of traditional lands continue to have 
pronounced social, cultural, and economic impacts on Indigenous peoples who maintain 
important human-environment relationships and engage in land-based subsistence activities.  
Sandlos and Keeling (2016d) explain that, while both settlers and Indigenous peoples experience 
risk associated with post-mining pollution, Indigenous peoples experience additional risk due to 
the integral role that land and water plays in their subsistence economies. The environmental 
footprint of mining and the landscape changes and contamination that so often come with it can 
undermine and marginalize the economic systems of affected communities. In addition to 
contributing to community economies, the natural environment plays important social and 
cultural roles in many Indigenous communities. For Inuit specifically, the land, all of its human 
and non-human inhabitants, and the traditional activities that occur there are critical components 
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of culture, identity, and social organization (Richmond, 2009; Scott, 2001; Todd, 2014; Willox et 
al., 2012). To degrade Inuit territory via resource extraction is to degrade important place-based 
connections that form the basis of Inuit identity. Thus, not only is the physical landscape 
changed in this context, but social and cultural landscapes are also altered in dramatic ways, 
representing larger issues of injustice, dispossession, and settler colonialism (Bainton & 
Holcombe, 2018; Cohen, 2017; Keeling & Sandlos, 2009).  
2.3. Mine Closure and Remediation: Environment, Society, and Dispossession 
While there has been considerable scholarly focus on the impacts of mineral development 
on Indigenous lands and communities, researchers have devoted less attention to mine closure, 
remediation, and post-mining legacies. Mine closure refers to the phase of a mine’s lifecycle that 
occurs after mine operations have ceased and the site is no longer viable, and all of the actions 
necessary for decommissioning that site (International Council on Mining & Metals, 2019a). 
Within mine closure is remediation, or the environmental clean-up and mitigation of negative 
impacts or potential harm – rehabilitation and reclamation are also used in North America in 
varying contexts, although these latter two tend to imply the return to some predetermined value 
or pre-mining state (Beckett & Keeling, 2019; International Council on Mining & Metals, 
2019a). Mine closure and remediation include all the methods for physically cleaning up a site 
(removing infrastructure, filling pits, containing, and stabilizing waste), the planning required 
before closure occurs, post-closure monitoring, and progressive reclamation.25  
 
25 Progressive reclamation or progressive closure refers to the closure and remediation activities that occur while a 
mine is still operational. Mine sites typically have multiple pits and underground tunnels that may be depleted at 
different time, and thus one pit may be decommissioned while the overall mine site remains operational. Progressive 
reclamation is usually required by government and is recommended by international best practice guidelines to 
ensure final closure is efficient and complete (International Council on Mining & Metals, 2019b). 
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Historically, mine closure was an afterthought for the industry and governments. While 
the development of a mine elicits excitement for communities and governments looking forward 
to new economic possibilities, the closure of a mine is not met with the same enthusiasm; as 
Laurence (2006) states, “reputations are rarely built by closing a mine” (p. 285). Mine closure 
was typically limited to placing barriers over pit openings, fencing off areas of potential concern, 
containing waste, and removing surface infrastructure and equipment, and companies were 
minimally penalized for not complying to these lax regulations (Mackasey, 2000). The volatility 
of mineral markets, natural boom-bust cycles of the industry, and unexpected adverse political 
and environmental conditions routinely cause closure to happen abruptly and sometimes result in 
the wholesale abandonment of a site by bankrupt companies (Laurence, 2006; Sandlos & 
Keeling, 2016a). The result has been a plethora of abandoned and poorly remediated mine sites 
across the country that eventually become the responsibility of federal, provincial, and territorial 
governments (Mackasey, 2000).  
Generally, mine closure and remediation are governed by provincial and territorial 
governments, although Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (CIRNAC) 
has developed many of the territorial resources Acts (Castrilli, 2005). Prior to 2003 (YK) and 
2014 (NWT), the federal government was responsible for this in the territorial North, although 
with the trend towards territorial devolution, Yukon, NWT, and Nunavut have become 
increasingly responsible for the management of their natural resources (Dance, 2015). In the last 
couple of decades provincial and territorial governments have developed more robust regulatory 
regimes with stricter environmental protections to ensure safe and stable post-closure landscapes. 
It is now widely understood that in order to avoid the creation of new hazardous abandoned mine 
sites, proponents need to begin planning for closure at the design phase of a mine’s life 
46 
 
(Tremblay & Hogan, 2016), and mine closure is accepted as being as important as construction 
and operations in the sustainability of individual site, the mine industry, and impacted 
communities/regions (Laurence, 2006). Provincial governments, like the governments of many 
other countries, now also require the early development and regular update of mine closure 
plans, as well as financial assurances to be used if the company becomes unable to meet its 
responsibilities (Cowan, Mackasey, & Robertson, 2010; Hart & Hoogeveen, 2012; Kabir et al., 
2015). The specific year when each province began implementing these policies varies, but 
Québec, for example, began requiring that mine companies pay financial securities for 
remediation in 1995. Since the 2000s Canadian and international best practice guidelines for 
closure have also been developed that emphasize the importance of beginning mine closure and 
community engagement early in the mines life and anticipating sudden and unplanned closure 
(International Council on Mining & Metals, 2019b; Mining Association of Canada, 2008), 
although how effectively the industry follows these recommendations is questionable. 
The industry has also dramatically improved its ability to effectively remediate post-
mining landscapes, although the scope of issues being addressed is still often too limited. While 
the importance of mine closure and remediation with regard to environmental quality and 
sustainability have been acknowledged, what is less widely recognized and acted upon is the 
wide ranging, complex, and interconnected impacts mine closure can have on social, economic, 
and cultural landscapes (Bainton & Holcombe, 2018). Stacey et al. (2010) describe the socio-
economic aspects of mine closure as being a subject that “is complex and high risk, requires 
engagement over years, delivers few quick-wins, and requires cooperation and understanding 
between internally and externally heterogeneous groups of people” (p. 4). They also explain, 
though, that it is under-researched and underestimated by the industry.  
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Mine closure is not a discrete event or a process with a clear start and end date. From an 
industry perspective, mine closure is complete when the government allows a company to 
relinquish the site and walk away without any remaining legal obligations. Typically, this occurs 
after several years of post-closure environmental monitoring to ensure that the remediated site is 
safe and stable. But from a critical academic perspective, and the perspective of many 
communities impacted by mineral development, a mine site is never truly closed. In Bainton and 
Holcombe’s (2018) words, “while the end of production typically represents a significant 
moment in the life of a project, mine closure encompasses more than the decommissioning of the 
processing plant, or the physical rehabilitation of the mine site” (p. 469). Mine waste will remain 
on site perpetually and landscape changes will likely never be completely restored to their pre-
mining conditions (Bridge, 2004; Hudson-Edwards et al., 2011; Kossoff et al., 2014; 
Lottermoser, 2007). Across Canada there is a general lack of regulations for dealing with the 
long-term care that is so often required for decades or even centuries after a mine closes (Dance, 
2015). The presence of a former mine will continue to impact not only the environment, but also 
people in ways that will last long after the company has left the region (Burns & Church, 2018). 
Additionally, past mine sites can remain economically and scientifically valuable to companies, 
governments, and researchers, and the memories of mine sites often shape perceptions of future 
(re)developments and land uses (Cater & Keeling, 2013; LeClerc & Keeling, 2015; Midgley, 
2015). The United Keno Hill Mine in Yukon, for example, operated between 1913 and 1989 
before mineral prices dropped, at which point the site was abandoned and remediation was left to 
the government (Fox, 2019). In 2006 Alexco Resource Corporation took over the mineral rights 
and, as part of an arrangement with the Yukon government, was made responsible for a portion 
of the previous site’s care and maintenance and eventually remediation (Alexco Resource Corp, 
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2020; Fox, 2019). Even defunct sites can remain economically valuable enough for companies to 
take on responsibility for the remediation of another company’s site.  
2.3.1. Environmental Aspects of Mine Closure 
Mineral development causes substantial environmental changes that are challenging and 
sometimes impossible to reverse or stabilize. Mining requires the movement of incredible 
amounts of earth – more than any natural earthmoving process – and in doing so modifies local 
drainage systems, topography, and vegetation (Bridge, 2004). Mines also require massive 
amounts of energy and infrastructure to operate. Hydroelectric dams and natural gas 
infrastructure are common developments that occur alongside mines, increasing the overall 
footprint of the site and competition between the mine and other land uses (Bebbington, 
Hinojosa, Bebbington, Burneo, & Warnaars, 2008). Old buildings, mining equipment, ore 
processing facilities, and unmaintained roads may be left behind and impact the ability of fish 
and animals to move through their natural environments, which can in turn have negative 
impacts on the local population’s ability to hunt and trap (Keeling & Sandlos, 2017). Closed and 
abandoned mines may also be sites of soil loss, changed groundwater regimes and vegetation, 
and landscape subsidence (United Nations Environmental Programme, 2001). 
Mining generates an incredible amount of waste that can cause chemical pollution and is 
particularly hazardous and challenging to manage. Mining activities remove materials from 
underground environments which, when exposed to surficial conditions, can breakdown, oxidize, 
and release elements that the receiving environment may not be able to absorb or process (Franks 
et al., 2011). The accumulation of these contaminants can pose serious risks to terrestrial and 
aquatic ecosystems and the humans who depend on them (Hudson-Edwards et al., 2011; Kossoff 
et al., 2014). Metal mining produces especially hazardous wastes due to the ore’s geochemistry, 
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chemicals used for extraction and processing, and the exceptionally large quantities of unused 
waste materials left behind (Bridge, 2004). There is typically no market for the less valuable, 
rejected materials, which on average accounts for >98% of mined materials (Ripley et al., 1996). 
Mine waste can generate both surface and sub-surface contamination on the site itself, as 
well as secondary areas of contamination caused by the flow of water and air through the site and 
into other environments (Emili, Pizarchik, & Mahan, 2016). Waste rock, the earth material 
extracted from the ground to access valuable ore, is often either stored on the surface in dump 
sites or put back into open pits and tunnels to reduce the footprint of the mine site (Franks et al., 
2011; Hudson-Edwards et al., 2011). This waste rock is susceptible to erosion and can release 
hazardous materials into the environment (Franks et al., 2011). Tailings, the waste created 
through ore processing, can contain xanthate and cyanide, or other processed chemicals 
(Hudson-Edwards et al., 2011; Kossoff et al., 2014). Liquid tailings are stored in man-made 
dams or dried and left on the surface. Tailings impoundments have high failure rates and release 
pollutants such as arsenic, cadmium, copper lead, and zinc into the environment, while 
dewatered “dry stack” piles are susceptible to oxidization and erosion like waste rock (Bridge, 
2004; Davies, 2002; Franks et al., 2011; Kossoff et al., 2014; Mining Minerals and Sustainable 
Development, 2002). Toxic acid mine drainage and reagents used for processing are found in 
waterways all over the world, including headwaters used for rural and urban water supplies and 
desert areas where water is brough in from elsewhere for mine operations (Bebbington et al., 
2008; Mackasey, 2000). 
The remediation of mine sites is also complex, time consuming, and expensive. 
Contamination can reach areas far beyond the mine site, and dealing with mine waste often 
requires permanent infrastructure that is among some of the largest industrial structures ever 
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built (e.g. tailings impoundments that can cover thousands of hectares; Emili et al., 2016; Mining 
Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD), 2002). Often all that can be done for sites of 
contamination is monitoring and management to reduce damage as much as possible. Reversing 
or completely eliminating the problem is often impossible and post-mining landscapes will never 
return to their true pre-mining state (Lottermoser, 2007). Furthermore, remediation itself can 
cause new problems for mine sites. As Sandlos and Keeling (2013) point out, toxic materials 
found in contaminated soil must go somewhere, and moving those materials can create new risks 
when they are unearthed, transported, and disposed of at a new waste site. They refer to these 
kinds of sites as zombie mines due to their ability to “exert some sort of malevolent effect during 
their afterlife” (para. 4). Wherever toxic soils are stored, management and monitoring will 
always be necessary. Thus, a mine’s life does not simply end at closure, but continues to require 
perpetual attention and care, the cost (environmental, societal, and financial) of which is passed 
on to future generations. 
2.3.1.1. Limitations in Financing and Monitoring Remediation  
Necessary post-closure care is often inadequate due to limitations in monitoring practices 
and financial resources. Mine closure planning notably does not account for perpetual care, only 
the activities that satisfy relinquishment requirements. Beyond relinquishment, any work 
remaining on site must be dealt with by the government and, by extension, Canadian taxpayers. 
Nor does post-closure monitoring account for cumulative impacts, which can extend beyond the 
site of remediation and outside of the geographical limits of what the company is required to 
clean up (Kuyek, 2011). Raffensperger et al. (2011) argues that short-term planning is a by-
product of our willingness to forget past failures. They explain that “society has accepted the 
practice of opening the earth, putting waste into it, then closing it … We bury, forget, and move 
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on” (p. 2). Local and Indigenous communities are also often excluded from contributing to 
monitoring practices and criteria, which limits the scope of what is being monitored, where, and 
for how long (McKay & Johnson, 2017). Non-industry programs to address abandoned and 
contaminated sites struggle to maintain adequate funding from year to year, and cutbacks in 
regulatory enforcement have created challenges for enforcing monitoring requirements imposed 
by government (CCSG Associates & MiningWatch Canada, 2001; Kuyek, 2011) 
Mining companies are currently required to provide financial securities to respective 
territorial or provincial governments to ensure remediation will be paid for in cases where the 
company is not able to fulfil its responsibilities at the end of the mine’s life. These securities can 
be a cheque, letter of credit, surety, bonds, investment certificates, term deposits, third-party 
generates to name only some of the acceptable forms  (CCSG Associates & MiningWatch 
Canada, 2001). These securities, though, rarely cover the full costs of remediation. Most 
obviously, they do not cover the costs of perpetual care. They are “weakly enforced, incorrectly 
calculated, and inconsistently collected” and governments are increasingly willing to accept 
delayed payments (Dance, 2015, p. 60). Many companies have never and will never pay their 
securities, or what is paid accounts for only a miniscule percentage of final remediation costs. 
The federal government plans to spend $2.2 billion on just eight abandoned mine sites in Yukon 
and NWT (CBC News, 2019). The remediation of Giant Mine in the NWT could cost up to a 
billion dollars on its own (CBC News, 2013, 2018) and the Faro Mine (a Yukon mine abandoned 
in 1998 after Anvil Range Mining Corp. went into receivership) has so far cost the government 
$500 million (Tobin, 2019). These remediation projects were originally estimated to cost $50-
400 million and $200 million, respectively (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2002). The 
amount collected through financial securities for these sites come nowhere close to covering 
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these costs. For Faro, $14 million was collected from the mine operator, less than 3% of the costs 
of remediation so far (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2002). For Giant, $400 million 
was collected from two companies (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2002). While this 
would have covered the original estimate of $50-400 million, the actual cost of remediation has 
ballooned well beyond that, demonstrating how difficult it is to estimate and regulate 
remediation costs.   
2.3.2. Socio-economic Impacts of Mine Closure 
Alongside efforts to calculate and quantify the pollution left behind by mine operations 
and the scope and scale of ecosystem degradation, humanities and social sciences researchers 
work to understand the human implications of mineral activities. Increasingly, emphasis is put on 
the need for mine-adjacent communities to plan for post-closure economic sustainability in 
addition to the need for physical environmental reclamation (Mining Minerals and Sustainable 
Development, 2002). Furthermore, chemical contamination, physical pollution, and landscape 
change cannot be separated from the humans that are harmed as a result, nor can it be separated 
from the systems and structures in place that have allowed this harm to happen.  
The negative social, economic, and cultural impacts of mine closure are complex and 
differ between communities and mine sites. Impacts of closure are unique from the impacts of 
mineral exploration, development, and operations (Burns & Church, 2018). A community’s 
experience with mine closure depends on how dependent they are on the industry – access to 
different sources of employment, investment, and resources outside of mining affect a 
community’s ability to bounce back after mine closure (Bainton & Holcombe, 2018). The 
number of mining jobs relative to community size, the community’s social and economic 
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characteristics, and internal cohesion are also all factors that influence how a community might 
experience closure (Roberts et al., 2000).  
2.3.2.1. Inequalities in Economic Benefits 
While often cited as the main benefit to mineral development in a region, higher incomes, 
investment, and access to opportunities are unequal and have their own human costs. This money 
can exacerbate existing problems within communities and families, such as intensifying drug and 
alcohol consumption, gambling, and mental health issues (Gibson & Klinck, 2005; Horowitz et 
al., 2018). Furthermore, an inflow of wages into small communities often leads to greater 
inequality, as these wages are not distributed evenly across all residents (Buell, 2006). Education 
and training opportunities are also inconsistently available between companies, sites, and 
employees. Mine employees who were not fortunate enough to work for a company that 
provided training and educational opportunities to employees (or were unable to access them due 
to any number of social, cultural, and economic reasons) may be ill prepared to transition into 
different kinds of work after closure (Edwards & Maritz, 2019). A return to pre-mining 
economic and social structures can be similarly difficult in cases where a mine has altered or 
degraded the environment in ways that limit land-based activities and access to country foods 
(Buell, 2006). Finally, residents of small communities with high rates of mine employment who 
are unable to find work at the mine for whatever reason may experience feelings of 
marginalization or a sense of not belonging, which can have negative impacts to their mental 
health (Buell, 2006; Neil, Tykkyläinen, & Bradbury, 1992; Pini, Mayes, & McDonald, 2010; 
Skeard, 2015; Wilson, 2004). 
To name only one dimension of this inequality, who benefits from mineral development 
is gendered. Women face barriers to taking advantage of employment opportunities brought by 
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mines, such as a lack of childcare options and harassment-free workplaces,26 which limits their 
access to both income and the training and education offered by many mines (Lapalme, 2003). 
This, then, limits their ability to build on those experiences after mine closure in the way that 
many men employed by mines can, which would have otherwise empowered women to make a 
living after mine closure (Lapalme, 2003). Women are also more likely to make career sacrifices 
when their husbands are laid off due to the pressures of maintaining harmony in the home 
(Roberts et al., 2000). It is possible that mine closure could benefit women and families as it 
frees workers from intense work schedules and provides opportunities for more equitable 
childcare, but it is similarly likely that the stress of job loss and already overcrowded housing 
conditions common in the North could result in increased family violence (McDonald, Mayes, & 
Pini, 2012; Rixen & Blangy, 2016).  
2.3.2.2. Economic Losses and Community Disruption 
The economic gains that come with mineral development in a region quickly disappear 
when the mine closes. Although mining can bring increased wages, development, and an overall 
higher quality of life to remote regions that otherwise struggle to maintain a stable economy, the 
benefits of mine development are rarely long-term. Furthermore, those benefits often do not live 
up to what is promised by the industry. Rodon & Lévesque (2015) detail these impacts, both 
positive and negative, in an Arctic context on the communities of Resolute Bay (near Polaris 
Mine), Arctic Bay (near Nanisivik Mine), and Salluit and Kangiqsujuaq (both near Raglan Mine 
and Nunavik Nickel). These communities benefited from the increased wages, development of 
new community facilities, and decreased social assistance spending that resulted from mineral 
 
26 For mines that have on-site housing for their employees, women suffer high rates of harassment and abuse 
(Czyzewski et al., 2014; Sponagle, 2018; Women’s Earth Alliance & Native Youth Sexual Health Network, 2016) 
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development in their respective regions. However, mining also brought (and left behind) 
contamination, disruptions to traditional economies, high employee turnover, and negative 
cultural and family impacts in Resolute Bay and Arctic Bay.27 The positive experiences are also 
short lived, disappearing after closure. Bowes-Lyon et al. (2009) additionally explain that 
Resolute Bay and Arctic Bay, to differing levels, gained access to education and training 
opportunities, but these disappeared once the mine closed and the training provided did not lead 
to any formal certification that could be transferred to other jobs or industries. Similarly, 
Indigenous peoples in NWT, especially those in Fort Resolution, experienced some employment 
benefits from the Pine Point mine but were also limited in their ability to continue trapping, and 
after the mine closed in 1988 they were left with abandoned pits, mine waste, and infrastructure 
(Sandlos & Keeling, 2012). 
Sudden and community-wide unemployment from mine closure affect both individuals 
and the larger community. The loss of employment can lead to mental health issues, which can in 
turn contribute to substance use disorders and family disruptions/violence (Roberts et al., 2000). 
Increased unemployment is often followed by similar increases in rates of suicides, homicides, 
and stress-related illnesses in communities (Warhurst et al., 2000, as cited in Roberts et al., 
2000). Communities may also experience sudden population decline as former employees move 
elsewhere for work. When the Rankin Inlet mine (NU) closed in 1963 many Rankin Inlet 
residents had a difficult time adjusting, and over ten years 25 families moved to Manitoba to 
work at the Lynn Lake mine (Rodon & Lévesque, 2015). For small communities, a loss of 25 
families can be significant. Population decline can abruptly alter community dynamic, cause 
 
27 The mines operating near Salluit and Kangiqsujuaq have not yet closed, and so the long-term negative impacts of 
closure are unknown. The mines operating near Arctic Bay and Resolute Bay both closed in 2002. 
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family disruptions, and leave remaining residents with limited social networks and resources 
(Burns & Church, 2018; Edwards & Maritz, 2019). In Kendall’s (1992) account of the 
experience of community members living in the Pine Point townsite, which was shut down and 
demolished after the mine closed, the relocation and separation of friends and family was a 
significant factor in the bitter feelings and memories that many former residents have. Similarly, 
in Archer and Bradbury’s (1992) documentation of the “winding down” of Schefferville, a 
mining camp that existed for 30 years in the Québec-Labrador Trough before the mine closed, 
they explain that it “was no longer a simple mining camp and stakes were no longer so easily 
pulled up … the severance package could not address the problems associated with pending 
social dislocation and the break-up of communities ties” (p. 186-187).  
The loss of profit-sharing, tax revenues, and investment can have far reaching impacts 
locally and regionally, meaning the economic losses from mine closure impact more than just 
former employees. Contemporary mine development in the North frequently occurs alongside 
the signing of an IBA between the company and impacted communities. These IBAs may 
include profit-sharing agreements, which means all residents of a community receive some sort 
of regular payment from the company regardless of their employment status at the mine (which 
would end with closure). Any locally or regionally sourced contracts will end, local businesses 
experience decreases in revenue as families have a more difficult time affording groceries and 
household items, and tourism can take a sharp decline (Bowes-Lyon et al., 2009; Edwards & 
Maritz, 2019). To return to the example of Resolute Bay, after the closure of Polaris the 
community experienced increases in flights costs, which affected the cost of shipped items 
(including groceries) and the affordability of tourism (Bowes-Lyon et al., 2009). As a result, 
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tourism has steadily declined and the airport gift shop has suffered a dramatic decrease in sales 
since 2002 (Bowes-Lyon et al., 2009).  
Governments may be unable to fill the financial gaps left behind by mine closure. In 
communities where economic resources are limited, important services may be dependent on the 
funds, human capacity, and/or investment provided by the mine. When the mine closes and the 
company leaves the region, those services may no longer be able to operate (Lapalme, 2003). 
This can include integral emergency and health services (Burns & Church, 2018; Laurence, 
2006). Local governments may also have difficulties taking over responsibility for infrastructure 
previously provided and maintained by a mine company (Edwards & Maritz, 2019; Laurence, 
2006). In some cases, all infrastructure (roads, airstrips, buildings, docks, etc.) are completely 
removed from the site and shipped elsewhere for disposal, reuse, or resale. An increasingly 
common trend, though, is for companies to transfer ownership of key pieces of infrastructure to 
nearby communities. However, without thorough planning and communication this can lead to 
new problems. Communities may not have the skills, money, or human capacity to maintain 
them, in which case the infrastructure can become a liability (Laurencont, Garrood, Vidler, & 
Fawcett, 2019). To return again to the example of Schefferville, the mine camp-turned-town saw 
a dramatic increase in population in the mid-20th century due to mineral development and was 
known as ‘Canada’s richest city’ (Archer & Bradbury, 1992). When the mine company pulled 
out of its municipal obligations in the 1970s and 80s as global mineral prices dropped, the town 
struggled to stay afloat. The town saw massive population decline, a disintegration of economic 
and social conditions, disinvestment, and reduced financial support for public services (Bradbury 
& St‐Martin, 1983). By 1986, municipal services amounted to as much as $18000/citizen/year 
(Archer & Bradbury, 1992). 
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2.3.3. Northern and Indigenous Encounters with Mining 
The impacts of mine closure become more complex when we consider them through the 
lens of settler colonialism and the dispossession of Indigenous lands. The development and 
operations of a mine can bring social and economic change to Indigenous communities with the 
introduction of a relatively large number of short-term wage labour jobs. This can decrease the 
number of people participating in the land-cased economies based on hunting, fishing, trapping, 
and gathering (Hall, 2013). Hall (2013) argues that northern mine employment removes people 
from their communities, allows for less time teaching the younger generation about the land-
based activities that serve as a means of cultural reproduction, and contributes to the loss of 
Indigenous languages. Buell (2006) additionally explains that these traditional activities can act 
as a source of individual and community pride and wellbeing, and so less time on the land and 
fewer younger people learning about those activities (and therefore important aspects of their 
culture) can negatively impact communities in both the short- and long-term. After the mine 
closes, it can be difficult for community members to transition back to the traditional economy 
for a variety of reasons, including fewer individuals having the necessary skills, decreased 
accessibility of land and water systems, and changing migratory patters of animals due to 
contamination or landscape alterations (Buell, 2006; Horowitz et al., 2018). This does not often 
result in a wholesale abandonment of traditional economies, but instead the emergence of mixed 
land- and wage-based economies (Angell & Parkins, 2011; Boutet, 2014; Boutet et al., 2015; 
Gibson & Klinck, 2005). Nonetheless, negative effects are still felt and environmental, 
economic, and cultural landscapes altered.  
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2.3.3.1. Perpetual Care and the Legacy of Giant Mine, NWT 
The abandonment of Giant Mine in the NWT demonstrates the legacy effects of mine 
abandonment, short-sighted remediation, and the myriad ways that a mine site can continue to 
impact the environment and Indigenous communities both during and long after operations. 
Giant Mine was a gold mine that operated from 1948 to 1999 on the western shore of Great 
Slave Lake. During the mine’s life arsenic trioxide, a non-threshold carcinogen and a by-product 
of gold extraction, was emitted into the environment and contained within the mine’s tailings 
(Sandlos & Keeling, 2016c). There is no safe exposure level for this substance. The company 
eventually attempted to reduce emissions and capture the arsenic being released into the air, 
which was directed into 13 underground chambers. A total of 237,000 tonnes of arsenic trioxide 
was contained in these chambers roughly the size of seven ten-storey buildings, the equivalent of 
300 football fields of contaminated mine tailings were left on the surface, and the underground 
mine water and surface soil are all contaminated with arsenic (Environment and Climate Change 
Canada, 2018; O’Reilly, 2015). The chambers containing arsenic trioxide will remain 
underground at the site indefinitely, and the site itself is now classified as a Federal 
Contaminated Site to be remediated using public funds. 
The development of Giant Mine led to changed settlement patterns, increased in-
migration of southerners, and undermined the local land-based economy via increased 
community participation in wage labour. The extensive contamination of the physical 
environment then worked alongside these socio-economic changes to marginalize the 
Yellowknives Dene community (Sandlos & Keeling, 2016c). While all nearby residents were 
exposed to this contamination, the Yellowknives Dene First Nation (YKDFN) experienced a 
disproportionate level of risk due to the contamination of snow and water used for drinking, and 
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ultimately they lost access to their local water supply and relied on water being shipped in 
(O’Reilly, 2015; Sandlos & Keeling, 2016b). Areas previously used for traditional land-based 
activities were closed off or were degraded to the point of not being useful for hunting, 
gathering, or fishing (Sandlos & Keeling, 2016c). In addition to the physical affects of being 
exposed to harmful contaminants and a decreased ability to access traditional country foods, 
YKDFN members felt “profound feelings of alienation from a landscape that had, in effect, been 
colonized as a pollution sink for southern economic interests” (Sandlos & Keeling, 2016c, p. 8).  
Because of the perpetual nature of many types of environmental contamination and the 
long-term impacts on communities, these mine legacies have the additional problem of being 
“not only acute and immediate, but chronic and intergenerational” (Sandlos & Keeling, 2016c, p. 
16). Future generations may experience the limited accessibility of traditional lands and 
resources left by the site, and therefore a decreased land-based livelihood potential (Hoadley & 
Limpitlaw, 2008). As the ability of community members to subsist off of the natural environment 
is reduced, the necessity of wage labour and mine employment increases. These future 
generations will not have received any benefits from past mine operations that could otherwise 
help offset the impacts of a decreased access to land-based livelihoods (Mining Minerals and 
Sustainable Development, 2002).  
2.3.3.2. Strategic Engagement with Mining 
Throughout the history of Canadian mineral extraction, Indigenous peoples have actively 
engaged with the industry to further their own agendas. Looking only at the ways in which 
mining and mine closure can negatively impact communities would paint an incomplete picture. 
Indigenous peoples are not helpless victims of mine development; many have benefitted greatly 
from the incomes and opportunities provided by mines. Traditional economies and wage labour 
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are not always antithetical – the latter is often used to subsidized the former in the North (Boutet 
et al., 2015). Indigenous communities, cultures, and ways of living are always evolving, they are 
not static. Mining can contribute to the self-sufficiency of individuals and communities and there 
is a desire among many to do so (Buell, 2006). Even the remaining pits and piles left from mine 
activity are not universally disliked. On the contrary, these features can be highly symbolic and 
represent better, more prosperous times (Bridge, 2004; Cater & Keeling, 2013). Critical analyses 
of northern mining that does not engage with these greater complexities and the nuances of 
company-community relationships risks inaccurately confining Indigenous peoples to a 
homogenous group (Boutet, 2014). 
Some benefits and spin-off developments from mineral development can have long-
lasting positive impacts for communities. Although a short-term benefit overall, the wages from 
mine employment can result in a greater ability for households to purchase hunting, fishing, and 
trapping equipment that can continue to be used after the mine closes (Bowes-Lyon et al., 2009). 
The donation of infrastructure, buildings, materials, and equipment from mines after they close 
can also be used to meet community needs (Bowes-Lyon et al., 2009). In the mid 20th century, 
the Innu of subarctic Québec used mine employment to supplement their subsistence economic 
systems. Boutet (2014) explains that their early experiences with mining, particularly the 
Schefferville iron mine, was not as simple as either resistance or participation. Mineral 
development in the region led to the opening of a railway that made the Innu’s annual movement 
to and from hunting grounds more efficient, affordable, and safer as it allowed people to bring 
more supplies. The wages from being employed at the mine was also used to buy hunting 
equipment and provisions. While wage labour did take time away from traditional hunting 
activities, it also made those activities more accessible in other ways.  
62 
 
The development and closure of the Pine Point mine in the NWT similarly brought 
dramatic changes to the First Nations and Métis communities nearby but was also engaged with 
by those communities to extract benefits during and after operations. During the mine’s 
development, cutlines were bulldozed through the forest, land users were displaced, and 
highways were constructed that disrupted local hydrology (LeClerc & Keeling, 2015). However, 
similar to the Innu of Québec, wages from mine employment contributed to hunting and trapping 
activities, and some applied the experienced gained at Pine Point to other jobs after closure 
(Sandlos, 2015). Importantly, the abandoned site is used today for hunting and trapping, and the 
extensive cutlines now allow land users to access the forest more easily. As LeClerc and Keeling 
(2015) explain, “the very cutlines that forced the initial displacement of land users from the 
region are being (re)claimed to benefit contemporary land use” (p. 12).  Some areas remain 
inaccessible because of the mine, and water quality remains a concern for residents. However, 
there are mixed memories and nostalgia tied to Pine Point and the environmental changes it 
brought – there was economic and environmental disruptions, but the mine was also a great place 
to work for many (Sandlos, 2015). 
These examples of positive and strategic interactions with mining are not meant to 
downplay the very real and often underestimated impacts of mining and mine closure. They do 
not negate the fact that mine closure can abruptly leave communities without adequate resources 
and support, and that environmental degradation can have long-lasting, intergenerational 
impacts. However, it is important to understand that the situation is complex and that 
participating in the mining industry can empower communities and contribute to their 
sustainability if planned for carefully and with community needs, priorities, and values in mind 
(Burns & Church, 2018). To ignore the more complex individual experiences of Indigenous 
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peoples across northern Canada would be a disservice to those who have strategically used the 
industry to improve the lives of their families and communities (Sandlos, 2015). 
2.3.3.3. Indigenous Resistance and Activism 
Indigenous peoples across Canada have also displayed powerful acts of agency and an 
incredible ability to organize and respond quickly to resource developments that threaten their 
traditional lands and communities. Despite the seemingly impossible hurdles associated with 
resisting and controlling multi-billion dollar mine companies and powerful governments, 
Indigenous peoples have continued to actively seek justice and equity (Barker, 2015; Niezen, 
2000; Rodon, 2018). Put another way, “despite centuries of concerted and evolving efforts, the 
settler colonial project has never succeeded” (Barker, 2015, p. 44). Not only have Indigenous 
organizations worked to influence decision making within their respective regions or 
communities, they have also made room for themselves on the national and international level to 
gain widespread support for their causes and exert pressure on government and private interests 
(Sandlos & Keeling, 2016b). In detailing some of the ways that communities have acted in 
response to resource development, Horowitz et al. (2018) explains that resistance can look like 
cohesive community organization, relationship-building and negotiating with private companies, 
strategically creating alliances with other communities and organizations, or a combination of 
these approaches. 
Examples of this activism can be found across the North. The YKDFN and other northern 
advocates have successfully worked to bring national attention to the many ways in which Giant 
Mine has caused significant and long lasting harm despite the government’s efforts to downplay 
and ignore it (Sandlos & Keeling, 2016b). In Québec, Inuit and Cree were faced with widespread 
destruction of traditional lands and spiritual places via government-sponsored hydro 
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development in 1960s and 70s. They responded by quickly organizing and learning to participate 
and negotiate in a foreign, Euro-centric legal system and were able to settle the JBNQA and 
established regional government systems that created avenues for having their voices heard in 
future developments (Fabbi et al., 2017; Nungak, 2017; Rodon, 2014). In Nunavut, the 
possibility of uranium mining in Baker Lake led to the creation of Nunavut’s first environmental 
NGO, which has strategically used social media to promote transparency, amplify the voices of 
local activists, and show both support for and concern about uranium mining (Scobie & Rodgers, 
2013). What is important to understand is that Indigenous peoples are not simply victims of 
marginalization and dispossession. They are active participants and negotiators (whether they 
have been invited to the table or not) in ongoing struggles over land, culture, language, and 
resources (see Piper, 2009; Rodon, 2018; Sistili, Metatawabin, Iannucci, & Tsuji, 2006; Tester & 
Irniq, 2008). 
2.4. Differing and Conflicting Understandings of Remediation 
Despite the plethora of examples that demonstrate a wide range of complex impacts to 
people and their environments, mine closure planning continues to be limited in the scope of 
issues addressed. This is due to a favouring of technical, scientific, and industry knowledge that 
quantifies and categorizes all aspects of remediation as neatly as possible. Highly technical 
knowledge produced by industrial geochemists and engineers is sought out and prioritized while 
community expertise, Traditional Knowledge (TK) and Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit28 (IQ), and the 
social sciences of mining and mine closure are left out of the closure equation (Bainton & 
Holcombe, 2018; Beckett & Keeling, 2019; Roberts et al., 2000; Stacey et al., 2010). The socio-
economic impacts of mine closure are not well documented or communicated by industry and 
 
28 Inuit traditional knowledge, institutions, and technology 
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government, and as a result there are few policies related specifically to these aspects of closure 
and the industry often avoids or postpones planning for them until it is too late (Edwards & 
Maritz, 2019; Kabir et al., 2015). As will be seen in Chapter Three and Four, both industry (in 
their closure plans) and government (in their closure policies and guidelines) neglect to 
acknowledge or address virtually any of the socio-economic aspects of closure discussed in this 
chapter.  
This is not to say that the natural sciences are not valuable. On the contrary, they are 
essential for protecting communities from the harmful contamination and pollution that mines 
produce and too often leave behind, and the mine industry is wise to continuously search for the 
most cutting edge, well-informed remediation strategies. But containing waste, however 
important, does little to mitigate many of the social, cultural, and economic impacts that 
communities are left to cope with. Furthermore, the ways in which contamination and risk are 
measured are far from objective science. Indeed, no science is without flaws, biases, and 
limitations. Society is always interpreting, defining, and redefining nature, which we translate 
through science to produce particular meanings (Bridge & Bakker, 2006). Techno-scientific 
knowledge cannot be separated from broader systems of capitalism and colonialism, and the 
assumed truth and value of scientific knowledge should itself be the subject of interrogations 
(Haalboom, 2014; Liboiron, Tironi, & Calvillo, 2018).  
2.4.1. Limitations of Western Science 
The assumption that there is a safe level of exposure to most substances that underlies 
environmental quality testing does not account for the fact that those ‘safe levels’ are not equally 
applicable across all environments. Arctic ecosystems are sensitive to contaminants in ways that 
are not always accounted for in environmental testing procedures and quality standards. 
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Organisms adapted to the cold have different metabolisms than those found in more temperate 
regions of the world, which affects the levels of accumulated toxins they can handle before 
experiencing negative health impacts, as well as the rate at which detox and recovery occur 
(Poland, Riddle, & Zeeb, 2003). Despite the unique characteristics of Arctic environments, the 
majority of science on toxicity testing and the biological effects of contamination is done in 
temperate regions, and as a result little published information exists on the sensitivity of Arctic 
ecosystems (Poland et al., 2003). Furthermore, these tests often do not account for temporal 
differences or cumulative and synergistic effects (Lavoie, Morin, Laderriere, Paris, & Fortin, 
2019). The consequences of these limitations can result in harm to both animals and humans.  
The exclusion of Indigenous knowledges further contributes to the limitations of closure 
and remediation science by neglecting differing exposure pathways, more holistic 
understandings of life in the North, or the complexities of risk perception. Tsosie (2015) explains 
that it is scientists—not communities—that determine what is a safe level of contamination and 
what constitutes harm and risk through technical and scientific means. Furthermore, it is settler 
society that creates the legal frameworks responsible for addressing harm and contamination. 
Tsosie states that Indigenous spiritual and cultural experiences and ways of knowing are 
excluded from these processes. Many northern Indigenous peoples rely on food found in their 
environment (i.e. country food) for both physical and cultural health and well-being (Cassady, 
2007). Those that consume country foods experience a more direct link to environmental 
contamination, especially those who consume seal and other carnivorous animals that occupy 
higher levels of the food chain (Tyrrell, 2006). Northern Indigenous peoples must weigh the cost 
of potential exposure to contaminants with the health and cultural benefits of consuming country 
food, and the outcomes of this cost-benefit analysis is highly variable between communities 
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(Cassady, 2007; Poirier & Brooke, 2000; Tyrrell, 2006). Where contamination is present, 
solutions to protect human populations are not as simple as asking communities to stop 
consuming caribou or seal or using local water sources. Where local knowledge, claims of 
contamination, and understandings of risk conflict with those from the medical and scientific 
communities, the latter is most frequently favoured. (Shriver, Cable, & Kennedy, 2008). To 
return to the example of Giant Mine, health officials and regulators overlooked the hazards of 
arsenic poisoning because of the well-accepted belief that there is a safe level of arsenic 
accumulation in humans (Sandlos & Keeling, 2016c). Despite those beliefs, a YKDFN child died 
of acute exposure to arsenic via meltwater, and the community claims several more children and 
elders suffered the same fate (Sandlos & Keeling, 2016b). In this case, science and the 
government failed the community. 
More recently, there has been greater recognition of the complexities of northern food 
systems and contamination. The federal Northern Contaminants Program, responsible for 
responding to concerns about human exposure to contaminants in the North and providing 
dietary advise to northerners (Donaldson et al., 2013), now recognizes the nutritional, cultural, 
and spiritual importance of country foods for northern peoples (Donaldson et al., 2010; Stow et 
al., 2017). They also state that including Indigenous governments in the work conducted by this 
organization “will ensure the cultural context of issues will be considered before 
publication/dissemination of results” (Government of Canada, 2018, par. 21). It remains to be 
seen, though, how effectively the Northern Contaminants Program and other similar 
organizations and independent researchers are involving Indigenous peoples and applying 
Indigenous understandings of health. Furthermore, the Northern Contaminants Program does not 
necessarily lead to improved and more nuanced closure and remediation efforts.  
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2.4.2. Indigenous Knowledge in Environmental Management 
These divergent experiences and perceptions of mining impacts and toxicity necessitate 
the careful incorporation of IK and values into mine remediation planning. While not necessarily 
conflicting with, better than, or in opposition of Western scientific knowledge, Indigenous ways 
of knowing and living can differ from dominant knowledge systems in Canada and provide 
insight into the particular needs of communities (Berkes, 2012). These epistemologies and 
ontologies point to differing value systems between Indigenous peoples and the capitalist modes 
of production and western conceptualizations of the environment that underpin resource 
development in Canada.  
In many Indigenous cultures, the natural environment and all its human and non-human 
inhabitants are understood as relations and critical components of society, but to mining 
companies and the state the natural environment is a frontier to be explored and extracted from 
for capital gain (Scott, 2001). Similarly, western society and especially resource industries frame 
animals as disposable, while animals are core actors with equal societal positions to humans for 
many Indigenous peoples (Hoogeveen, 2016). For example, in describing environmental 
assessment in Canada and the ways in which aquatic life is valued differently between 
government and community, Hoogeveen (2016) refers to “fishhood” as “the intrinsic value of 
fish as living beings outside of the technical and scientific traits reposted on in environmental 
assessment hearings” (p. 357). Scientific categorization of non-human actors often fails to 
capture these kinds of relationships (Todd, 2014). This does not mean Indigenous knowledges, 
relationships, and ways of living are in conflict with science; on the contrary they can work 
together to produce more meaningful knowledge that contributes to better environmental 
management regimes (Todd, 2014). In the context of mine closure and remediation, there is 
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potential for Indigenous and western scientific knowledge to work in tandem to produce post-
closure outcomes that protect communities physically, socially, and spiritually.  
Unfortunately, the application of IK in the non-renewable resource sector remains 
limited. In cases where companies or consultants do attempt to engage with IK, it is often 
tokenized and relegated to an inferior position below technical, Western scientific knowledge. It 
is typically sought out to supplement existing scientific data about plants and animals or pre-
contact, historical details of Indigenous culture (Sandlos & Keeling, 2016a). The process for 
obtaining that knowledge is also problematic. Indigenous consultation occurs most often at the 
front-end of a development while little effort is put in to maintaining long-term conversation and 
power-sharing (Keeling, Sandlos, Boutet, & Longley, 2014).  
In their discussion of the consultation processes for oil sands development in northern 
Alberta, Baker and Westman (2018) explain that consultation processes between industry and 
communities are based on rapid assessments and utilize consultants that are not trained in social 
sciences or ethnographic research, resulting in reports that do not adequately engage with and 
represent “the incredibly nuanced relationship Indigenous peoples have with sentient landscapes, 
more-than-humans, and one another” (p. 151). Similarly, Sandlos and Keeling (2016a) explain 
that IK was used  in the Giant Mine remediation project for depoliticized ecological information 
and kept separate from anything deemed technical or scientific. They argue that, while the 
Yellowknives Dene First Nation put in considerable work to utilize community consultations in a 
way that would ensure their knowledge, perspectives, and critiques were integrated into the 
Giant Mine remediation plan, the engagement process worked to confine their traditional 
knowledge “to matters relating to local, historical, and non-industrial activities, and to biotic, 
rather than non-renewable resources” (p. 285). Chapter Three, which in part examines how 
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companies are incorporating IK into their closure plans, will contribute additional evidence to 
these observations. As this chapter will show, closure plans typically only superficially refer to 
IK in short sections dedicated to community engagement or landscape characteristics, and rarely 
apply community expertise to issues like mine waste management, water quality monitoring, and 
infrastructure reuse. 
Finally, the closure and remediation process fails to account for the historical and 
cumulative aspects of settler colonialism and mineral development in the North. Planning for and 
executing mine closure can bring feelings of injustice and distrust from past experiences with 
mine abandonment and environmental degradation to the forefront of community members’ 
minds (Sandlos & Keeling, 2013). Those feelings in turn influence contemporary interactions 
with the mine industry (Bridge, 2004; Cater & Keeling, 2013). While companies would prefer to 
limit the geographical and temporal scope of remediation for the sake of simplicity and cost 
efficiency, communities may instead want to expand these conversations to include some kind of 
accountability for the legacy impacts of past mines and the clean-up of contamination that 
extends beyond the boundaries of the mine site (Sandlos & Keeling, 2016a). Remediation, and 
reconciliation in Canada broadly, requires “the confrontation of colonial histories (and their 
ongoing legacies) through processes of truth-telling, apology, and compensation or redress” 
(Beckett & Keeling, 2019, p. 222). Remediation is about more than just the physical 
environment: it should also address the inequalities in power between communities and 
companies – inequalities that exist in many facets of life for marginalized peoples.  
2.5. Power, Decision-making, and Community Engagement 
Power and access to decision-making plays an important role in closure and remediation, 
as it decides whose perspectives are favoured in the planning process, where benefits flow, and 
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whether and how negative impacts are mitigated. Given the numerous and far-reaching impacts 
of mine closure, conflicting evaluations of those impacts, and histories of colonization and land 
dispossession, it is integral that Indigenous communities can participate in decision-making 
around the closure planning process. Ensuring that Indigenous peoples have a just and consistent 
level of power in resource management (and by extension closure planning) requires the 
management of complex relationships between communities, industry, and government (Cohen, 
2017; Fidler, 2010). In particular, government plays a vital role in regulating how and when 
companies engage with communities and producing guidelines based on best practices (Fidler, 
2010). Unfortunately, throughout much of the 20th century Indigenous peoples were mostly 
ignored in the development and implementation of resource plans and policies (Rodon, 2018). 
Only in the last 40 years have positive changes been made at the federal, provincial, and 
territorial levels to better engage with Indigenous communities and organizations and better 
protect people and the environment from inadequate remediation (Cowan et al., 2010; Hart & 
Hoogeveen, 2012). This has been in large part due to the power that Indigenous peoples have 
gained access to through activism that brings attention to land rights, treaty obligations, and the 
state’s duty to consult (Dance, 2015; Rodon, 2018). 
2.5.1. Positive Changes in Community Engagement 
An increasingly robust regulatory environment that requires mine companies to engage 
with communities early on in development is one of the positive changes in mine closure 
governance. Through the federal Impact Assessment Act, mine proponents today must clearly 
demonstrate how they are engaging with affected communities and how community feedback is 
translated into site designs and management plans (Alderson, Gilbride, Bundock, & Sanger, 
2019). The rights of Indigenous peoples and the consultation responsibilities of government and 
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resource industries have also been further clarified through recent case law (Isaac & Knox, 
2005). Mines operating on Indigenous territory must abide by the requirements of local land and 
water boards and land claims agreements (Dance, 2015). The devolution of federal responsibility 
over mines and metals in the North has also created space for new self-government 
arrangements, management boards, and committees to control mineral activities (Dance, 2015). 
With regard to closure and remediation specifically, territorial governments have begun 
developing their own closure policies and guidelines that centre the needs of Indigenous 
communities and require Indigenous consultation (for example, Government of Yukon, 2006; 
Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board, 2005; Mackenzie Valley Land and 
Water Board, 2013).  
The historical and ongoing work of grassroots activists and NGOs has additionally 
incentivized industry to engage with communities and build good relationships to obtain a social 
license to operate (SLO). A SLO refers to the acceptance given by communities that allows 
companies to move forward with a development project without receiving public pushback 
(Otto, 2009). This is not legally required or binding, but beneficial for a company’s reputation 
and generally makes development and operations run more smoothly. Obtaining and maintaining 
SLO requires the (at least perceived) mitigation of unacceptable risk, maximization of benefits, 
and transparent communication between company and community, and often involves company 
investment in community infrastructure, businesses development, and social programs (Veiga et 
al., 2001; Xavier, Veiga, & Zyl, 2015). IBAs have also emerged as a common method of meeting 
both community and company needs and filling gaps in government policies. They typically 
include requirements for training and education programs, rents and profit sharing agreements, 
procedures for sharing decision making and ensuring community autonomy, and preferential 
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hiring and contracts for local and Indigenous peoples and businesses (Fidler, 2010; Hodgkins, 
2018; O’Faircheallaigh, 2018). These IBAs and the benefits guaranteed to communities are 
meant to then encourage those communities to grant their social license for the project 
(Hodgkins, 2018).The result of these changes is an increased emphasis on good relationships and 
communication between a company and the people whose lives they are impacting. 
2.5.2. Benefits of Community Engagement 
Thoughtful, consistent community engagement that prioritizes the sharing of both 
knowledge and decision-making power is essential in good mine closure planning. Communities 
are their own experts in knowing what they need to be healthy and successful after the mine 
closes, and so for mine closure to meet the needs of a community they need to be able to 
contribute to closure and remediation planning (Fidler, 2010). Contributing to mine closure 
planning also gives the community the power to develop its own vision for the future – 
potentially one that does not rely solely on mining – instead of having a particular post-closure 
future imposed on it by short-sighted  and overly technical remediation planning (Edwards & 
Maritz, 2019). The International Council on Mining and Metals (2019b) states that communities 
should play an integral role in the development of goals, visions, success criteria, and post-
closure land uses. The ICMM best practices guide additionally stresses the importance of closure 
planning that involves and empowers affected communities, engages with a wide range of people 
within the communities, and begins early on in the mine’s life (International Council on Mining 
& Metals, 2019b). Xavier (2013) argues that mine closure planning should not be seen “as a 
deadline-driven problem that has to be solved” but instead “as a matter that has to be 
continuously attended to” (p. 26).  
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Community engaged mine closure creates opportunities to centre the needs, values, 
expertise, and concerns of the people who will inherit the land that is left behind, and opens up 
space for co-learning and the co-production of knowledge between the company and community. 
Companies can learn more about the culture, social dynamics, and vulnerabilities of a 
community, which can then be used to develop more informed closure strategies and success 
criteria that make sense for that particular community (Hoadley & Limpitlaw, 2008; 
International Council on Mining & Metals, 2019b). Conversely, communities can learn about the 
process of developing a mine closure plan and the kinds of considerations, possibilities, 
uncertainties, and limitations of closure and remediation, giving them realistic expectations as 
well as a greater ability to negotiate with industry (Veiga et al., 2001). Community engaged 
closure planning can also lead to greater innovation when concepts, designs, and management 
plans contain the perspectives and expertise of multiple parties (Edwards & Maritz, 2019). 
Through the sharing of power to decide how mine closure happens, what issues are prioritized, 
and whose knowledge matters, and what trade-offs are acceptable, communities can better 
maximize the benefits they experience and feel a greater sense of ownership of the plans and 
outcomes that are generated (Edwards & Maritz, 2019; Fidler, 2010).  
The need for social transition plans is also increasingly stressed in literature and 
international closure guidelines, as they can contribute to the long-term sustainability of a 
community. Many of the negative impacts of mine closure, particularly economic impacts, could 
be mitigated or minimized by proactive planning for the transition away from a mining-based 
economy after closure (Costa, 2015; International Council on Mining & Metals, 2019b). To be 
most effective, the company, responsible governments, and affected communities should be 
involved in this planning. Planning for this transition should begin early in the mine’s lifecycle 
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and executed throughout operations, like progressive reclamation (International Council on 
Mining & Metals, 2019b). Laurencont et al. (2019) stress that supporting socio-economic 
development, specifically development that will help the community and individual workers 
move away from mining in order to find work after closure, is integral for increasing a 
community’s resilience.  
In addition to protecting the environment and communities from short- and long-term 
harm, the incredible amounts of wealth produced by mines must be invested into those 
communities to ensure they experience long-lasting benefits, a promise the industry so often 
makes and fails to live up to. Veiga et al. (2001) argues that mine companies should not only 
plan to attain a “zero-sum equation” (p. 201) with short-term trade-offs and risk management, 
but that communities should be able to “realize a net benefit from the introduction of mining that 
lasts through the closure of the mine and beyond” (p. 192). Xavier’s (2013) Socio-economic 
Mine Closure Framework (Table 2.1) proposes ten key elements, broken into 25 sub-elements, 
for planning for socio-economic mine closure that centre leadership, commitment, developing 
and sharing knowledge, and capacity building as being crucial for effective closure planning and 
social transitioning. 
Table 2.1: Socio-economic mine closure framework (the 10 Ps framework)1 
Elements Sub-Elements Elements Sub-Elements 
1. Policy Corporate Commitment 2. Presence Presence in the Field 
Governance Stakeholder Analysis 
3. Participation Mobilization 4. Planning Asset Mapping 
Education/Capacity Building Socio-Economic Impact 
Assessment 
Empowerment Envisioning 
Community Engagement Project Design 
Partnerships Performance Indicators 
5. Performance Implementation Resources 






7. Perseverance Overcoming Resistance and 
Inertia 
8. Patience Allowing Time for Effective 
Change 
Reinforcing Quality of 
Participation 
9. Passion Individual Passion/Motivation 10. Personality Trust, Respect and Empathy 
1Table redrawn from and originally produced by Xavier (2013). 
To achieve these outcomes, though, community engagement must be carefully planned, 
executed early in the mine’s development, and continue until relinquishment to ensure social 
transition and closure plans are appropriate and effective (International Council on Mining & 
Metals, 2019b). In reality, closure planning and community engagement often fall short of these 
best practices. Company investment in community sustainability are routinely limited to short-
sighted infrastructure projects and overly specialized skills training instead of well-rounded 
education programs (Xavier et al., 2015). Ultimately, without meaningful and long-term 
consultation and a dedication to building strong relationships, mine closure planning risks 
repeating past mistakes and harmful legacies. Chapter Four contributes new knowledge to these 
issues by examining closure planning and community engagement governance in Nunavik. The 
results of Chapter Four will show that both regional and provincial governments could be doing 
much more to regulate community engagement in closure planning, and in the absence of 
regulations the companies operating in Nunavik have substantially differing community 
engagement strategies. In Chapter Five, recommendations will be made for how governments 
across the North can more effectively govern community engagement in mine closure to avoid 
the repetition of past shortcomings and failings.  
2.5.3. Challenges in Community Engagement 
Best practices for community engaged mine closure planning are not applied by all mine 
companies, and the regulatory framework in Canada is certainly not without flaws. Despite 
improvements in the legal requirements for both government authorities and companies to 
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engage with communities, that engagement is often limited, superficial, and based on southern 
value systems, expectations, and the belief that nature is a commodity to be exploited (Dokis, 
2015). While most jurisdictions in Canada have guidelines and policies in place to ensure that 
mine companies are engaging with relevant Indigenous groups and adequately protecting the 
environment, these policies are inconsistent across the North and enforcement depends on 
political willingness and financial and human capacity, all of which are in short supply (Bainton 
& Holcombe, 2018; Dance et. al, in press) and there are few examples of successful community 
engaged socio-economic mine closure (Costa, 2015) There appears also to be a separation 
between past remediation regimes, which left the many disastrous abandoned mine sites that 
exist across the North today, and the contemporary remediation regime that embraces the critical 
role of closure and remediation without acknowledging the problems that still exist today (Dance 
et al., in press). This mental separating of old and new mining will be confirmed in Chapter Four, 
and the challenges caused by this belief will also be discussed. Furthermore, not all mine 
companies are equal. Different companies are operating with differing time scales and amounts 
of capital, and smaller companies likely to be operating for only a short time are less likely to 
invest in long-term community engagement and corporate social responsibility strategies 
(Bebbington et al., 2008; Otto, 2009). The inconsistencies and gaps in closure regulations allow 
for these inconsistencies in industry practice (Morrison-Saunders, 2019). In Chapter Four we will 
see how ill-defined and non-existent regulations have allowed the mines operating in Nunavik to 
have different community engagement strategies that vary substantially in quality and 
effectiveness. 
The strategies used by mine companies to meet their engagement responsibilities 
routinely fail to account for community dynamics, attitudes, and inequalities. Communities who 
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have had poor experiences with the mining industry in the past may be more hesitant to 
participate in company engagement activities (Hoadley & Limpitlaw, 2008; Veiga et al., 2001). 
Poor engagement strategies in turn risk reinforcing mistrust and an unwillingness to engage with 
the industry (Sandlos & Keeling, 2016a). Furthermore, companies can easily take for granted the 
complex and evolving social environments within communities (Laurencont et al., 2019). 
Inequality is part of that complex social environment. Those in clear positions of power (mayors, 
elders, business owners) and those who reflect the kinds of people who typically hold power in 
western society (male, able bodied, cis-gendered, wealthy, etc.) are more likely to be the subjects 
of engagement by companies, and those community members may not prioritize the concerns of 
those who have less power, who are more marginalized, and who have unique needs (women, 
children, disable and LGBTQ2S+ folks, etc.) (Cox & Mills, 2015; Horowitz, 2017; Horowitz et 
al., 2018). Gender inequalities, for example, can manifest in a lack of perspectives from women 
when discussions between company and community do occur (Lapalme, 2003; Nuttall, 1998). In 
some cases, this exclusion of women is purposeful. Pini, Mayes, and McDonald (2010) argue 
that BHP Billiton’s decision to exclude the partners of mine employees, most of whom were 
women, from mandatory counselling sessions after the abrupt closure of a local nickel mine 
“illustrates that beliefs about women’s inherent excessive and dangerous emotionality continue, 
as well as further exemplifies the corporation’s strategies to suppress particular emotions they 
deemed risk or inappropriate” (p. 568).  
Negotiated agreements like IBAs can help address many of these issues, but these 
agreements are the result of negotiations that suffer from all these same challenges, with the 
addition of some unique constraints that can ultimately hinder communities. Negotiated 
agreements are almost always confidential and community members are often silenced by non-
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disclosure clauses while simultaneously being required to support the project or grant specific 
licenses and approvals, and communities can be locked in to these agreements that may not 
entirely serve them (or continue to serve them) for the duration of a project’s life (Hodgkins, 
2018; O’Faircheallaigh, 2018). The enforcement of these agreements, too, is not always clear. 
There are no government guidelines or procedures for tracking accountability and enforcing 
stipulations other that what is agreed on within the IBA (Bowes-Lyon et al., 2009).  
Ultimately, from an industry perspective, the purpose of community engagement is 
generally to achieve SLO while meeting the government’s minimal requirements for 
consultation. Put another way, engagement is about getting a ‘yes’ from communities (Plotkin, 
2018), as opposed to being a sincere endeavor. When companies seek out negotiated agreements, 
consult meaningfully with communities, and work to obtain SLO, they are doing so because it 
makes development easier for them in cases where communities have the leverage and political 
power to exert pressure on the company. In Alberta, Baker and Westman (2018) argue that “once 
knowledge is extracted from Aboriginal peoples, it is refined and distilled to meet consultation 
requirements, so corporations can extract bitumen from sand” (p. 145). 
Finally, although there is ample literature describing the value and challenges in 
community engagement, examinations of community engagement in mine closure planning are 
limited (see Costa, 2015 as an exception to this). Community engagement is often discussed in 
the context of front-end negotiations of IBAs and ESIAs, while the complexities of mine closure 
are left off the negotiating table as long as possible (Bainton & Holcombe, 2018; Veiga et al., 
2001; Xavier et al., 2015). Successful strategies for involving Indigenous communities in mine 
closure planning remain limited and mostly undocumented in academic literature 
(O’Faircheallaigh & Lawrence, 2019). Work that does focus on community engaged mine 
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closure planning typically focuses on documenting past failures or are consultant reports 
outlining the need for better engagement practices without providing examples of where those 
practices have successfully been applied (Morrison-Saunders, 2019; Stacey et al., 2010). This 
thesis attempts to contribute new knowledge to this gap by demonstrating how mine companies 
are currently planning for mine closure, and using the data in Chapter Three and Four to make 
practical, clear recommendations for improving mine closure practices and governance.  
2.6. Conclusion 
Mine closure and remediation in northern Canada remain limited in the scope of issues 
addressed and the kinds of knowledges deemed relevant. For mine closure to be successful in the 
North, discourse and planning strategies must address the many social, cultural, and economic 
impacts experienced by northern and Indigenous peoples. Additionally, it must create space to 
consider the larger historical context of settler colonialism and environmental injustice, and 
accommodate the needs, priorities, and values of northern residents. Given the many possible 
understandings and experiences with mine closure, Indigenous Knowledge must also be included 
in closure planning. This kind of expertise can add to Western understandings of the 
environment and human relationships to land and contribute to closure strategies that better meet 
community needs (Berkes, 2012; Hoogeveen, 2016; Scott, 2001; Todd, 2014).  
Mine closure and remediation planning have improved significantly, but nevertheless 
have a long way to go and many hurdles yet to overcome. The inclusion of IK, application of 
community engagement strategies, and incorporation of socio-economic impacts into closure 
planning are questionable despite the wealth of literature that points to their importance. Looking 
back to past failings has been helpful for developing strategies for future success, but what is 
equally important is the examination of how mine closure is currently being planned for to 
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ensure that the next generation of closures is set up for success. Furthermore, because both 
industry and government priorities are not altruistic and both depend on the mine industry 
generating profits, responsibility falls on affected communities and their local, regional, and 
ethnic political bodies to protect their interests. Thus, it becomes necessary to understand both 
company practices (as is asked in Chapter Three: how is mine closure being planned for by those 
with the power to do so?) and remediation governance (as is asked in Chapter Four: how are 
authorities at different levels protecting northern communities?) within the historical context of 




PLANNING FOR SOCIAL AND COMMUNITY-ENGAGED CLOSURE: A 
COMPARISON OF MINE CLOSURE PLANS FROM CANADA’S TERRITORIAL AND 
PROVINCIAL NORTH29 
3.1. Introduction 
Mine closure plans30 are the instruction manuals for closure. They explain precisely how 
closure and remediation activities will happen for a given mine site, and outline post-closure 
objectives (International Council on Mining & Metals, 2019a). They also represent a 
convergence of government policy and company practices: while government regulatory regimes 
control many aspects of mine closure, gaps in these regimes and the specifics of individual mine 
sites create space for individual interpretation by mine companies. Thus, an examination of 
closure plans can point to both gaps in public policy and the shortcomings of industry practices. 
Depending on the region in which the mine is operating, a closure plan may go through 
different levels of government or public review. Despite their importance, however, closure 
plans are rarely the subject of critical academic review, with focus instead being placed on 
documenting the failures of past closures and mine abandonments (e.g. Archer and Bradbury, 
1992; Bainton and Holcombe, 2018; Boutet, 2014; Bowes-Lyon et al., 2009; Green, 2015; Lim, 
2013; Rodon and Lévesque, 2015). In Kabir et al.’s (2015) examination of ten Canadian and 
Australian closure plans, the authors found that these documents inadequately address social 
impact assessment, community consultation, and post-closure monitoring. This research builds 
on Kabir et al.’s results, focusing more specifically on local and Indigenous knowledge in 
 
29 This chapter was co-authored by Miranda Monosky and Dr. Arn Keeling and was accepted for publication in the 
Journal of Environmental Management in August 2020.  
30 Also called mine closure and reclamation plans and commonly abbreviated as MCP, MCRP, CP, or CRP. 
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closure planning and company strategies for addressing socio-economic impacts in a specific 
geographical context, northern Canada. 
This chapter systematically reviews and compares ten mine closure plans from mines 
currently operating in northern Canada to determine how companies understand and address 
many of the critical social, economic, and cultural aspects of closure identified in the literature. 
This analysis involved collecting publicly available (or requested) mine closure plans and 
extracting text that addresses the following issues: (1) how mine companies engage with 
communities for closure planning; (2) how companies are utilizing knowledge gained from 
communities, and (3) how companies are addressing the socio-economic aspects of mine closure. 
This review made it possible to compare different approaches to mine closure planning, and to 
determine how public engagement strategies diverge and overlap between companies and across 
five different northern territories/regions.  
The results show that, overall, companies are poorly addressing the socio-economic 
impacts of mine closure, and consistently using vague language when describing the collection 
and application of community expertise and IK. Mine closure plans produced for mines in two 
jurisdictions (the Northwest Territories and Nunavut) tend to contain more detail and cover a 
wider scope of issues than those in Yukon, Nunavik, and Nunatsiavut. However, even the best 
examples have major shortcomings. Some, but not all of these differences are explained by the 
different regulatory regimes between these jurisdictions. This demonstrates that both policy and 
a company’s willingness to go above and beyond baseline requirements are important factors in 
effective and comprehensive mine closure planning. Additionally, two major arguments in the 
literature are confirmed by these results. First, despite the recommendations of industry “best 
practices” guidelines, mine closure planning continues to focus almost exclusively on technical 
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engineering challenges to the neglect of social, economic, and cultural aspects. Second, 
knowledge from Indigenous communities (which are prominent rightsholders in the Canadian 
North) is selectively and inconsistently incorporated, typically only in relation to ecological and 
historical information. For mine closure to be successful in a northern context it must incorporate 
community expertise, emerge from the values and priorities of the Indigenous peoples whose 
lands mines are operating on, and account for a wider scope of social, economic, and cultural 
impacts. 
3.2. Methods 
This chapter focuses on mine closure plans for mineral mines located in northern Canada 
that are currently operating, or, more specifically, are in the phase of their lifecycle that is after 
development and before closure. These criteria included two mines that are not currently in 
production but have not yet entered closure. Closure documents were initially identified and 
retrieved through online public registries using keyword searches or manually searching through 
digital folders and files found on public registries. Because of the limited availability of public 
registries for Nunavik31 and Nunatsiavut, closure plans from these regions were requested from 
the companies themselves or via information requests from public agencies. The documents 
provided by Canadian Royalties (Nunavik) were in their original French form and translated to 
English before analysis. A total of ten mine closure plans from Yukon (n=1), NWT (n=3), 
Nunavut (n=3), Nunavik (n=2), and Nunatsiavut (n=1) were collected. Table 3.1 lists basic 
information related to the mine sites represented by these closure plans, including affected 
Indigenous communities, and Figure 3.1 shows their location. 
 
31 Québec does have a public registry for documents submitted by mine companies to the government. However, 




Table 3.1: Northern mine sites whose closure plans were collected and analysed. 






















2017 NWT Diamond Kitikmeot Inuit Association; Lutsel 
K'e Dene First Nation; North Slave 
Métis Alliance; Tłı̨chǫ Government; 








2018 NWT Diamond Tłı̨chǫ Government; The hamlet of 
Kugluktuk and Kitikmeot Inuit 
Association; Yellowknives Dene 
First Nation; Lutsel K’e Dene First 
Nation; North Slave Métis Alliance; 
Deninu Kue First Nation; Fort 




De Beers 2019 NWT Diamond Tłı̨chǫ Government; Yellowknives 
Dene First Nation; Lutsel K’e Dene 








2014 Nunavut Gold Kivalliq Inuit Association 
Meliadine 










2018 Nunavut Iron Qikiqtani Inuit Association 
Raglan Mine  Raglan 
Mine 
2019 Nunavik Nickel Salluit Land Holdings; 









Nunavik Nickel Salluit Land Holdings; 
Kangiqsujuaq Land Holdings; 
Municipality of Puvirnituq; Makivik 
Corporation 
 
Voisey’s Bay  Vale 2016 Nunatsiavut Nickel; 
copper 
Innu Nation; Nunatsiavut 
Government 
1 This category relates to the most recent version of closure plan available, not the date of mine opening or closure. 
Updated closure plans are typically required every five years. 
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2 Canadian Royalties has separate closure plans produced at different times for each of the site’s pits 
The methods used for this analysis were adapted from literature on document analysis 
and systematic reviews (e.g., Bowen, 2009; U Flick, 2014; Haddaway, Woodcock, Macura, & 
Collins, 2015). These kinds of analyses are flexible tools for understanding gaps, overlaps, and 
patterns across multiple instances of a type of document (Zou & Thomalla, 2010), in this case 
mine closure plans. Document analysis generally follows a similar set of steps, including: 
developing research questions, developing document search criteria and collection methods, 
Figure 3.1: Map of the study area showing the locations of mine sites whose closure plans were collected 
and analyzed for this review. Map produced in ArcGIS 10.7.1 using Statistics Canada (2016) data and 
contains information licensed under the Open Government License – Canada. 
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coding text into categories appropriate to the research questions, and interpreting, synthesizing, 
and describing the data (U Flick, 2014; Zou & Thomalla, 2010). 
Guidance was also taken from Larsen, Österlin, and Guia (2018), who conducted a 
comparison of impact assessments from mine companies. These authors developed a framework 
flexible enough to account for the high degree of variability between the impact assessments (R. 
K. Larsen et al., 2018). Similarly, mine closure plans vary considerably in organization, issues 
addressed, and the collection and application of community knowledge. Therefore, I initially 
developed broad, open-ended categories for text to be sorted into, along with questions relating 
to their documentation in closure plans (see Table 3.2). These three categories are: (1) methods 
for community engagement; (2) use of community knowledge; and (3) socio-economic impacts 
of closure.  





Does the closure plan explain how and when communities are engaged 
with? 
Does the closure plan include what the outcomes of engagement activities 
were? 
Are engagement activities specific to closure planning, or to mine 
operations more generally? 
Use of community 
knowledge 
Does the closure plan cite TK/IQ? 
Where in the closure plan is TK/IQ used? In reference to what topics? 
Does the closure plan clearly demonstrate how community concerns are 
being addressed? 
Is it clear how community input has influenced the closure plan? 
Does the community knowledge refer specifically to aspects of mine 
closure, or mine operations more generally? 
Socio-economic 
impacts of closure 
Does the closure plan acknowledge the possible negative socio-economic 
impacts of closure? 
What is the scope of negative impacts acknowledged?  
Does the closure plan present clear plans for mitigating negative socio-
economic impacts? 
When are mitigation strategies to begin and end? 




The term ‘community knowledge’ in the context of this research includes the various 
forms of expertise, stories, and values that come from northern and Indigenous communities. 
This includes the many distinct forms of Traditional Knowledge (TK), Indigenous Knowledge 
(IK), and Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit (IQ), the cumulative body of cultural and ecological 
knowledge, practices, and values that are generated and maintained by Indigenous communities 
(Battiste, 2014; Berkes, 2012; Tester & Irniq, 2008; Todd, 2014). It also includes the more 
general concerns, questions, priorities, and desires that northern communities have concerning 
mineral development, mine closure, and their own futures. The broad term ‘community 
knowledge’ is not meant to erase the distinctions between different ways of knowing, but instead 
is meant to be an inclusive short form for the variety of knowledge systems and perspectives that 
exist across this geographical region, and to distinguish them from the formalized, technical 
expertise associated with Western science-informed resource management (Haalboom, 2016). 
Coding involved the careful review of each document from start to finish, including 
appendices, and sorting data into the appropriate category in an Excel spreadsheet. Sentences, 
phrases, tables, and paragraphs that were relevant to each category were copied into individual 
cells under each category (community engagement methods, use of community knowledge, or 
socio-economic impacts). Once this was completed for all ten closure plans, the text under each 
category was re-read several times and any patterns or noteworthy results summarized. These 
summaries were then compared between the documents.  
Qualitative data interpretation focused on understanding the definitions, meanings, and 
processes revealed in the text (Altheide & Schneider, 2012). Like Larsen et al. (R. K. Larsen et 
al., 2018), this examination is not meant to determine whether or not information in closure plans 
is factually accurate or correct. Instead, it is meant to determine how particular mine companies 
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articulate and plan for community-engaged, socio-economic mine closure. Furthermore, this 
examination did not produce quantitative data or counts of particular words or phrases. Two 
closure plans can theoretically have an identical number of individual sentences with the same 
number of individual words in each sentence describing a particular topic, but they would still 
not be equal because the meaning behind each word used, and how those words contribute to 
larger narratives, would differ. Thus, a quantitative approach would not produce useful data. 
Instead, I explore the meanings and narratives in the closure plans, and how they envision a 
particular future for the site, the region, and the affected communities. 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Accessibility 
The limited and inconsistent accessibility of closure plans and supplementary documents 
creates challenges for transparency in mine closure planning. The varying levels of ease with 
which I was able to collect mine closure plans points to a potential barrier for community 
participation in closure planning. As stated, the three territories have public registries that are 
relatively easy to find and navigate if you know what you are looking for, although it is not clear 
how often they are updated or exactly what documents are (and are not) uploaded. Finding 
closure plans for mines operating in Nunavik and Nunatsiavut, however, was challenging due to 
the poor quality or the lack of public registries. This means that communities in some regions 
must rely on companies to provide those documents, while communities in other regions can find 
these documents themselves. All ten closure plans contained countless references to technical 
reports, past research, environmental impact statements, approval conditions, and a variety of 
other documents to support different aspects of closure. These documents are often not included 
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or summarized in the closure plan itself, meaning readers must either search for these additional 
documents or trust that the closure plan is representing them accurately and completely.  
The inter-textual nature of closure plans creates challenges for assessing the quality and 
effectiveness of the closure plan, because a reader may not necessarily have access to all this 
supplementary data or the technical knowledge to understand it. If a closure plan were to be sent 
out for public review, the public would be limited in their ability to determine if the closure plan 
is acceptable because they would not have these additional documents that are being used to 
justify the closure methods. For example, the Snap Lake closure plan states that “records of past 
engagement are available in other documentation, including the Environmental Assessment 
Report … water license applications and renewals … and annual closure and reclamation plan 
progress reports (including annual reports from 2012 to 2017, each of which contains a 
description of engagement and consultation related to closure plans, objectives, criteria, 
progressive reclamation, and related topics)” (De Beers, 2019, pp. 2–9). Finding these additional 
documents to be able to fully understand the closure plan would be possible because of the 
MVLWB public registry, assuming one has a reliable enough internet connection to find and 
download the documents. However, it would cost a considerable amount of time (both to locate, 
download, and read) and would not be possible if the mine were operating in Nunavik or 
Nunatsiavut.   
The Mary River closure plan makes a brief, seemingly insignificant reference to a 
Closure Scenario Report (Wilkinson, 2014) that exemplifies the problems that can arise when 
closure plans reference external documents and reports as justification for their closure plans. 
Published in 2014 by the company and submitted to the NIRB, this report is meant to examine 
the possible social, cultural, and economic impacts of temporary and permanent closure and 
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present the company’s mitigation strategies. This report, which can be found on the NIRB public 
registry, is only six pages of text that almost exclusively discusses job loss under both the ‘social 
and cultural impacts’ and ‘economic impacts’ subsections, and thus the mitigation strategies 
described are limited. The document also argues that the mine will create spin-off jobs and 
concludes that closure will not happen for “many, many years”, implying that it is not a pressing 
issues (Wilkinson, 2014, p. 8). The inclusion of this reference may lead readers to believe that 
the company has exercised due diligence in assessing the possible negative impacts of mine 
closure, but in reality the document being referenced uses an incomplete conceptualization of 
‘negative impacts’ and thus offers incomplete mitigations strategies. If a reader wants to check 
this reference, they would be able to do so on the NIRB public registry, but to check every 
reference in a closure plan (which are typically several hundreds of pages long) is not a feasible 
task. For closure plans produced in regions without public registries, it would be virtually 
impossible.  
Even where public registries do exist it can be difficult to retrieve specific documents. 
The Meliadine closure plan references the environmental impact statement as evidence of the 
company’s community engagement in closure planning. It states that “Agnico Eagle has received 
comments from various local and regional communities and government stakeholders on the 
Project. Key community findings and the Company’s response to address them are outlined in 
the Meliadine Final Environmental Impact Statement” (Agnico Eagle Mines, 2015, p. 2). If a 
reader wants to see this document, they will likely use the NIRB public registry, which has a set 
of document categories for each mine site. Under the category for Meliadine’s Final 
Environmental Impact Statement there are 191 documents, none of which are clearly marked as 
being the complete impact statement.  
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3.3.2. Documentation of Community Engagement 
Mine closure plans across northern Canada tend to use vague language to describe the 
methods used for engaging with and learning from affected communities. Mines operating in the 
NWT tend to have more informative descriptions of community engagement strategies than 
those from other territories/regions. Nunatsiavut and Nunavik closure plans are especially 
lacking in this area. Where descriptions of community engagement methods do exist, they tend 
to suffer from two problems. First, explanations do not necessarily describe community 
engagement that occurred for closure planning specifically, but instead may refer to engagement 
activities pertaining to mine development or operations. Second, community engagement might 
only be spoken about in the future tense while failing to document previous or ongoing 
engagement for closure planning.  
All ten closure plans reviewed varied in their descriptions of engagement with affected 
stakeholders and communities. Some plans contain no mention of impacted communities at all 
(e.g.: Raglan Mine and Nunavik Nickel in Nunavik); others have relatively clear descriptions of 
engagement activities and their outcomes (e.g.: Ekati and Diavik in the NWT), although vague 
statements are present to some degree across all ten documents. Many of the plans make 
references to the importance of engaging with Indigenous communities, but without clearly 
articulating their strategies and outcomes. The Keno Hill (Yukon) closure plan, for example, 
states that the company recognizes the importance of creating a plan that is developed in 
partnership with Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Development Canada (CIRNAC, 
formerly Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada), Yukon Government, and First Nation of Na-
cho Nyak Dun (FNNND). The plan references the company’s relationship with FNNND, which 
“provides for significant consultation and collaboration on closure objectives and final options” 
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(Alexco Resource Corp, 2018, p. 8). The plan is, however, silent on what “significant 
consultation and collaboration” means, how that will be achieved, how success will be measured, 
or how input from FNNND was obtained and integrated into the closure plan. The Voisey’s Bay 
(Nunatsiavut) closure plan is similarly limited. In one of the few references to impacted 
communities, the company states only that it will “provide the Closure Plan to the Innu Nation 
and the Nunatsiavut Government for review as per the Aboriginal Consultation Guidelines for 
Regulatory Approval Applications” (Vale Newfoundland and Labrador, 2016, p. 5) and refer to 
the existence of “mechanisms established during construction and operations” that allow for 
review and feedback (p. 35). The Meliadine (Nunavut) closure plan offers a final example of this 
vague language, explaining that the company will “consider community land use expectations 
and traditional knowledge in the closure planning” and that “community engagement will 
continue to be implemented” (Agnico Eagle Mines, 2015, p. 7).  
Where detailed descriptions of community engagement do exist, it is not always clear if it 
is related to closure specifically, or other phases of the mine’s lifecycle. For example, the Ekati 
(NWT) closure plan contains details about the incorporation of Traditional Knowledge into 
wildlife monitoring and other similar programs. While this is an important aspect of Indigenous 
community engagement, it is not clear if these programs will continue after the mine ceases 
operations and enters closure and remediation. The Keno Hill, Meliadine, and Snap Lake closure 
plans all have similar examples of this uncertainty around post-closure engagement. The Keno 
Hill closure plan explains that “consultation and engagement will include a variety of topics and 
activities within the [Keno Hill Silver District], including permitting of new mines, development 
of the Keno District Closure Plan or general updates” (Alexco Resource Corp, 2018). In other 
words, consultation that does happen may not necessarily be specific to mine closure planning.  
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Similar examples of closure plans detailing seemingly beneficial community engagement 
strategies, but which lack specific reference to closure planning itself include: 
Development plans and potential impacts and benefits resulting from the proposed 
Project have been presented on an ongoing basis to the general public, community 
organizations, community leaders, businesses, and government. The feedback obtained 
from this engagement activity was incorporated in the Project planning to optimize the 
Project from an environmental and socio- economic point of view, including costs and 
operability. (Meliadine closure plan, Agnico Eagle Mines, 2015, pp. 68–69) 
De Beers’ regularly planned engagement includes annual visits to Indigenous 
communities to hold workshops and community meetings; site visits for community 
members to the mine; meetings with the Snap Lake Environmental Monitoring Agency 
(SLEMA) and Tłįcho Kwe Beh Working Group; and annual technical and/or traditional 
knowledge workshops coordinated through the SLEMA. (Snap Lake closure plan, De 
Beers, 2019, p. 2.8) 
Indigenous groups are consulted on the Mine through a number of forums … including 
community meetings and open houses, site visits, and other activities designed to solicit 
feedback and input from both community members and leaders. (Snap Lake closure plan, 
De Beers, 2019, p. 2.9) 
In some cases, community engagement is only discussed in the future tense. Closure 
plans will explain how community engagement is going to happen in the future, while neglecting 
to explain if it has already occurred or been incorporated into the closure plan. One example is 
the Mary River (Nunavut) closure plan. Mary River is not a new mine--it began operations in 
2014. Yet the mine closure plan makes many references to a Mine Closure Working Group that 
is in development but not yet established or currently contributing to closure planning in any 
way. The Mary River closure plan also lists a set of topics that the company intends to discuss 
and receive feedback on from community members, including closure objectives and criteria, 
additional research activities, and the transfer of infrastructure ownership but there is no clear 
timetable outlined for this engagement. When any of these goals and requirements will be met is 
unclear, and describing future community engagement does little to provide insight into what 
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communities' needs, priorities, and concerns have been for the four years between the opening of 
the mine and the submission of this closure plan.  
The Ekati and Diavik diamond mines offer the best examples of how companies can 
explain their community engagement methods in enough detail to allow reviewers to understand 
community participation and its incorporation into the closure plan. Both closure plans have 
relatively detailed descriptions of engagement activities that have already occurred, what issues 
community members have raised, and how different Traditional Knowledge working groups and 
Elders have contributed to closure planning. The Ekati closure plan references a Traditional 
Knowledge Management Framework which “describes protocols for collecting, storing, and 
managing TK” and “outlines how Dominion will use TK in environmental decisions for the 
Ekati mine” (Dominion Diamond Mines, 2018). The Diavik closure plan contains a brief history 
of community engagement and outlines the demographics that make up their Traditional 
Knowledge Panel, which has men, women, Elders, and youth. The documentation is clear in how 
this panel contributes to closure, explaining that it is “a body to facilitate appropriate and 
meaningful accommodation of TK in the planning and review of mine closure options” (Diavik 
Diamond Mines, 2017). Diavik’s closure plan also outlines an engagement strategy developed 
with input and feedback from community members, noting exactly who will be consulted and 
how that consultation will happen. Finally, both the Ekati and Diavik closure plans include 
detailed research plans in their appendices to address remaining uncertainties. These research 
plans are valuable for both tracking the progress of refining and improving the closure plan over 
time and acknowledging knowledge gaps. Where other closure plans often shy away from 
uncertainty and present information as if it is final and complete, the Ekati and Diavik closure 
96 
 
plans are transparent about the uncertainties surrounding closure and remediation, which then 
permits them to create plans for filling gaps in knowledge. 
3.3.3. Use of Community Knowledge 
Communities have a wealth of knowledge, experience, and insight that are applicable to 
every facet of mine closure and remediation.  In the context of northern Canada, local and 
Indigenous Knowledge are increasingly acknowledged as critical contributors to effective 
environmental management, from wildlife management to climate change (Parlee, 2012; Tester 
& Irniq, 2008; Todd, 2014). Once narrowly defined in terms of “traditional” environmental 
knowledge, IK is now widely understood to encompass a holistic, place-based perspective on 
social and environmental relations, including Indigenous ecological knowledge, values, 
practices, and worldviews (Cohen, 2017; Horowitz, 2015; McGregor, 2013). IK is also usually 
legally required to be considered in project assessment, review, and permitting processes in each 
of these northern jurisdictions--though the effectiveness of these processes in doing so is debated 
(Ellis, 2004; White, 2006). 
As with documentation related to community engagement methods, there is significant 
variability in how mine closure plans integrate community knowledge. For most of the closure 
plans, community knowledge is either not explicitly used or acknowledged at all, or it is only 
referenced generically. Neither mine in Nunavik, Raglan Mine and Nunavik Nickel, make 
mention of community knowledge in their closure plans. The Meliadine plan states only that 
local communities’ “inputs have been considered in the preparation of this CRP” (Agnico Eagle 
Mines, 2015), but without explanation of how or where in the document.  
In many plans, not only is it unclear how such community review mechanisms address 
closure and remediation, it is also unclear what ‘consideration for traditional knowledge holders’ 
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means. The Meadowbank closure plan does contain clear examples of how the company is 
addressing community concerns, and it states that Traditional Knowledge was used in the 
summaries of the atmospheric, physical, chemical, biological, and social environments. 
However, the closure plan often explains that Traditional Knowledge was “recorded” or 
“documented” or “used” without explaining how and where. One of their closure objectives is a 
“final landscape guided by pre-development conditions and traditional knowledge” (Agnico 
Eagle Mines, 2014, p. 3) with no details on how success would be measured. Such vague 
statements are common. Without demonstrating how community knowledge is being applied to 
closure, general references to its existence do little to practically improve closure planning.  
The Snap Lake closure plan provides an instructive example of how community 
knowledge may be documented in the closure plan without necessarily being meaningfully 
incorporated. The closure plan itself contains almost no references to community influence on 
the closure plan. However, a 321-page appendix (which is not contained within the same 
document and must be located separately on the public registry), simply titled ‘Appendix C 
Engagement,’ documents all closure-specific community knowledge and government questions 
and recommendations from 2011 to 2019. Within these 321 pages is a 29-page table that lists 
Traditional Knowledge input related to closure. This is an overwhelming amount of information 
that is not organized or synthesized in a way that makes it useful or applicable to the closure plan 
itself. The body of the plan makes few references to the appendix, and none that point to any 
specific items in the 321-page appendix. Table 2.2 in the closure plan has a list of “selected 
engagement” activities taken from the engagement record, but no specific outcomes are listed, 
just descriptions of topics discussed and dates.   
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Where closure plans do clearly reference community knowledge, it is most often limited 
to descriptions of places and ecosystems, and/or concerns about animal and fish species. This 
information is contained within sections dedicated to community engagement (usually at the 
beginning of the document) or sections specifically related to wildlife impacts. Rarely do any of 
the closure plans engage with any form of community knowledge related to the more technical or 
future-oriented aspects of closure and remediation. This is not to undervalue the importance of 
using knowledge from communities to understand the mine’s ecological and social context. 
However, it appears that companies (or the consultants they hire to draft closure plans) are 
operating with the assumption that communities only have valuable information to provide about 
the natural environment, not other aspects of closure and remediation. Although these documents 
are essentially plans for the future, community knowledge is routinely limited to descriptions of 
past or current conditions. Even in the best examples of community-engaged closure plans, it is 
less clear how community knowledge is incorporated into the remediation of pits and tunnels, 
management of tailings and waste rock, mitigation of contaminants, and post-closure wildlife 
and socio-economic monitoring. These results echo those reported by Sandlos and Keeling 
(Sandlos & Keeling, 2016a) on the remediation project for the abandoned Giant Mine in the 
NWT. They argue that the planning and assessment process for this major remediation project 
confined IK to apolitical information about traditional harvesting: “almost nowhere did the report 
mandate or even mention the ways the TK, and the values embedded in such knowledge systems, 
might inform technical aspects of the project such as arsenic storage or surface remediation” (p. 
285). In closure planning, it is engineers and professional scientists who have the privilege and 
power to construct the future, rather than communities.  
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A few notable exceptions show promise for better engagement with and use of 
community knowledge in closure planning. Closure plans from the NWT, particularly for the 
Ekati and Diavik mines, more clearly articulate how they are utilizing community knowledge 
and demonstrate how the company is responding to community needs, concerns, and requests. 
The Ekati closure plan gives a number of clear examples distributed throughout the closure plan 
where community concerns are summarized and addressed, for instance:  
Community visits in mid-2018 yielded further feedback on the WRSA piles. Many noted 
the sensitivity of caribou to large cobbles and boulders, and the potential for very coarse 
substrate on the piles to result in potential for injury. A common suggestion was to ensure 
that a fine-grained material be used to cover the waste rock storage piles to avoid this 
potential. It was also recommended that ramps be of an appropriate slope to allow 
caribou easy access on and off of piles. (Dominion Diamond Mines, 2018, p. 180) 
Mixed feedback was received regarding the potential for leaving the airstrip in place, 
with some viewing it as an important piece of survival infrastructure for bush pilots, 
while others suggested that hunters may take the opportunity to use the airstrip to land 
and over-hunt wildlife in the area. Feedback from engagement … has suggested that the 
current road system could be used as a caribou movement corridor similar to an esker. 
Access and predation were two other main concerns regarding caribou use of roads at the 
Ekati mine. (Dominion Diamond Mines, 2018, p. 245) 
Community members have suggested that studies be undertaken to determine what plant 
species can be effectively grown on kimberlite, and that the community be involved. 
(Dominion Diamond Mines, 2018, p. 263)  
While documented concerns often emerge from community members’ prioritization of 
ecological health, the number of different topics addressed is higher than most other closure 
plans. In the examples above, the closure plan clearly demonstrates that community members 
were able to provide input to waste rock pile covers and the possibilities for kimberlite 
remediation.  
The Diavik closure plan similarly contains a number of examples of community 
knowledge being clearly documented and addressed. It explains that the mine’s TK Panel 
evaluated re-vegetation plans and contributed knowledge about pre-mining plant and wildlife 
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baselines. The plan lists several community priorities for closure, including the significance of 
land and water quality, potential employment and business opportunities for northern peoples, 
compensation for land and water use, the need for regular consultation, and minimizing the 
overall footprint of the mine site. It also includes design principles identified by workshop 
participants, such as consolidating the mine site and where to put processed kimberlite. Like the 
Ekati closure plan, community concerns, priorities, and expertise are not limited to one or two 
sections dedicated to community engagement or wildlife descriptions, but instead are integrated 
throughout the document and include a variety of topics. The difference in usefulness and 
transparency becomes clear when compared to the typically generic statements about community 
knowledge from other closure plans. 
3.3.4. Acknowledging and Addressing Socio-economic Impacts 
As with community engagement and community knowledge, the incorporation of socio-
economic objectives into these closure plans is typically cursory and/or poorly documented. 
While industry guidelines and best practices increasingly emphasize the need to address the 
social and economic impacts of mine closure, these plans lack any common understanding, 
acknowledgement, or standard practice for mitigating these impacts. The Snap Lake, Voisey’s 
Bay, and Nunavik Nickel closure plans either do not mention negative socio-economic impacts 
or simply state that there will be none. The Ekati closure plan only mentions a permanent visual 
change to the landscape in relation to cultural impacts. In the Meliadine closure plan, one of the 
goals listed for closure is to “help protect traditional values” and “mitigate socio-economic 
impacts in the area where the mine is located following decommissioning and closure as 
practically possible” (Agnico Eagle Mines, 2015). These goals and impacts remain undefined in 
the document. The Raglan Mine closure plan states multiple times that a particular closure 
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method or strategy was chosen based on “environmental, societal and economic performance” 
(Raglan Mine, 2019), but these criteria remain undefined.  
When closure plans acknowledge negative impacts, they are often limited in scope or not 
related to closure. The Diavik plan claims that information about socio-economic impacts is 
included in an appendix titled “Site-Specific Risk-Based Closure Criteria Phase I Report,” but 
upon review it is clear that these impacts are limited to the potential for contaminants to be found 
in country foods. The Meadowbank closure plan also limits discussion of health risks to country 
food consumption. In other cases, the impacts addressed are limited to job loss and the potential 
loss of archaeological sites. For instance, as the sole example of a possible negative socio-
economic impact, the Nunavik Nickel closure plan mentions strategies for avoiding damaging 
archaeological sites and refers readers to the original environmental impact assessment. 
Similarly, in describing possible residual negative impacts on the human and physical 
environment, the Snap Lake closure plan makes several references to the effects of construction 
and operations and cites the original environmental assessment report from 2002 as evidence that 
these impacts will not extend beyond those phases. 
In some cases, even when negative socio-economic impacts are acknowledged, they are 
deemed not significant or outweighed by the apparently more significant positive benefits 
experienced during operations. The Mary River closure plan considers that if an individual is 
likely to experience both a negative and a positive impact, then the negative impact is deemed 
not significant – therefore a mitigation strategy is not required. For example, the plan concludes 
that educational and training opportunities for employees and community members during 
operations will offset the negative effects of job-loss at closure. The plan also states that, overall, 
“the potential for beneficial outcomes is equally or more highly anticipated than the potential for 
102 
 
negative effects” (Baffinland Iron Mines, 2018). This ignores the considerable evidence for the 
opposite effect: that the economic and employment benefits of mining in remote regions are 
often (though not always) short-lived, unevenly distributed, and outweighed by the longer-term 
negative impacts of closure (Bainton & Holcombe, 2018; Bowes-Lyon et al., 2009; Buell, 2006; 
Lawrie, Tonts, & Plummer, 2011; Rodon & Lévesque, 2015; Wilson, 2004). 
In general, concrete plans for mitigating negative socio-economic impacts are rare in 
these closure plans. The Raglan Mine, Nunavik Nickel, Voisey’s Bay, and Snap Lake closure 
plans present no plans whatsoever for mitigating negative regional socio-economic impacts. 
Others make general statements about this issue but lack concrete strategies. One objective in the 
Keno Hill closure plan is to “maximize First nation, local, and Yukon socio-economic benefits” 
(Alexco Resource Corp, 2018). This is the only mention of socio-economic benefits in the 
closure plan, and there is no explanation for what ‘maximize’ means in this context or how it will 
be achieved. Similarly, the Diavik closure plan also includes an objective to “maximize northern 
business opportunities during operations and closure” and “develop northern capacities during 
operations and closure for the benefit of the north, post-closure” (Diavik Diamond Mines, 2017) 
but with no real plan of action. The Meadowbank closure plan also states the company’s 
intention to “maximize the benefits of the Project for all parties involved while minimizing or 
eliminating any negative impacts or long-term influences on the environment and local 
communities” (Agnico Eagle Mines, 2014) without further explanation. Some closure plans 
briefly mention the transfer of infrastructure to communities after closure, but with no real plans 
for execution. Without clear strategies for this transfer companies risk leaving communities with 
infrastructure that they are unable to operate and maintain (Laurencont et al., 2019; Roberts et 
al., 2000; Xavier et al., 2015). 
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A number of closure plans contend the socio-economic impacts will be investigated 
closer to, during, or after closure. The Diavik closure plan simply states that community 
engagement will guide closure planning, with no additional information about what kinds of 
issues will be addressed. The Meliadine and Mary River closure plans explain that data collected 
during operations will contribute to post-closure monitoring activities, but include no details on 
how the socio-economic aspects of closure are being planned for and mitigated now. The 
Meadowbank closure plan states that “post-reclamation risks to human and environmental health 
will be identified and evaluated closer to mine closure, once the final closure designs are 
determined” (Agnico Eagle Mines, 2014). Yet this closure plan was published in 2014, when the 
expected closure date of the mine site was only five years later in 2019. This means that the next 
and final closure plan for Meadowbank will be the first closure plan to include any discussion of 
human risks, which is far too late for local, regional, and territorial authorities to assess.32 In 
contrast to this scant coverage of socio-economic closure issues, Rixen and Blangy (2016) found 
that local residents near Meadowbank have concerns about community violence, stress, and food 
security when the mine closes and suggest strategies for improving community resilience. Based 
on its closure plan, the company has not engaged with the local knowledge and concerns about 
closure planning that exist within this community. This deferral of socio-economic closure 
planning directly contradicts industry best practice guidelines like those published by the 
International Council on Mining and Metals, which suggest that closure planning must integrate 
social, economic, and cultural considerations early in the mine’s life, in order to have the time to 
 
32 Agnico has since opened several new pits to extend operations beyond 2019. The 2014 Meadowbank closure plan 
used for this research, though, was written under the assumption that the mine would close in 2019. 
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develop an adequate knowledge base and prepare for the complexities of these aspects of closure 
(International Council on Mining & Metals, 2019b). 
3.4. Discussion 
Mine closure plans across northern Canada are highly variable with often vague 
references to local and Indigenous community engagement, few explicit examples of community 
knowledge being incorporated into closure planning, and weak planning for the socio-economic 
and cultural impacts of closure. How poorly a closure plan addresses these issues differs between 
mine sites, although there appears to be a significant difference between closure plans from the 
NWT and Nunavut and those from Yukon, Nunavik, and Nunatsiavut. The latter tend to entirely 
neglect the socio-economic impacts of closure and contain more vague, unhelpful language 
compared to closure plans from the NWT and Nunavut. 
The age of a mine or the number of years until anticipated closure seem to have little 
effect on the quality or detail of the closure plan with regard to the three areas examined for this 
study. One could assume that the longer a mine has been in operation the more detailed and 
thorough the closure plan will be because the company has had more time to collect data and 
refine their understanding of the site, the environment, and the affected communities. However,  
the two closure plans from mines that have been in operations longest, Raglan Mine and Ekati 
(21 and 20 years respectively, based on the version year of their most recent closure plan) differ 
considerably in how they describe their methods for community engagement and how 
community knowledge is used. The Ekati closure plan is the best example of those examined, as 
detailed in previous sections, while Raglan Mine makes no mention of community engagement 
or what knowledge and concerns the affected communities have shared with the company. 
Similarly, one might assume that the mine sites nearest to their expected closure dates will have 
105 
 
the most detail and thorough, clear plans for mitigating negative impacts because the company’s 
time for refining those plans is running out. This is again not the case. The Nunavik Nickel and 
Snap Lake mines are nearest to their closure dates (as few as two years for Nunavik Nickel and 
less than one year for Snap Lake as it is expected to enter closure in 2020). The closure plan for 
the former makes no mention of socio-economic impacts and presents no mitigation strategies, 
while the latter simply refers to the environmental assessment completed in 2002 that concluded 
there will be no significant impacts.  
Different territorial and provincial regulatory regimes likely account for some of the 
variability identified in the closure plans. As noted in Section two, mine closure policies, 
regulations, and guidelines vary across these jurisdictions. Policies in the NWT and to a lesser 
extent Nunavut provide more thorough guidelines for addressing the socio-economic aspects of 
closure and place a heavier emphasis on collecting and incorporating community knowledge in 
closure plans. Guidance and policy documents from the Nunavut Impact Review Board (NIRB) 
and Nunavut Water Board (NWB) make connections between mine closure and potential impacts 
to cultural sites, employment, community wellness, community infrastructure, and human health 
(Nunavut Impact Review Board & Nunavut Water Board, 2012), and both organizations mandate 
community consultation throughout a mine’s life. The Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board 
(MVLWB) requires proponents in the NWT to “consider factors such as risk acceptability, 
public perception of risk, socio-economic impacts, benefits, and technical feasibility” in their 
closure plans (Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board, 2013), and their guidelines for closure 
and reclamation have detailed requirements for community engagement and the integration of 
Traditional Knowledge. The result are closure plans that more clearly address community 
concerns and acknowledge a wider (though by no means complete) range of negative impacts. 
106 
 
Closure plans for mines located in NWT and Nunavut were more likely to address a wider scope 
of issues and more clearly engage with community knowledge.  
By contrast, plans from Yukon, Nunavik, and Nunatsiavut lacked detail and sometimes 
entirely neglected all three elements examined for this study. Policy guidance on mine closure 
from these jurisdictions makes few connections between closure planning, community 
engagement, and socio-economic impacts. In Newfoundland and Labrador, projects are 
“evaluated for [their] bio-physical and socio-economic impacts” during the environmental 
assessment phase (Newfoundland and Labrador, 2010), but no further detail is provided and no 
connections are made between socio-economic impacts and closure in mining guidelines or 
environmental assessment regulations. The Québec government closure guidelines (which apply 
to the Nunavik territory) state that remediation must meet social objectives, but provide no 
definition or criteria (Ministère de l’Énergie et des Ressources naturelles, 2017). Nunavik does 
have several regional authorities (the Kativik Environmental Advisory Committee, Kativik 
Environmental Quality Commission, and Makivik Corporation) responsible for facilitating 
public engagement and holding companies accountable to Nunavik Inuit, but the Nunavik Inuit 
Mining Policy only requires social impact studies to be carried out for mineral exploration and 
operations, not closure (Makivik Corporation, 2014a). The Government of Yukon (Government 
of Yukon, 2006) emphasizes the need for remediation strategies that “will provide economic 
benefits to local communities and First Nations” (p. 9). All of these statements are generic and 
open to a wide range of interpretations--similar to the language used in the closure plans 
themselves. 
Variations in policy cannot account for all of the differences found in these closure plans, 
however, and even the most robust closure regulations leave significant gaps. The Mary River 
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closure plan, for example, includes a terms and conditions concordance table that lists the 
NIRB’s closure conditions for the company’s water license. A wide range of issues is included, 
from concerns about the marine environment to noise pollution, and more social and economic 
concerns about demographics, livelihood, and well-being. Most of the conditions for the socio-
economic aspects of closure can be summarized as asking the company to engage with specific 
community groups and regional organizations to monitor and mitigate socio-economic impacts. 
While this is not a clear plan in itself, and the Mary River closure plan overall does a poor job 
addressing the socio-economic aspects of closure, the conditions in this table are an encouraging 
inclusion that points to the possibility of communities being able to guide closure planning when 
adequate regulatory frameworks exist. However, the wording used for socio-economic and 
cultural conditions in this table is notably weaker than the wording used for conditions related to 
the natural environment despite regulations in Nunavut being stricter than most other 
territories/provinces. The word ‘encouraged’ is only used in the table when discussing issues 
related to population demographics, livelihoods, economic development, human health and well-
being, community infrastructure, culture, and socio-economic impacts. For other topics, like the 
marine environment and wildlife monitoring, stronger language is used, such as ‘shall ensure,’ 
‘shall review,’ ‘shall maintain,’ and ‘shall meet or exceed.’ 
Within the same territory or region, closure plans vary considerably in how effectively 
they address community knowledge and socio-economic impacts. The Ekati and Diavik closure 
plans contain many positive examples, whereas the Snap Lake closure plan (also in the NWT) 
only nominally meets territorial requirements by including a lengthy community engagement 
report in its appendix, without clear indications of how this information is incorporated into the 
plan. In Nunavut, the Meliadine and Meadowbank closure plans hardly mention potential 
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negative socio-economic impacts, while the Mary River closure plan at least acknowledges a 
wider scope of issues. These variations indicate that, even where policies and guidelines are 
more thorough and directive, companies can interpret and address those policies in ways that suit 
them. In effect, the quality of a company’s closure plan depends on its willingness to go above 
and beyond minimal requirements and honour the spirit of territorial guidelines as well as its 
relationship to local communities.  
3.5. Conclusion 
Successful strategies for involving Indigenous communities in mine closure planning 
remain limited and mostly undocumented in the academic literature and, as this research shows, 
in industry documents. For mine closure to be successful and not repeat past failures, companies 
must work to understand and apply community expertise. Goals and outcomes for closure must 
engage local values, needs, priorities, and visions for the future (Xavier et al., 2015). A detailed 
analysis of northern Canadian closure plans allowed us to examine how government policy and 
industry practices are coming together in this region to create particular futures for mine sites 
(and their affected communities). I asked how these closure plans, the official and detailed 
instructions for the closure of a mine site, are utilizing community knowledge, describing their 
community engagement strategies, and addressing the social dimensions of closure and 
remediation.  
In general, my review of these closure plans reaffirmed observations made elsewhere: 
mine closure focuses heavily on addressing technical issues, while more complex social, cultural, 
and historical challenges are not well understood or left out the scope of the planning process 
(Bainton & Holcombe, 2018; Beckett & Keeling, 2019; Cohen, 2017). Socio-economic impacts 
are poorly addressed and, in many cases, go unacknowledged altogether in these documents. If 
109 
 
negative impacts are listed, they are often too limited in scope or they are related more to the 
earlier phases of the mine’s life, not closure directly. In other cases, companies appear to assume 
that the negative impacts of closure are offset by positive impacts experienced during operations, 
despite closure having unique impacts that require specialized mitigation strategies. Overall, few 
plans contain concrete strategies for mitigation, making any acknowledgements of negative 
impacts ineffective in improving the material conditions of communities after closure. 
Similarly, the community engagement methods for closure planning are poorly 
documented. These methods are critical pieces of information for evaluating the quality of a 
closure plan, as they provide insight into how well the company understands the needs and 
priorities of the communities to whom they are accountable. In some cases, community 
engagement is only spoken about in the future tense, regardless of how close the mine site is to 
its expected closure date. Where past community engagement is described, outcomes are rarely 
included, making it impossible to evaluate whether or not a company has addressed community 
concerns. The contents of these closure plans do not appear to align with mine closure guidelines 
that stress the importance of engaging early with affected communities (Lodhia, 2018; The 
Mining Association of Canada, 2008). These recommendations are particularly important given 
the volatile nature of mineral markets and histories of abrupt closures in northern Canada 
(Laurence, 2006; Sandlos & Keeling, 2016a) – mine companies may not have the time they think 
they do to engage with communities and develop (and execute) long-term, socially and culturally 
appropriate closure strategies.  
The application of community expertise gained through community engagement can 
create space for local contributions to the goals, criteria, and outcomes of closure. This is 
especially important in the North where Indigenous land use, sovereignty, and self-determination 
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can be negatively impacted by large-scale mining developments and the long-term 
environmental impacts of improper remediation (Rodon, 2018). Yet in spite of growing 
participation and consultation in mineral development and environmental assessment, Indigenous 
communities remain largely excluded from mine closure planning. As shown by this analysis, 
closure planning is still falling short in the inclusion of community knowledge. In most of these 
documents, there are no clear indications of how or whether community knowledge was used in 
the plan, nor is local knowledge cited as a source of information related to closure strategies, 
beyond descriptions of the natural environment.  
These findings provide potential lessons that the governments of Yukon, 
Québec/Nunavik, and Nunatsiavut/Newfoundland and Labrador can learn from the NWT and 
Nunavut. Closure guidelines and regulations must explicitly demand that closure plans account 
for more than just the removal of infrastructure and physical remediation of pits and waste piles. 
From an early stage, closure plans must clearly outline strategies for community engagement and 
plan for the sustainability of affected communities. Guidelines from governments and regional 
authorities must establish clear requirements between community engagement, socio-economic 
impacts, and closure. While some mining acts and resource policies have specific requirements 
for community engagement or addressing socio-economic impacts, these are rarely specific to 
the closure phase. This allows companies to neglect these critical elements in closure planning. 
Furthermore, even the best examples of closure governance, like that of the NWT and Nunavut, 
have room for improvement to ensure that there is little opportunity for mine companies to 
interpret regulations and decide how effective and thoughtful they will be based on their own 





MINE CLOSURE PLANNING IN NUNAVIK, QUÉBEC 
4.1. IntroductionEffective and community-engaged mine closure planning is complex. It 
requires that companies, governments, and communities look far into the future, decide what 
they want for the physical, social, and economic post-closure landscape, and have a clear 
understanding of the steps necessary to get there. Chapter Three looked at mine closure from a 
mostly industry perspective, seeking to understand how companies are approaching mine closure 
in the North. This chapter focuses on the role that government plays in mine closure planning in 
Nunavik, a region with complex governance systems that include: local Landholding 
Corporations; multiple regional authorities with different but sometimes overlapping mandates; 
two IBAs; and a land claims agreement that provides Inuit with special rights while also limiting 
many of those rights to a small portion of the territory. All of these are additionally operating 
within the provincial regulatory systems of Québec. Nunavik is currently the site of two 
operational mines (Raglan Mine and Nunavik Nickel), one abandoned and mostly unremediated 
mine (Asbestos Hill), and a substantial amount of mineral exploration activity.  
Mining regulations have become increasingly robust, and companies are required to 
consult with affected communities and abide by the requirements of local land and water boards, 
Indigenous communities, and land claims agreements (Dance et al., in press). In Nunavik, the 
James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement (JBNQA) recognizes the unique rights of 
Nunavimmiut and entitles them to a high degree of consultation. IBAs between companies and 
communities, too, can have consultation requirements that go above what governments require. 
The degree to which these consultation requirements apply to mine closure planning, though, is 
not usually clear. Given the potential for communities to experience a wide range of socio-
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economic impacts when a mine closes, community engagement in closure planning is essential. 
Communities are experts in their own histories, needs, priorities, and values. To understand and 
plan for the socio-economic impacts of mine closure, communities must be meaningfully and 
consistently involved in the closure planning process. Government plays an important role in 
regulating how and when community engagement happens, and what kinds of impacts should be 
included in the scope of closure planning (Fidler, 2010). With careful management, mine closure 
can create opportunities for community growth, sustainability, and empowerment (Bainton & 
Holcombe, 2018; International Council on Mining & Metals, 2019b).  
Importantly, this work is intended to contribute to the expertise of the Raglan Mine 
Closure Plan Sub-committee by illuminating how communities can engage with mine closure 
planning, and what resources are at their disposal for ensuring that the companies operating in 
Nunavik are planning for closure with their respective impacted communities. It also seeks to 
identify what gaps in governance must be filled to ensure this happens. While Raglan Mine has 
established the closure sub-committee (which this research was designed in partnership with), 
Nunavik Nickel has not employed the same level of community engagement. By conducting 
interviews with industry and government actors and reviewing mine closure policies and 
guidelines, it was possible to determine why these differences in engagement exist and what gaps 
in policy can be addressed to allow Nunavimmiut more consistent access to closure planning. 
Interview questions and policy analyses were guided by the following questions: (1) How is 
mine closure governed in Nunavik? (2) What knowledge informs these governing structures and 
policy decisions? And (3) how is government facilitating Inuit participation in closure planning? 
This chapter will demonstrate how limitations in mineral and mine closure governance in 
Nunavik are producing risks for Nunavimmiut. There is a lack of clear regulations for mine 
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closure specifically, which leaves communities vulnerable to negative social and economic 
impacts after the inevitable closures of the Raglan Mine and Nunavik Nickel mines. Ample 
regulations exist for mine development and operations, and before authorization all mine projects 
are subject to an ESIA which typically involves public consultations and a review by regional 
authorities. However, follow-up and enforcement mechanisms decrease once the ESIA is 
complete and the project is licensed, which creates challenges for ensuring that communities 
continue to be involved in the project and that key socio-economic issues are being addressed in 
closure planning. These front-end processes, or the steps taken early in a mine’s life to facilitate 
development and operations, are the main focus of mineral governance. These processes give 
more attention to the physical aspects of mine closure than social and economic considerations. 
The regulatory framework for mine closure puts forth strict requirements for remediating the 
mine site after closure but has little to say about protecting communities from social and 
economic disruptions. Similarly, community engagement requirements for mine development 
and operations are more fleshed out than those for closure planning, which is controlled largely 
by IBA conditions and the decisions of individual companies. If governments are to protect 
Nunavimmiut far into the future and contribute to the sustainability of Nunavik communities, 
policy must be explicit in how closure must happen and how communities should be involved in 
the planning process.  
4.2. Methods 
To understand the governance of mine closure in Nunavik, particularly those aspects 
related to socio-economic impacts and community engagement, this research employed semi-
structured interviews with employees of regional and provincial governments as well as 
executive level employees working for the two operational mines in the region – Nunavik Nickel 
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(owned by Canadian Royalties) and Raglan Mine (owned by Glencore). Purposive sampling was 
used in the selection of interview participants. This sampling method involved the selection of 
interview participants based on a particular characteristic that they possess that makes them 
qualified to be an informant (Patton, 2002; Tongco, 2007). Generalizability is not the aim of this 
method; instead this sampling method is meant to produce interview data that will explain 
specific complex systems based on the expertise of participants (Bolderston, 2012). In this case, 
key informants include government and industry actors that have information about mineral 
policy, the process of mine closure planning, and/or community engagement in Nunavik. 
Interviews with government officials are useful for gaining insight about the internal dynamics 
that influence policy decisions, or “the informal backstage of decision-making and priority 
setting … bringing to the forefront aspects of context that are not necessarily written down at the 
time of decision-making” (Jiwani & Krawchenko, 2014, p. 59). Participants were recruited either 
in person during a two-week stay in Kuujjuaq (Nunavik) in April/May 2019 during the Nunavik 
Mining Workshop or through email based on my own knowledge and networks or with the help 
of participants putting me in contact with colleagues who they thought I would benefit from 
speaking to.  
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the primary method because they are valuable 
for gaining in-depth knowledge and personal experience with complex topics. They make use of 
a flexible interview guide as opposed to a strict set of questions or completely open-ended 
conversations. This allows participants to guide the interview based on their unique knowledge 
and expertise and cover topics or details that the interviewer may not have been previously aware 
of, while still ensuring that important topics relevant to the research questions are covered 
(Bolderston, 2012; Hay, 2010). A total of 15 individuals were interviewed over nine sessions 
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(Table 4.1). Regional authorities covered by these interviews were Makivik Corporation 
(Makivik), the Kativik Regional Government (KRG), Kativik Environmental Advisory 
Committee (KEAC), and Kativik Environmental Quality Commission (KEQC). Interviews with 
Nunavik Nickel and Raglan Mine executive-level employees also occurred. An interview with 
two employees of the Ministère de l'Énergie et des Ressources naturelles (MERN) took place in 
early 2020 and the participants’ consent was contingent on the interview transcript being 
approved by their manager first. Unfortunately, the transcript was never approved. No reason 
was offered and I simply stopped receiving responses from the interview participants. This 
happened during the spring of 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic that caused widespread 
disruptions in business and government operations, and so this may have impacted the review 
and approval process. The information in this interview does not contribute to the data used for 
this research, although it did provide helpful background information that I used to find relevant 
information elsewhere (e.g. specific policies relevant to mine closure or layperson explanations 
of regulations). An interview request was also made to the Ministère de l'Environnement et de la 
Lutte Contre les Changements Climatiques (MELCC, also more casually referred to as the 
Ministry of Environment) in early 2020. I provided a written list of questions, to which they 
provided written answers in July 2020. Most interviews were one-on-one conversations, 
although two sessions involved multiple participants at once. These operated similarly to one-on-
one interviews, though, using the same question guide as the others.  
Table 4.1: Information about interview participants 
Interview #  Participant affiliation Date of interview Method 
1 Makivik Corporation April 2019 In person 
2 Makivik Corporation April 2019 In person 
3  Kativik Regional Government May 2019 In person 
4 Kativik Environmental Advisory Committee May 2019 In person 
5 Raglan Mine May 2019 In person 
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6 Kativik Environmental Advisory Committee June 2019 Phone 
7 Nunavik Nickel1 June 2019 Phone 
8 Nunavik Nickel June 2019 Phone 
9 Kativik Environmental Quality Commission2 February 2020 In person 
10 Kativik Environmental Quality Commission February 2020 In person 
11 Kativik Environmental Quality Commission February 2020 In person 
12 Kativik Environmental Quality Commission February 2020 In person 
13 Kativik Environmental Quality Commission February 2020 In person 
14 Kativik Environmental Quality Commission February 2020 In person 
15 MELCC July 6, 2020 E-mail 
1, 2 The two Nunavik Nickel participants were interviewed at the same time, and the six KEQC participants were 
interviewed as a group. 
This research would have benefitted from interviews with local Landholding 
Corporations (LHCs) and leaders in IBA signatory communities (Salluit, Kangiqsujuaq, and 
Puvirnituq), as they are the stewards of Inuit-owned lands and include individuals who are most 
likely to participate in on-the-ground mine closure planning. These interviews were not sought 
out as it likely would have required travel to the communities. This would have gone against the 
wishes of the Inuit parties on the Raglan closure sub-committee who, as discussed in the Chapter 
One, felt that travel to these small communities would have placed an unnecessary burden on 
them for little material gain. Research objectives and methods were developed with guidance 
from the sub-committee to ensure that the research was both helpful and appropriate, and thus 
travel to Nunavik was limited to the one trip to Kuujjuaq. However, information about the LHCs 
and local forms of government were gained through both formal interviews and informal 
conversations with community leaders and government employees that occurred during my stay 
in Kuujjuaq and attendance at closure sub-committee meetings.  
In order to develop an understanding of the systems governing closure planning, 
participants were asked questions related to their knowledge and experience with mine closure 
planning, as well as their organization’s priorities and strategies for mine closure and community 
engagement. Interviews lasted between 25 and 70 minutes and occurred either in person, over the 
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phone, or through email depending on the participant’s location. In person and phone interviews 
were manually transcribed and sent back to participants via email, at which point they were 
given the opportunity to review the transcript and make any changes or omissions that they felt 
were necessary. Three transcripts received minor revisions for the sake of clarity and accuracy, 
and the rest remained in their original form. Analysis involved the reading and re-reading of 
these transcripts, sorting data into themes and categories, and making connections between 
different interviews to understand where information is repeated and where gaps in knowledge 
exist (Roulston, 2014). Themes that data were sorted into were based on the three research 
questions: (1) How mine closure is regulated; (2) the knowledge about and experience with mine 
closure that informs those systems; and (3) strategies for facilitating Inuit participation in closure 
planning.  
Lastly, policy and guidance documents from Nunavik and Québec were examined to 
supplement this data (Table 4.2). Documents produced by the Government of Québec, Makivik 
Corporation, and the KEQC pertaining to mining, mine closure, and Indigenous consultation 
were collected from government websites. Many of these documents were referenced in 
interviews and informal conversations with government and industry employees, and they cover 
all of the major policies and guidelines used to assess and regulate mine closure. Questions that 
this policy review sought to answer were: (1) Do government policies and guidelines explain 
how companies should address socio-economic aspects of closure? If so, how, and what specific 
impacts are included? (2) Do government policies and guidelines explain how companies should 
engage with impacted Indigenous communities in closure planning? If so, how? And (3) Do 
government policies and guidelines have clear requirements for including community concerns 
and knowledge into their closure plan? Like Chapter Three, this analysis involved reading each 
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document closely and copying relevant text into one of three categories based on the three 
research questions to create a summary of how these issues are (or are not) being addressed by 
formal government regulations. This combination of text from policies and guidelines and 
accounts from government and industry employees about their organization/company’s strategies 
for closure planning combined to create a figurative map of mine closure governance in 
Nunavik. The results detailed in this chapter are meant to make this map of mine closure 
governance clear and identify gaps in knowledge and regulations that, if left unaddressed, could 
lead to more examples of poorly remediated mine sites and community social and economic 
decline in the North. 
Table 4.2: Government documents related to mining and mine closure that were examined 
Authority Document 
Government of Québec Environmental Quality Act (2020) 
Government of Québec Section 23 Schedule 3 of the James Bay Northern Québec Agreement 
(1985) 
Government of Québec Mining Act (2020) 
MELCC Directive 019 sur l’Industrie Minière (2012) 
MERN Guidelines for Preparing Mine Closure Plans in Québec (2017) 
MERN Guidelines of the Ministère de l’Energie et des Ressources Naturelles 
in the Area of Social Responsibility (2017) 
MERN Aboriginal Community Consultation Policy Specific to the Mining 
Sector (2019) 
Makivik Corporation Nunavik Inuit Mining Policy (2015) 
Makivik Corporation Nunavik Guidebook: Mineral Exploration, Mining Development and 
the Nunavik Region (2011) 
Kativik Environmental Quality 
Commission 
Information and Public Consultation Procedure (1998) 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Mine Governance 
The province of Québec has final decision-making authority for all aspects of mineral 
development in Nunavik, including mine closure. The MELCC and MERN are responsible for 
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governing how mine closure happens, what mine closure plans must contain, and the standards 
for remediation. The Mining Act and Environmental Quality Act regulate most aspects of mine 
closure, while Directive 019 and the Guidelines for Preparing Mine Closure Plans in Québec are 
guidance documents that communicate the provincial government’s expectations for proponents. 
As for regional authorities, only the KEQC has a defined role in closure planning through the 
impact assessment process and regular review of closure plans. Makivik and the KRG may sit on 
committees with mine companies where closure is discussed (such as the Raglan closure sub-
committee, which Makivik is a member of), but these engagements originate more from the 
companies themselves than from government regulations.  
Despite the social, economic, and cultural protection of Nunavimmiut being built into the 
mandates of the KEQC, KEAC, KRG, and Makivik, the focus of regional government policies is 
largely on physical, environmental remediation. Statements about whether and how companies 
should assess and mitigate negative socio-economic impacts either do not exist at all, are vague 
and unhelpful, or are not related to closure specifically. Québec’s guidelines for preparing 
closure plans state that “reclamation techniques may affect wildlife, plants and the social 
environment” and that “the reclamation of accumulation areas must attain technical, 
environmental, and social objectives” (Ministère de l’Énergie et des Ressources naturelles, 2017, 
p. 27). However, this document does not define ‘social objectives’ and provides no guidance on 
how to measure success in meeting them. The Nunavik Inuit Mining Policy sets out objectives 
and corresponding actions for proponents to minimize the negative social and environmental 
impacts of mines, but there are no actions related to the social aspects of closure and the policy 
does not explain what negative impacts it is referring to that a company should be cognizant of. 
Only one action related to closure exists at all, which is that the site must “be restored to once 
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again permit access to Nunavik Inuit, as close to the original state of the sites as possible, and to 
ensure they will not be a source of environmental contamination or a danger to humans or 
wildlife” (Makivik Corporation, 2014a, p. 14), reinforcing the observation that mine closure 
tends to be framed as being solely related to environmental remediation. 
There is rarely overlap between mine closure regulations and requirements for mitigating 
socio-economic impacts. The Mining Act, Environmental Quality Act, and Guidelines for 
Producing Mine Closure Plans in Québec discuss the requirements for the environmental, 
technical, and engineering aspects of closure in great detail, while the social, economic, and 
cultural aspects are considered only in relation to a mine’s construction and operation phases. 
Connections are not made between the closure phase of a mine’s life and possible negative 
impacts to human communities. Section 23 schedule 3 of the JBNQA, which describes the 
necessary elements of an ESIA in Nunavik, states that proponents should be attentive “to impacts 
occurring at different phases of development, and on different scales” (Québec, 1985). This is 
the closest the agreement comes to discussing closure and remediation. The Nunavik Inuit 
Mining Policy states that an impact assessment must be completed for mineral exploration and 
mine operations, but not for closure (Makivik Corporation, 2014a). The MELCC’s Directive 
019, which sets out the Ministry’s expectations and is used in evaluating a project, states that 
proponents must indicate how the project might influence a community’s traditional way of life, 
including changes to the accessibility of areas used for hunting, fishing, and trapping (Ministère 
de l’Environnement et de la Lutte Contre les Changements Climatiques, 2012). It could be 
argued that this statement should apply to the post-closure environment, but it is not explicit and 
could be interpreted and applied differently by different proponents. 
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Much of the region’s influence over mineral development and mine closure comes from 
the KEQC. Unlike most other land claims agreement signatories throughout Canada, the KEQC 
has decision-making power regarding lands and resources (Rodon, 2018). As one participant 
explained, though, the power that this committee holds comes largely from the ESIA that occurs 
during the planning phase of a project’s life (Interview #1). Before beginning work on a project, 
proponents must provide the KEQC with preliminary information about the proposed 
development. Then, the committee determines whether or not an impact assessment is required 
and the scope of the assessment, which typically involves public consultations and research to 
determine the possible social and environmental impacts of the project (Ministère de 
l’Environnement et de la Lutte Contre les Changements Climatiques, 2020). Based on the impact 
assessment, the KEQC can either deny or approve the project and, if approved, outlines the 
conditions under which the project can be developed (Interview #15). This applies to all lands in 
Nunavik. After the impact assessment has concluded and the project approved, the proponent 
must submit documentation of their activities each year for additional review by the KEQC, 
although these yearly updates do not go through individual impact assessments or go out for 
public review (Interview #6). 
The ESIA process allows for regional governments and communities to communicate 
their needs and expectations for a new mine. While impact assessments are not specific to the 
closure and remediation stage, they are meant to account for possible project impacts at every 
stage, from construction to post-closure. This means the KEQC does have some ability to assess 
and set conditions for the company’s plan for closure and remediation. A preliminary closure 
plan is provided to the KEQC as part of the impact assessment process, which it can review, 
approve, reject, and set additional conditions. A KEQC member explained that subsequent 
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interim closure plans produced every five years as required by the Mining Act are also reviewed, 
at which point the committee can seek additional information from the company, send the 
closure plan back for revisions, or set additional conditions (Interview #7). It is MERN’s 
responsibility to approve these interim plans, but, as one participant explained, “[MERN] will 
take into account our comments. If we say it makes no sense, they will not approve it” (Interview 
#10). When asked about the role KEQC would play in assessing a mine’s final closure plan, the 
last one produced before the mine formally enters into closure, a participant explained that the 
KEQC will “have the final say” on whether or not the company has fulfilled its remediation 
responsibilities. However, the committee has not been through this process yet because the 
region’s only closed mine (Asbestos Hill) shut down before the Mining Act and Environmental 
Quality Act existed (Interview #11). Finally, despite the important role that the KEQC plays in 
ensuring mine companies are acting in the best interest of Nunavimmiut, the province can 
overturn any of the KEQC’s decisions at any point, meaning the province holds more formal 
power over Nunavik lands (Rodon, 2018).  
Other regional authorities fill an advisory role to government and industry, with little 
formal power to make decisions. The KEAC in particular makes policy recommendations to 
relevant governing bodies to ensure that the environmental and social protection regime outlined 
in the JBNQA is upheld. It meets several times each year and facilitate research into the possible 
effects of provincial and federal policy changes. KEAC’s mandate includes pursuing actions 
“regarding sustainable development, the safeguarding of biodiversity, climate change, and the 
quality of life of the residents of Nunavik” (Kativik Environmental Advisory Committee, 2020). 
A KEAC member explained that if, for example, the provincial government was amending or 
creating new regulations, the committee would “study the possible impacts this could have on 
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the region and its inhabitants, and then we make recommendations to the government 
accordingly” (Interview #4). For example, in 2018 it provided feedback on draft regulations 
stemming from the Environmental Quality Act and requested that new protections regarding 
adverse effects on wetlands and other bodies of water be extended to also apply to Nunavik. In 
this way the KEAC plays a similar role as the KEQC, but in relation to government policy rather 
than specific development proposals and with less power to make decisions.  
Makivik Corporation also advises government and industry, with the primary purpose of 
promoting regional social and economic agendas. Makivik is, as one participant described, “the 
watchdog for Nunavik Inuit rights and interests,” encouraging good industry practices that are in 
line with the views and lifestyles of Nunavimmiut (Interview #1, April 2019). It receives, 
administers, and invests JBNQA compensation money for beneficiaries, and facilitates economic 
development that they believe will improve the lives of Nunavimmiut, balancing financial gains, 
environmental quality, and community well-being. In 2002, for example, Makivik entered a 
partnership with the Québec Government, called the Sanarrutik Agreement, that outlined a 
shared economic vision for development in Nunavik. It focused on mining and energy 
development as a means to improve living conditions for Nunavik residents (Makivik 
Corporation, 2014a). In 2015, in response to Plan Nord, which similarly promoted resource 
development in Nunavik but without any consultation with Nunavimmiut, Makivik created the 
Nunavik Inuit Mining Policy. The guiding principle of this policy is to ensure that “Inuit derive 
significant direct and indirect social and economic benefits during the exploration, development, 
operating and restoration phases of mining activity in Nunavik” (Makivik Corporation, 2014a, p. 
12). A Makivik employee explained that the Nunavik Inuit Mining Policy is “a process and a 
framework for mining companies to work closely with… collaborate with us to negotiate IBAs 
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and whatnot,” but it has no enforcement mechanisms, and “in terms of authority and making 
regulations and policies, [Makivik is] not set up for that” (Interview #2). Thus, Makivik’s role is 
to both encourage mineral development activities and also restrict it in ways that align with the 
needs and values of Nunavik Inuit, but it does so with little formal decision-making power.  
Lastly, the KRG acts as a public municipal government for the region and as such is more 
focused on service provision, land-use planning, and the general operations of the Northern 
Villages. It has jurisdiction over all of Nunavik and is involved broadly in inspections and 
follow-up with regard to mining activities and the environment. KRG is currently in the process 
of revising the region’s master land-use plan, which influences where exploration and mining 
activities can take place. The current master land-use plan was adopted in 1998 and required 
companies to notify the KRG about their activities and consult with adjacent communities. 
Proposed revisions would also create zoning by-laws that allow the KRG to reject certain 
activities (Interview #3). KRG’s Renewable Resources, Environment, Lands and Parks 
Department acts as a liaison between the MELCC and the communities on environmental issues 
and assists in addressing specific environmental concerns (Kativik Regional Government, 2019). 
The LHCs and NVs in each community also operate as a more local municipal government with 
assistance from the KRG, and they are similarly concerned mostly with general operations. They 
are responsible for issuing permits and authorization for any development proposed on Category 
I and II lands, but currently no mining activities have occurred outside of Category III lands. 
Both the LHCs and NV of Salluit, Kangiqsujuaq, and Puvirnituq are signatories of their 
respective IBAs with Raglan Mine and Nunavik Nickel, though, so they have a role in mine 
closure planning through IBA negotiations and subsequent engagement requirements. 
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Because most of these regional authorities act as advisors to other governments and 
industry, the ability of regional authorities to participate in decision-making relies on the 
relationship between the two levels of government. Participants from regional authorities mostly 
expressed confidence in their good relationships with the province and explained that, despite the 
province having greater authority, Quebec authorities have always agreed with the 
recommendations of regional bodies. One participant explained that in 30 years the Ministry of 
Environment has always agreed to the conditions set by the KEQC (Interview #3). Another 
stated that the provincial government always takes regional policy recommendations into 
account, and that the recent amendments to the Mining Act included a consultation policy that 
was directly connected to the Nunavik Inuit Mining Policy’s principle of transparent 
communication (Interview #1). However, the KEQC has never outright rejected an unwanted 
project and thus it is unclear if the province would support this kind of decision (Rodon, 2018). 
While good relationships currently exist, one participant from Nunavik argued that the province 
has greater incentive to push a project forward regardless of the region’s approval because it has 
more to gain and less to lose. The province will gain tax revenues and know that any negative 
impacts from mineral development will occur in remote areas where relatively small populations 
live compared to the south. This participant explained,  
[The Québec Government] will want to reap the benefits and more employment means 
more tax to make the economy roll, so I mean they’re all for development, it’s in their 
favour … so I think governments are very pro-development and that’s why these mines 
have the go-ahead even though the social acceptability was not there.33 (Interview #2) 
In terms of practical challenges in the relationship between regional and provincial 
authorities, participants identified communication and access to resources as problems. A 
 
33 In stating that ‘the social acceptability was not there,’ this participant is referring to the development of Nunavik 
Nickel’s wharf at Deception Bay, which many people from Salluit and Kangiqsujuaq were opposed to because there 
is an existing wharf there for Raglan Mine. 
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member of the KEAC, in describing the communication challenges between the region and 
province, explained that “there’s a problem on both ends.” On one hand, they explained, the 
province tends to organize meetings and consultations last minute. On the other hand, when the 
province does reach out to regional organizations or LHCs, there may not be much of a response. 
This participant also explained that some organizations in Nunavik, namely KRG, are also 
limited in their ability to access federal grants because of its status as a region within the 
province, and so relies heavily on the province to act on crucial issues (Interview #4). In fact, in 
2018 the KEAC sent a letter to Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada 
(CIRNAC) that brought attention to how frequently the NVs and KRG are excluded from federal 
funding programs intended for Indigenous and northern communities. The letter argued that 
important environmental priorities have not been addressed because of limited financial support 
from both Québec and Canada (Kativik Environmental Advisory Committee, 2019). The 
remediation of Asbestos Hill, for instance, remains a provincial responsibility and is moving 
much more slowly than regional authorities and community members would like, despite the 
region and Nunavimmiut being highly motivated to move forward with this work34 (Interview 
#6). 
4.3.2. Mine Closure Knowledge and Experience 
Much of the regional authorities’ knowledge and experience about the environmental 
aspects of remediation come from a two-decades-long clean-up project for the many abandoned 
 
34 The Asbestos Hill site was classified as an orphaned mine and added to the province’s abandoned mine site 
priority list 2019, at which point the provincial government was able to allocate funds for its remediation. Before 
then, it was still under private ownership despite it not being operational since 1984, and therefore the provincial 
government had difficulty taking over responsibility of the site. While many of those interviewed recognized these 
challenges, there was also a belief that the province could have worked harder and moved quicker given the high 




mineral exploration sites located throughout Nunavik. Mine companies were not required to 
clean up exploration sites before 1976, and so equipment, fuel caches, and chemicals were often 
left behind without any cleanup, especially if the equipment at the site became outdated and less 
valuable (Duhaime & Comtois, 2003). As KEAC and KRG participants explained, in the 1990s 
Nunavimmiut began asking KRG for assistance cleaning up barrels, chemicals, and equipment 
left on the land by mineral exploration companies. These materials were beginning to degrade 
and become unstable, creating health and safety risks for the environment and communities 
(Duhaime, Bernard, & Comtois, 2005). After several years of consistent complaints about these 
sites, KRG began to formally look into the issue. Through a combination of community surveys 
and aerial photos, 600 possible abandoned exploration sites were identified, of which 275 
abandoned sites were confirmed (Duhaime et al., 2005). Because of the negative attention these 
exploration sites were receiving in the news, mineral exploration companies working in the 
region established the Fonds du Restor-Action Nunavik (FRAN) and, between 30 companies, 
raised $2 million for this restoration work. MERN contributed an additional $4 million. Of the 
275 confirmed abandoned sites, 25 represented a major risk, 95 represented a moderate risk, and 
the rest were minor risks (Duhaime et al., 2005). Between 2000 and 2017, through FRAN, 90 
sites were remediated, and work has now begun on an additional 30 sites (Interview #6). These 
sites range from being ‘minor,’ with fewer than ten barrels and small pieces of equipment, to 
‘major,’ with buildings, trailers, heavy equipment, hundreds of barrels filled with hydrocarbon 
based products, oil, diesel, and jet fuels, and large batteries (Interview #6).  
Although the interview questions for this project were specific to mine closure, 
participants frequently spoke about these abandoned exploration sites. It was clear throughout 
most of the interviews that there is greater focus on, knowledge about, and experience with the 
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cleanup of these sites than the long-term planning for the closure of fully operational mines. The 
experience with the FRAN project provided valuable knowledge about environmental cleanup 
and brought attention to the tendency for some mine companies to leave materials behind when 
regulations are weak and consequences are unlikely. The remediation of major mine sites, 
though, are much more complex endeavors that will require a much greater breadth of expertise 
and technical knowledge than regional authorities currently have (Interview #6). Mine closure is 
also more likely to have challenging socio-economic dimensions than small exploration site 
cleanups. 
The abandoned Asbestos Hill mine has played a key role in shaping regional authorities’ 
knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes about closure. Participants working for regional bodies 
frequently pointed to Asbestos Hill as an example of poor outcomes related to mine closure and 
remediation. Carney (2017) details the legacies left behind by this mine, such as the 
unremediated tailings and asbestos contamination at the mine site as well as in between the site 
and the port at Deception Bay, which has affected wildlife and human health. Interview 
participants referenced the harm caused by Asbestos Hill in describing their ideals and priorities 
for future closures. For instance, participants often referred to the poorly remediated and 
currently eroding tailings pile at Asbestos Hill and emphasized the importance of the tailings 
piles at Raglan Mine and Nunavik Nickel being contained, stabilized, monitored, and made to 
blend into the surrounding environment. Participants also explained that neither the communities 
nor the region benefitted from Asbestos Hill due to the lack of benefits-sharing agreements. As a 
result, profit-sharing, preferential hiring for Inuit and preferential contracting for local and Inuit-
owned businesses were a priority in future negotiations with Raglan Mine and Nunavik Nickel. 
One KEQC member explained that there is no way to avoid all of the negative environmental 
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impacts of mining because it is ultimately a destructive activity, but the committee can ensure 
that those impacts are minimized and that Inuit gain something in return (Interview #9).  
The socio-economic impacts of closure, while largely absent in policy, are relatively well 
known to regional actors. Indeed, there appears to be a disconnect between what regional 
authorities know about closure and what policy accounts for. When asked about how mine 
closure can impact northern communities, participants often spoke about sustainability. Many 
recognize that the communities have benefitted considerably from mining activities in the region, 
but remain skeptical that these benefits are contributing to community sustainability, or that they 
will last long after closure. Issues related to the abrupt decline or end of employment, tax and 
business revenue, and profit-sharing arrangements came up just as frequently as those related to 
tailings stability, water quality, and landscape changes. Participants expressed concern about the 
impact that mine closure may have on a community’s ability to maintain infrastructure and 
services, and how unemployment could affect the health and well-being of families and the 
community. Another concern was the possibility that Inuit will lose their jobs without 
transferable skills or employment opportunities in other industries in the region/community. One 
participant explained,  
When these people stop working there at the mine, that will be 2.5 million dollars a year 
[in wages and compensation] that will disappear … The standard of living might drop, 
some families might have difficulty paying rent, buying food, and maybe some other 
social impacts will happen at home. Contractors too, it is not only for employees, Air 
Inuit is making money, other companies in Nunavik are making money [from the mines]. 
(Interview #9) 
Interviewees also mentioned environmental issues in the context of their human impacts. 
Both the mines active in Nunavik are in the Deception Bay region and have port facilities in 
Deception Bay, which is used by Inuit in Salluit and Kangiqsujuaq for hunting and fishing. 
Community members and regional authorities already suspect that the area has widespread 
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asbestos contamination from Asbestos Hill, and the additional mining and shipping activities of 
Raglan Mine and Nunavik Nickel increase concerns about Inuit being able to continue 
subsistence practices after closure. Similarly, when Nunavik-based participants described what 
the ideal mine closure scenario would look like they described both physical and community 
characteristics: the site is returned to its pre-mining state, there is long-term environmental 
monitoring, communities adopt infrastructure and materials from the mine, former employees 
have transferable skills, and the community has a sense of ownership and pride in closure 
outcomes. 
A common theme across most interviews was the separation between an older, 
problematic generation of mines and a new, socially responsible, and technologically 
sophisticated generation of mines. Participants categorized Asbestos Hill as an old mine that 
operated and closed before the Mining Act and Environmental Quality Act were adopted, before 
closure plans and financial securities were required, and before IBAs and land claim agreements 
guaranteed benefits and protections for communities. The older generation of mines that 
operated before the 1990s did so in a regulatory landscape that facilitated development without 
concern for environmental and human impacts. By contrast, participants identified Raglan Mine 
and Nunavik Nickel as being part of the newer generation of mines that are operating within a 
system that ensures humans and the environment are protected through strict health and 
environmental standards, “polluter pays” laws, up-front financial securities, greater 
environmental monitoring, and a political landscape that empowers northern territories, regions, 
and peoples. However, despite the belief that we have entered a new age of socially responsible 




We find sites that should not be there at all because they are new. You know by looking 
at the tools and equipment and just the camps themselves it probably dates to the 2000s 
… These people should have cleaned up their materials, according to the Mining Act, and 
should not have left anything behind. (Interview #6) 
Thus, despite trust in the existing regulatory system and a belief that governance has improved 
significantly in recent decades, there still appear to be problems. This quote points to possible 
challenges with enforcement, as even in this new era of responsible mining some companies will 
still not act in the best interest of the region if they are unlikely to suffer consequences. 
4.3.3. Avenues for Community Engagement 
Both provincial and regional governments require community engagement between mine 
companies and Indigenous communities, although this is typically limited to the early stages of a 
project’s life. The JBNQA recognizes the special status and rights of Nunavimmiut which entitle 
them to a level of involvement over and above the consultation and representation mechanisms 
to which the general public of Québec is entitled (Québec, 1985). However, the land regime 
established by the JBNQA also does not specifically require community engagement on 
Category III lands, which make up 85% of the region. This does not mean Nunavimmiut and 
regional governments have no ability to be involved with developments occurring on Category 
III lands, but that those requirements come more through IBAs, industry good will, and the 
recommendations of the KEQC than from any specific government regulation. Projects occurring 
anywhere in Nunavik regardless of land category must go through an ESIA, and through that 
process the KEQC can make recommendations to the province and set conditions for the 
company that dictate how it should engage with communities (Interview #6). Although KEAC 
and Makivik do not have regulatory or decision-making power, they do put pressure on industry 
and government to influence decision-making. Community members in the Northern Villages 
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can bring any concerns to Makivik or KEAC and those organizations can provide advice and/or 
bring these concerns to other governing bodies or the companies themselves (Interview #4). 
Community-engaged mine closure planning, however, is not explicitly required by any 
level of government. The most recent amendment of the Quebec Mining Act in 2013 now 
requires mining companies to establish a joint company-community committee that “must be 
established within 30 days after the lease is issued and must be maintained until all the work 
provided for in the rehabilitation and restoration plan has been completed” (Quebec, 2020), 
pointing to positive improvements in provincial requirements for community-engaged closure 
planning. The purpose of this committee is to ensure community involvement of all aspects of 
the project, and the requirement that it exist until after remediation has been completed means 
that it is more likely now that communities will be involved in planning for or assessing closure 
outcomes. However, provincial policies and regulations do not offer much specific guidance for 
how communities should be engaged, especially for closure planning, or what issues should be 
addressed in this company-community committee. Similar to the absence of clear guidelines of 
addressing socio-economic impacts in closure, connections are scarcely made between 
community engagement and closure planning in the regulations. When asked about avenues for 
community engaged closure planning, the MELCC referred only to the ESIA and the role of the 
KEQC and community consultation in that process, and did not mention closure at all in its 
answer (Interview #15). 
For current mines in the region, closure planning with communities has largely been 
limited to the activities of the Raglan Mine Closure Sub-committee, an initiative which came 
from the company itself and was not a requirement of any government. This committee may 
influence the practices of other companies. One participant explained that Canadian Royalties 
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(operator of Nunavik Nickel) seems to follow the actions of Raglan Mine, and that when 
Makivik submits a proposal or request to the company based on its experience with Raglan 
Mine, Canadian Royalties will quickly accept it without issue (Interview #1). Participants also 
suggested that a similar closure committee for Nunavik Nickel be established so that 
communities can have the same level of involvement in closure planning as they do now with 
Raglan Mine through its closure sub-committee. 
The community engagement strategies between Raglan Mine and Nunavik Nickel appear 
to be quite different, despite the former’s positive influence. In speaking about the relationship 
between regional authorities, communities, and the two mine companies, many participants 
explained that Raglan Mine communicates more effectively and consistently than Canadian 
Royalties. Some said that Canadian Royalties provides relatively less information to authorities 
and communities about their operations than Raglan Mine, and others said there was a complete 
lack of communication. One participant had coordinated with Raglan Mine on many occasions 
and explained that they have provided in-kind support for some regional projects despite having 
no obligations to assist the region in this way (Interview #6). Based on interviews with Raglan 
Mine and Nunavik Nickel employees, Raglan Mine’s strategy for community engagement is 
focused on a two-way exchange of information between company and community while 
Nunavik Nickel’s engagement is limited to providing information to communities. The former is 
a two-way exchange, while the latter is only one-way. The IBAs for both companies mandated a 
steering committee for the full existence of the mine’s life that meets at regular intervals and has 
members from all IBA communities and the company. Thus, there are mechanisms to ensure 
ongoing engagement with communities. However, much of the work that Raglan Mine does 
appears to go beyond the minimal requirements of regulations and their IBA. For instance, the 
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Raglan Closure Sub-committee is not legally required but was deemed necessary by the 
company and community members who expressed the need to know more about their tailings 
management strategy (Interview #5). 
Participants cited several challenges to successful community engagement in closure 
planning. These include trust issues stemming from Asbestos Hill and the industry’s tendency to 
avoid speaking honestly about uncertainties and risk (Interview #7). One participant explained 
that fluctuations in the financial well-being of a company can also impact how frequently and 
effectively they engage with communities (Interview #5). Most often, participants spoke of the 
limited community knowledge about closure and its possible negative impacts. Recent research 
done by another TERRE-NET student found this same result within the communities: individual 
participants did not have a lot of knowledge about mine closure and its possible impacts, and so 
planning for closure with communities may be challenging (Potvin, 2018).  
The region only has one previous example of closure to draw from (Asbestos Hill), and 
the issues associated with exploration and operations are at the forefront of people’s minds, 
while closure is much easier to forget about. Both Nunavik Nickel and Raglan Mine are currently 
expanding operations, and countless mineral exploration companies come to the region to take 
samples and talk to communities every summer. Ensuring Nunavik residents are benefiting from 
employment and training and that the environment is being adequately protected takes priority 
(consciously or unconsciously) over long-term planning for the future closure of those sites. One 
is a clear immediate need, while the other is more easily forgotten about or thought to be 
something that can be dealt with at a later date. Future-oriented thinking in general was identified 
by participants as being a major challenge in closure planning. Raglan Mine, for example, is not 
expected to close until at least 2041. One participant explained, 
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My children’s kids might be the ones who have to close the mine, but my mind hasn’t 
practiced thinking that out, what that entails. I think that’s an exercise we need to always 
keep. Much like an extinguisher you always keep handy in case of a fire, I think we need 
to have that train of thought of saying, ‘okay the mine is closing, what does that mean?’ 
(Interview #2). 
Assuming the dates in their most recent closure plans are accurate, Nunavik Nickel will 
likely close much sooner than Raglan Mine unless significant new ore bodies are found. Nunavik 
Nickel could close between two and six years from now. So, while thinking 20 years into the 
future for Raglan Mine’s closure can be challenging, there are also much more immediate 
planning needs for Nunavik Nickel. One participant acknowledged the limited information 
residents and regional governments have and closure, and explained that that lack of knowledge, 
combined with its inevitability, can feel overwhelming or defeating, making it difficult for 
officials to know where to begin (Interview #13). Thus, the lack of knowledge about closure can 
perpetuate a lack of regional planning.  
Despite these challenges and a lack of clear guidance coming from government, 
interview participants stressed that community involvement in closure planning is important and 
worth pursuing. Most often, participants stated that closure-specific community engagement 
would be helpful for increasing awareness about the realities of closure. By participating in the 
process, companies learn from Inuit what they want from closure and Inuit learn about closure 
and remediation. If there were more closure-specific engagement activities happening in the 
region, community members would perhaps become more aware and motivated to participate in 
closure planning. Some participants similarly explained that community engagement should 
involve site visits so Nunavimmiut can more fully comprehend the scale of these sites and their 
tailings. Community engagement, particularly with Elders, hunters, and Landholding 
Corporations, was also seen as critical for restoring the site as close as possible to its pre-mining 
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state, with healthy terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems to protect hunting, fishing, and harvesting 
activities. Lastly, it was recognized that participating in planning as well as the actual 
remediation work can provide work experience and help those involved find future employment. 
Local people are hired each year to assist with the abandoned mine site cleanup and one 
participant expressed that it was valuable for both those participating (who made an income and 
could put the work on their resume) and those organizing the cleanup (who benefitted from 
community members’ knowledge about the local environment) (Interview #6).  
4.4. Discussion 
The results outlined in this chapter point to some key shortcomings in closure governance 
in Nunavik, namely the overconfidence in incomplete policies and overreliance on impact 
assessments and job creation for mitigating socio-economic risks. Through interviews and a 
review of relevant mining policies it is clear that the provincial government retains most of the 
power to regulate closure, and regional authorities gain much of their influence through the ESIA 
process and by playing an advisory role to the province. There appears to be no authority, 
program, department, or individual in Nunavik that is wholly responsible for ensuring the 
region’s mines are planning for socio-economic mine closure with their respective communities. 
Despite the limited official power of regional authorities, interview participants expressed 
confidence in modern closure regulations as well as their relationship with the provincial 
government. They cited the ESIA process and financial security requirements as examples of 
good closure governance, but acknowledged a lack of knowledge about mine closure, 
fluctuations in the economic wellbeing of companies, difficulties with future-oriented thinking, 
and trust issues as challenges that will need to be overcome. The high level of confidence in 
provincial policies and impact assessments, though, points to some problems which may explain 
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the shortcomings in the Raglan Mine and Nunavik Nickel closure plans observed in Chapter 
Three.  
Interview participants frequently described two “generations” of mining, where 
companies operating in the 20th century were free to act in whatever way they wanted regardless 
of the human and environmental impacts, while companies today operate in a rigid regulatory 
framework that better protects people and the environment. Yet this distinction, and the 
confidence expressed by interview participants in closure regulations, obscures the challenges 
that remain, such as the limits of financial securities and post-closure monitoring, poorly 
enforced environmental regulations, and the fact that new mines are just as susceptible to 
collapsing mineral markets (Bebbington et al., 2008; Dance et al., in press). In reality, mine 
closure governance is inconsistent across the North and even between different companies in the 
same region, and mines today continue to produce closure-related problems (Dance et al., in 
press) 
Financial securities and post-closure monitoring are particularly problematic. Financial 
securities are required to be paid by mine companies to their respective territorial or provincial 
government to guarantee the availability of funds in case the company is not able to fulfill its 
remediation duties. Specific requirements differ between jurisdictions, but in Québec the amount 
must cover the full cost of expected remediation work for the site, including the cost of necessary 
studies, land rehabilitation, and environmental characterization studies (Ministère de l’Énergie et 
des Ressources naturelles, 2017). Most often, these securities are credit guarantees from banks, 
and is held by the province until the company has relinquished the site or proven itself unable to 
complete the remediation work. As explained in Chapter Two, these securities rarely cover the 
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real costs of remediation and do not account for the perpetual care often needed (Dance, 2015; 
Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2002).  
Post-closure monitoring requirements, too, do not account for cumulative impacts or the 
long-term care that is often needed, do not extend to areas outside of the mine site, and in cases 
of abandonment can be underfunded due to the shortcomings of financial securities and cutbacks 
to government programs (CCSG Associates & MiningWatch Canada, 2001; Kuyek, 2011; 
Raffensperger et al., 2011). For a company to relinquish a mine site back to the government, 
Québec requires a minimum of ten years of post-closure monitoring with five consecutive years 
meeting environmental quality standards (Ministère de l’Environnement et de la Lutte Contre les 
Changements Climatiques, 2012). The duration of this monitoring is relatively insignificant 
when considering the perpetual nature of some mine waste (Hudson-Edwards et al., 2011), 
especially acid-generating wastes such as those possibly found at Raglan Mine and Nunavik 
Nickel.35 Potentially toxic mine waste often remains on site forever along with the risks that it 
poses to the environment and nearby communities. Questions of post-closure monitoring and 
perpetual care were not discussed much in interviews, as the focus was primarily on community 
engagement and socio-economic aspects of closure, but these are important issues that the region 
will inevitably have to face when Raglan Mine and Nunavik Nickel close. If authorities in 
Nunavik wish to see sustainability and community well-being centered in mine closure planning, 
it is perhaps unwise to assume that the modern changes to mine closure governance cover a wide 
enough scope of issues and adequately protect communities from major environmental, social, 
and economic disruptions. 
 
35 The Raglan Mine closure plan indicates that their tailings are considered acid generating, and the Nunavik Nickel 
closure plan states that at least some waste on site has acid generating potential.  
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The KEQC, through the ESIA process, plays the most direct role in regulating mine 
closure in the region, but impact assessments are front-end processes that may not adequately 
address closure. The preliminary closure plan is also assessed in ESIA, but it remains a distinctly 
front-end process and may not pay adequate attention to the closure phase of the mine’s life. The 
emphasis on impact assessments as a primary means of protecting people and the environment 
from potentially harmful projects is part of a larger issue of prioritizing development and 
operational issues while neglecting to support downstream socio-economic monitoring and 
community engagement. Indeed, the time between an ESIA and closure can be decades, so the 
information about the mine site and affected communities presented in the impact assessment 
may not be reflect what closure will actually look like as the project evolves and the community 
changes.  
There are also few mechanisms for follow-up or enforcement. The main method for 
follow up between the ESIA and closure planning is the requirement that companies resubmit 
their closure plan to the KEQC and MELCC every five years. In our interviews, KEQC members 
acknowledged some of the negative impacts that communities may experience when Raglan 
Mine and Nunavik Nickel close, such as environmental contamination and subsequent threats to 
Inuit food security, and the loss of wages, benefits, and profit sharing to support community 
development. It was clear that KEQC members have a relatively complete understanding of mine 
closure impacts. However, although the KEQC reviews each closure plan and can set conditions 
for all phases of the mine’s life, the plans for both Raglan Mine and Nunavik Nickel are 
extremely limited with regard to community engagement, addressing community concerns, and 
mitigating socio-economic impacts. As detailed in Chapter Three, neither closure plan makes any 
mention of community knowledge or explicitly addresses community concerns in their closure 
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plans. They also do not acknowledge or present plans to mitigate any negative socio-economic 
impacts. Of the ten closure plans examined for Chapter Three, these were two of the shortest and 
least detailed regarding the socio-economic aspects of closure, community engagement, and use 
of community knowledge. The KEQC does important work in protecting the social and 
environmental wellbeing of Nunavik, but the shortcomings of these closure plans seem to go 
unnoticed or unaddressed within their review. It is not clear why this is happening, although it is 
likely unintentional given the mandate of the KEQC and the tendency for mine closure globally 
to be a neglected and underappreciated phase of the mining lifecycle. Regardless of intention, the 
regular review of closure plans does not appear to be producing good outcomes.  
These findings echo Vivoda, Kemp, and Owen (2019), who refer to the diminishing of 
attention paid to socio-economic aspects of closure as a mine moves through its lifecycle as “an 
imbalance between the ‘enabling’ and ‘restrictive’ elements” (p. 3) of regulatory frameworks. 
These authors argue that a balance is needed between incentivizing companies to operate in a 
particular place and restricting how they operate in order to protect society and the environment. 
In their examination of this imbalance in Australia, they found that requirements for the socio-
economic aspects of mine closure were stricter during the early approval phases, and much 
weaker after the approval process. The limited restrictive elements of closure governance in 
Nunavik occurs alongside enabling incentives to promote mineral development in northern 
Québec. The massive development agenda of Plan Nord came with substantial government 
investments to promote resource extraction in the North (Rodon, 2017; Rodon & Schott, 2014). 
While Plan Nord emphasizes sustainable development, it does not address or contribute to the 
closure and remediation of projects being incentivized by this program. Provincially, the primary 
objective of the body most responsible for regulating mining and mine closure, MERN, is 
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ultimately to promote and support responsible mining. Within Nunavik, too, there are more 
mechanisms for enabling mining than restricting it. The Nunavik Mineral Exploration Fund 
(NMEF) trains Nunavik Inuit in mineral exploration and “assists the mineral exploration industry 
in the realization of different projects” (Séguin & Larivière, 2011, p. 8). Creating space for 
Nunavimmiut to participate in and profit from mineral exploration in the region helps keep some 
of the money generated by these companies in the region and provides valuable skills training, 
but there is no similar mine closure fund to train Inuit in mine remediation, support closure-
related Inuit enterprises, and promote the responsible and sustainable closure of the mines that 
may result from those exploration activities.  
This imbalance between enabling and restricting elements is evident in the case of the 
Schefferville (located in the Québec-Labrador Trough) mine closure in the 1980s.  During the 
region’s development phase, provincial and federal governments “spent more time and effort 
merely facilitating private sector activity in the north than actually planning for a long-term 
future” (Archer & Bradbury, 1992, p. 190). Governments chose to support a single industry 
instead of invest in the sustainability of the community, and when the mine closed Schefferville 
struggled to maintain other industries, public services, or a stable population (Bradbury & St‐
Martin, 1983). Since abandonment, the site has received very little environmental remediation 
and “acts as an incessant material reminder of three decades of intensive land and resource 
exploitation” for the Innu and Naskapi (Boutet, 2015, p. 181). This example also reaffirms a 
point made earlier, that despite the distinctions made between “new” and “old” mining, many of 
the same issues related to long-term planning and sustainability remain.  
Other than environmental impacts, interview participants most often focused on 
employment when discussing how mining and mine closure can impact communities. They 
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brought up how the loss of employment and contracts will negatively affect the communities 
when the mines close, but also spoke positively about the number of Inuit currently employed by 
the two mines. Both the Raglan Agreement and Nunavik Nickel Agreement have Inuit hiring 
quotas, which was also talked about positively. In Raglan Mine’s promotional materials, the 
number of Inuit employees is frequently presented as a point of pride and evidence of corporate 
social responsibility and their contributions to sustainable development in the region. 
Government development agendas like Plan Nord, too, focus heavily on the creation of jobs 
during operations as a means of sustainable development in resource industries. But while 
increased income is certainly a benefit for communities it also contributes to an increased level 
of risk when a mine closes. The more reliant a community is on mining, the more likely that 
community is to experience negative impacts when that mine closes and local employment and 
contracts end (Bainton & Holcombe, 2018; Boutet, 2015; Boutet et al., 2015; Keeling & Boulter, 
2015; Skeard, 2015; Southcott, Abele, Natcher, & Parlee, 2018). More diverse economies can 
help communities become more resilient to mine closure by ensuring that no one industry is 
responsible for all or most of a community’s employment and economic activities.  
4.5. Conclusion 
 Through semi-structured interviews and a review of provincial and regional policies and 
guidelines, this chapter sought to understand how mine closure in Nunavik is governed, what 
knowledge and experiences inform mine closure governance, and what avenues exist for 
community-engaged planning, with particular focus on the socio-economic aspects of closure. 
The results of this work show that there are significant gaps in mine closure governance, and 
regional authorities have limited power to implement their own regulations and enforcement 
mechanisms. The province has extensive environmental regulations for mine closure to ensure 
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post-closure environmental quality, but the socio-economic aspects of closure are mostly absent. 
There is no clear guidance for how mine companies should be planning for and mitigating these 
critical elements of mine closure. Community engagement in closure planning, too, is weakly 
addressed in policy. This means that companies can meet provincial requirements without 
involving impacted communities in closure planning.  
Asbestos Hill and the abandoned exploration site cleanup project were brought up 
frequently in interviews as examples of poor practices that should not be repeated. These 
examples contribute considerably to participants’ knowledge about the varied impacts of mine 
closure and abandonment, but also contribute to a common narrative where old mining and new 
mining are distinct, with the latter of which is believed to be occurring within a regulatory 
framework that will protect the environment and Nunavimmiut. This separation ultimately leads 
to trust being placed in closure regulations that have a plethora of gaps and limitations. Believing 
that this new generation of mining is without flaws closes regional political actors off to 
considering how mine closure governance can continue to expand to include a wider range of 
issues not otherwise represented in policy.   
These results also demonstrate the shortcomings of a reliance on ESIA processes to 
address mine closure. ESIAs are a front-end process, though. They occur early on, perhaps 
decades before the mine enters closure. There are no clear mechanisms for following up and 
ensuring the company is appropriately planning for any negative impacts from closure identified 
by the ESIA. The shortcomings of this process are exemplified by the closure plans for Raglan 
Mine and Nunavik Nickel, which do not clearly address community concerns or present any 
plans for mitigating negative socio-economic impacts (see Chapter Three results). After an 
ESIA, there are fewer restrictive elements for addressing socio-economic impacts and ensuring 
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community engagement in closure planning to balance the enabling incentives created by both 
regional and provincial authorities. Plan Nord and the NMEF work to facilitate mine exploration 
and development to bring greater economic gains to the region. Job creation for Nunavimmiut 
through mine development is framed as contributing to the sustainable development of the 
region.  
These sustainability agendas do not account for the inevitable post-closure loss of jobs, 
investment, tax revenue, and royalties, nor do they acknowledge the potentially harmful impacts 
that mining and exploration can have on land-based food systems and cultural/social systems. 
Mine development continues to be the primary strategy for bringing development and prosperity 
to the North, but given the harsh environments, shifting political landscapes, remote locations, 
lack of infrastructure, and fluctuating mineral markets it is perhaps naïve to believe that there 
will always be a new mine for workers to transfer to after the closure of another (Cater, Carney, 
& Keeling, 2018). Furthermore, even a consistent stream of new mines across the North would 
not address the loss of royalties and investments that a specific community or region loses when 
their mine closes. Job creation from mine development produces short-term gains that can 
certainly contribute to a family’s economic wellbeing, but it cannot be the only solution 
proposed.  
The Raglan Mine Closure Sub-committee presents a creative solution to many of the 
challenges in closure planning and gaps in closure governance. It creates a forum for 
communities to participate in closer planning and works as an open dialogue between parties 
instead of simple knowledge dispersal from company to community. This ultimately leaves 
inequalities between companies, though, as it is a company initiative not required by any 
government. Raglan Mine may be working creatively to ensure closure outcomes meet the needs 
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of their IBA communities, but Nunavik Nickel or other future mines are not obligated to do the 
same. If communities are going to be consistently and meaningfully included in the process of 
planning for the future of sites operating on their traditional territories, government must create 
appropriate regulatory frameworks to require it, instead of leaving companies to decide for 
themselves if they have the time, resources, and motivation to partner with communities in this 
way. Political actors must engage in creative, future-oriented thinking to guarantee that closure is 
governed effectively to not just protect the physical environment but contribute to the long-term, 
post-closure sustainability of Nunavik communities and their traditional lands.  
Strengthening regional authority over closure planning (and mineral development 
broadly) is one possible avenue for improving outcomes. Built into the mandates of the KRG, 
KEAC, KEQC, and Makivik is the protection of Nunavimmiut health, well-being, and futures; 
through the interviews it was clear that the employees of these governments have a wealth of 
knowledge and insight about the possible impacts of closure on Nunavik. These governing 
bodies have a more direct line of communication with the Northern Villages than the Québec 
Government, and Nunavimmiut occupy many of positions within these organizations. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, communities and their local and ethnic governments are experts in 
their own lands, people, and cultures, and so giving more control to regional governments to 
make decisions and plan for the future of the region can better guarantee that those plans will 





Mine closure has come a long way from the common practice of abandoning sites 
without much clean up or stabilization. The mines that closed throughout the 20th century have 
left legacies of environmental contamination, dramatic landscape and ecological change, 
economic decline, social disruptions, and complex cultural impacts stemming from those 
environmental, economic, and social changes (Bainton & Holcombe, 2018; Bridge, 2004; Cohen, 
2017; Keeling & Sandlos, 2016, 2017; United Nations Environmental Programme, 2001). Today, 
strict environmental regulations and ever-evolving technologies and technical expertise have 
resulted in safer and longer-term remediation solutions. Modern land claims agreements, 
Indigenous activism, and pressure for industry to obtain a social license to operate have 
additionally resulted in greater control by Indigenous peoples over mining activities (Dance, 
2015; Hodgkins, 2018; Otto, 2009; Rodon, 2018). There are still lessons to be learned, though, 
and mine closure continues to suffer from a lack of specialized attention that addresses aspects of 
closure not accounted for by physical environmental remediation (Bainton & Holcombe, 2018; 
Beckett & Keeling, 2019; Laurence, 2006; Stacey et al., 2010).  
Given the many possible impacts of mine closure, differing understandings of 
remediation, environmental health, and risk between parties, and the unequal power held by 
academics and engineers versus the communities that experience mine closure first hand, it is 
crucial that companies and governments make space for those communities to participate in 
decision making about closure. Planning for the socio-economic impacts of mine closure 
requires long-term engagement with many different groups within a community, beginning as 
early in the mine’s life as possible (International Council on Mining & Metals, 2019b; Stacey et 
al., 2010). This engagement should ensure that community members have a role in developing 
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closure goals, visions, success criteria, and post-closure land uses. (International Council on 
Mining & Metals, 2019b). Involving communities in closure planning can result in a greater 
scope of issues being addressed, more nuanced and complete understandings of risk and 
contamination exposure pathways, and greater innovation in designs and managements strategies 
(Edwards & Maritz, 2019; Fidler, 2010; McKay & Johnson, 2017). Developing social and 
economic transition plans, too, can help communities move away from mineral-based 
economies, not to refuse future mine development entirely but to ensure that northern economies 
are sustainable with or without the presence of boom-bust resource industries (Costa, 2015; 
International Council on Mining & Metals, 2019b; Laurencont et al., 2019; Veiga et al., 2001). 
This kind of community engagement, that centres the needs, values, expertise, and concerns of 
the communities and plans for the meaningful and practical mitigation of negative closure 
impacts, requires considerable time and dedication, and must be continuously attended to 
(Xavier, 2013). Without long-term community engagement and a dedication to protecting 
communities, mine closure risks repeating past mistakes and producing a new generation of 
harmful legacies.  
Much of the literature on mine closure focuses on documenting these past mistakes, 
which has been helpful for developing strategies for future success. This thesis instead sought to 
illuminate current mine closure practices and explore how companies and governments are 
working to ensure that the next generation of closures is set up for success. I used a combination 
of document analysis, semi-structured interviews with key informants, and participant 
observation to understand company mine closure practices across five northern regions and 
government processes for controlling mine closure in Nunavik, Québec. I wanted to know what 
those in positions of power are doing to protect northern communities from the many well 
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documented negative impacts of closure, while keeping in mind the historical context of mineral 
development, mine abandonment, and settler colonialism in the North. Importantly, I also wanted 
to generate knowledge that was beneficial for the Raglan closure sub-committee as they work 
towards producing a new closure plan that better meets the needs of Salluit and Kangiqsujuaq. It 
was my primary objective to answer questions already raised by sub-committee members: How 
can community knowledge be integrated into a closure plan? How can a closure plan do more 
than meet basic environmental remediation requirements? And what resources and pathways 
exist (or could in exist in the future) in Nunavik to facilitate the same level of engagement with 
other companies operating in the region? 
5.1. Summary of Results 
In Chapter Three, the analysis of ten closure plans from Yukon, NWT, Nunavut, 
Nunavik, and Nunatsiavut demonstrated that mine companies are inconsistent in their 
explanations of community engagement methods as well their application of knowledge gained 
from that engagement. Often descriptions of community engagement were not specific to 
closure, or community engagement was only spoken about in the future tense without detailing 
any past or ongoing engagement strategies and outcomes. Descriptions of community 
engagement were vague and provided little useful information that demonstrates that 
communities have access to closure planning. The social, cultural, and economic impacts of mine 
closure as also inconsistently acknowledged, with some companies not referring to them in any 
capacity. Most often, socio-economic aspects of closure are only briefly and vaguely present in 
closure plans, perhaps being mentioned once early in the document without any subsequent 
explanations or practical strategies. In other cases, closure plans do not mention socio-economic 
impacts at all, meaning the document is entirely technical instructions for the mine site without 
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addressing any issues facing impacted communities. Across all ten documents, virtually no 
concrete plans are proposed to mitigate the socio-economic aspects of closure. The subsequent 
review of regional closure policies and guidelines shows that differences in closure governance 
account for many of these inconsistencies between jurisdictions. Even within the same 
region/territory, though, there are differences in the quality and detail of closure plans, meaning 
company closure practices also play an important role.  
Interviews with provincial and regional authorities in Nunavik and a close reading of 
policies and guidelines in Chapter Four revealed similar themes. Provincial closure regulations 
focus predominantly on physical remediation while the socio-economic aspects of closure are 
neglected, and community engagement is not required for closure planning. Both these issues 
should ideally be accounted for through the ESIA process and subsequent closure plan reviews 
by the KEQC, but neither are explicitly required by any regulations for the closure and 
remediation phases of a mine’s life. Other than the KEQC, regional authorities like the KEAC 
and Makivik Corporation hold little formal decision making power and thus cannot implement or 
enforce their own mine closure regulations, but interview participants expressed confidence in 
their relationship with the provincial government and their ability to influence policy decisions 
and company practices. Much of the knowledge that regional authorities have about remediation 
comes from the example set by Asbestos Hill as well as the abandoned exploration site cleanup 
project. Asbestos Hill in particular has influenced participants’ attitudes and beliefs about mine 
closure, although it is also contributing to a belief that poor remediation is a phenomenon of the 
past that is unlikely to happen again in the 21st century. Lastly, because community engagement 
in closure planning is not explicitly required by provincial regulations, the strategies used by 
Nunavik Nickel and Raglan Mine differ considerably.  
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The mine closure plans and government policies and guidelines reviewed in Chapter 
Three and Four confirmed observations made elsewhere in literature, that mine closure planning 
focuses more on physical remediation while the social, cultural, economic, ecological, and 
historical challenges are frequently left out of the scope of remediation (Bainton & Holcombe, 
2018; Beckett & Keeling, 2019; Cohen, 2017). In Nunavik, regional authorities acknowledged 
the complex ways that closure can impact more than just the physical environment contained 
within the borders of the mine property, most notably the far-reaching economic impacts of 
closure were mentioned. Unfortunately, this knowledge is not reflected in mine closure policies 
or guidelines or the closure plans of the two mines operating in the region.  
Mining policies across the North, to varying degrees, acknowledge socio-economic 
impacts of mining and require companies to ensure communities are benefiting and being 
protected from the project. However, connections are rarely made between socio-economic 
considerations and closure specifically. Instead, clear regulations typically only exist for the 
construction and operational phases of the mine’s life, leaving companies with little guidance for 
what kinds of issues they must account for in closure planning. In Nunavik, interview 
participants frequently referred to the ESIA process, which only occurs at the beginning of a 
mine’s life, as evidence that community engagement and socio-economic impacts are being 
accounted for in mine closure. It is true that impact assessments should account for the possible 
impacts of closure and present solutions or alternatives to mitigate those impacts, but the closure 
plans for Raglan Mine and Nunavik Nickel do not reflect this. These two closure plans do not 
acknowledge any socio-economic impacts that Salluit and Kangiqsujuaq may experience. Thus, 
either the ESIA process is not adequately accounting for these aspects of closure or there are no 
follow-up mechanisms to ensure that the impacts identified in the ESIA are making it into 
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closure plans. This is despite the fact that the closure plans for both these mines are updated and 
resubmitted to the KEQC every five years for additional review. All of the mines represented in 
Chapter Three would have similarly gone through some kind of impact assessment, and yet all of 
their closure plans neglect the possible socio-economic impacts to nearby communities to some 
degree.  
Vague or non-existent attention to the socio-economic impacts of mine closure are not 
unique to Nunavik or Québec, but in fact reaffirm the observation made elsewhere that passive 
government approaches to socio-economic mine closure planning is common internationally 
(Xavier et al., 2015). Weak, ambiguous, or absent regulations surround the scope, objectives, 
mitigation strategies, and measurements for success in closure planning; thus, companies are 
often left to make their own decisions about what should and should not be addressed.  
When companies do attempt to address socio-economic aspects of closure, it is often 
limited to providing industry-specific technical training during operations instead of more 
rounded education that diversifies an employee’s skillset (Xavier et al., 2015). Job creation and 
technical training have valuable short-term benefits but must be balanced with the risk of 
overreliance on mining in order to contribute to the long-term, post closure health and wellbeing 
of a community. As Abele (2018) explains, “the mineral exploitation ‘pillar’ cannot hold up the 
society on its own” (p. 180). Bainton and Holcombe (2018) argue that mine closure itself can 
provide long-term benefits to communities if adequately planned for, managed, and resourced. 
“Repurposing infrastructure and mining landscapes, reskilling and redeploying labour, 
establishing alternative economic opportunities, [and] strengthening local livelihoods and food 
security” (Bainton & Holcombe, 2018, p. 469) are all possible outcomes that contribute to 
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sustainable development as opposed to the short-term employment gains that come from 
development agendas focused on job creation. 
Like the socio-economic aspects of closure, other phases of the mine’s life have more 
clear engagement requirements – communities are typically engaged with during impact 
assessments, IBA negotiations, and some form of consistent communication usually must be 
maintained throughout operations between the company and community. None of these 
guarantee that communities are able to voice concerns and have a role in planning and decision-
making for closure, though. The absence of policies around community engagement mean that 
companies can meet consultation requirements while neglecting to involve them in planning for 
the end of the mine’s life. Weak policy also means that closure planning is not equal between 
companies, as evidenced by the different relationships and strategies for engagement between the 
region, communities and the two companies operating in Nunavik. The Québec Government’s 
most recent revisions to the Mining Act now require that mine companies establish a company-
community committee that lasts from the beginning of the mine’s life until post-closure, but 
there are no requirements that the committee (or communities in general) must have a role in 
planning for closure. Whether or not community-engaged socio-economic mine closure planning 
occurs, both in Nunavik and across the North, remains largely dependent on a company’s own 
willingness and initiative 
What little community engagement in closure planning is happening also does not appear 
to result in closure plans that effectively utilize community knowledge. Instead, that knowledge 
is frequently confined to descriptions of the environment and almost never applied to the 
technical and engineering aspects of closure, which ultimately reproduces the existing power 
imbalance between academic and community knowledge. As described in Chapter Two, mine 
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closure planning is fraught with challenges: it is complex and requires years of careful planning 
(Stacey et al., 2010); there are different and at times conflicting understandings of environmental 
and human impacts, risk, and exposure pathways (Haalboom, 2014; Poirier & Brooke, 2000; 
Sandlos & Keeling, 2016c; Shriver et al., 2008; Tsosie, 2015; Tyrrell, 2006); closure doesn’t 
account for perpetual care, cumulative impacts or the possibility of contamination occurring 
years after relinquishment (Kuyek, 2011; Raffensperger et al., 2011; Sandlos & Keeling, 2013); 
and, in cases of abandonment, financial securities collected from companies often do not cover 
the real cost of remediation, including impacts that occur outside of the immediate boundaries of 
the mine site (Dance, 2015; Kuyek, 2011). Community engagement can help address many of 
these issues by allowing communities to come to their own conclusions about what closure and 
remediation means, what issues are being accounted for, what success should look like, and what 
kinds of risk are acceptable. Without good, effective closure governance, though, this outcome 
appears to be unlikely.  
All mine sites and communities are unique and require case-specific closure and 
engagement strategies. Different sites will have special engineering and environmental 
challenges that will need to be accounted for, and different communities will have different 
social, economic, and cultural characteristics as well as varying priorities and values. Flexibility 
in regulations and guidelines is thus necessary to account for these differences. However, as it 
currently stands, closure policy is leaving room for much more than flexibility between sites and 
communities. There is virtually no guidance for engagement or socio-economic aspects of 
closure, which means that much of the closure planning process is being left to the decision-
making and good will of individual companies. Some companies will do good work that exceeds 
minimal government requirements. Based on their closure plans, the owners of the Diavik and 
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Ekati mines appear to be making an effort to engage with communities and share decision 
making power in closure planning, and the Mary River closure plan attempts to engage with a 
much wider set of issues than what is common or required by law. Other companies, for a variety 
of reasons, will inevitably not make the same kinds of commitments.  
Companies across the North have different financial capacities, corporate philosophies, 
and relationships to communities that result in different kinds of SLOs and IBAs with different 
stipulations and expectations. The large number of variables, combined with weak or absent 
regulations for closure planning, has resulted in the high degree of variability in closure plans 
across the North. In Nunavik, the unclear expectations of government have allowed for the 
region’s two operating mines to have quite different community engagement strategies. While 
Raglan Mine has recently established the Raglan Mine Closure Plan Sub-committee, which is 
dedicated solely to collaboratively developing a closure plan with community and regional 
representatives, Nunavik Nickel has no such committee and interview participants spoke often of 
the lack of communication between Nunavik Nickel and the region. 
The Raglan Mine Closure Sub-committee and other similar groups have the capacity to 
fill many of the regulatory gaps that exist for mine closure planning. The group is made up of 
community, regional, and industry members as well as experts in physical and social mine 
remediation and meet regularly to discuss issues related to mine closure. Other committees and 
venues exist for community engagement related to mine operations broadly, but this sub-
committee is dedicated solely to collaborative planning for closure. Community members are 
able to voice a wide range of concerns that are typically not accounted for in mine closure 
policies, which the company can use to improve its closure plan. This sub-committee was also 
created long before the mine is expected to close, at least 20 years, which allows the company to 
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begin implementing mitigation strategies early and adjust as necessary as time passes. 
Independent experts in both physical and social mine remediation regularly provide critical 
information based on the most up to date research for sub-committee members to apply to 
Raglan Mine’s closure plan. Given the weak regulatory framework for mitigating negative socio-
economic impacts of closure, the sub-committee creates an opportunity for community members 
to plan for their own futures based on their own knowledge and expertise about their 
communities, cultures, and environments.  
The existence of the Raglan Closure Sub-committee, though, does not negate the fact that 
policy gaps in the regulatory framework for mine closure allow for substantial inequalities 
between companies. No such closure committee exists for Nunavik Nickel. Raglan’s closure sub-
committee also does not mean that the company is immune to the same risks and uncertainties 
that all mine sites experience, like decreased market prices for minerals or changes in 
leadership/ownership that could lead to decreased investment in communities and special 
planning committees and changes in overall engagement strategies. It is also unclear how Raglan 
Mine will be held accountable to the outcomes of the Raglan Closure Sub-committee outside of 
the operator’s incentive to be a good corporate citizen and retain its social license to operate. 
5.2. Recommendations 
Overall, mining policies must much more clearly and frequently make connections 
between community engagement, socio-economic impacts, and the closure phase of a mine’s life 
instead of relying on regulations related to other earlier phases and hoping that they translate to 
closure planning. Governments must clearly explain the kinds of socio-economic issues that 
proponents must address in closure planning, as opposed to making vague statement about 
closure needing to “attain technical, environmental and social objectives” (Ministère de l’Énergie 
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et des Ressources naturelles, 2017, p. 27) or “provide economic benefits to local communities” 
(Government of Yukon, 2006, p. 9). Governments should instruct proponents on how to develop 
social objectives and mitigation strategies for socio-economic impacts with communities to 
ensure they are protected from negative impacts and are left with lasting gains. Similarly, 
governments must develop a clear framework (albeit a flexible one) for community engagement 
in closure planning that makes it clear that proponents must begin planning for closure with 
impacted communities early in the mine’s life.  
Increasing regional authority over mine governance and giving regional governments 
greater formal power to make decisions and develop and enforce regulations could lead to more 
appropriate and effective closure planning in the region. The results of Chapter Four showed that 
interview participants working for regional governments could point to more possible negative 
socio-economic impacts than what is accounted for in provincial policy or the closure plans of 
Raglan Mine and Nunavik Nickel. These authorities are employed largely by people living in 
Nunavik who have a deep understanding of the region, its strengths, and its challenges. This 
would likely require greater access to resources and human capacity given the complex and 
expensive nature of policy development, implementation, and enforcement, which can be 
difficult to come by for small northern governments. Finally, closure planning would benefit 
from communities and governments both having greater access to information about closure, 
what it entails, and the ways that communities elsewhere have been impacted. The necessity to 
increase a community’s knowledge about closure is one important reason why closure planning 
must begin as early as possible.  
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5.3. Future Research Areas 
The impact assessment process and IBA contents are two areas of interest that were 
outside of the scope of this research, but play an important role in closure planning. An 
examination of the impact assessment process, impact statements, the conditions set by the 
KEQC or other government organizations in the North, and how those compare to respective 
closure plans would contribute to a more complete understanding of the role of impact 
assessments in regulating mine closure. The KEQC and ESIA process were mentioned 
frequently by interview participants in their explanations of how mine closure governance works 
in Nunavik, and many of the closure plans examined in Chapter Three referred to their impact 
assessments. It is clear that impact assessments are currently understood to be a primary means 
of regulating mine closure in the North, especially with regard to community engagement and 
socio-economic impacts. Whether or not the impact assessment process is adequately accounting 
for closure and all of its complexities still remains unclear. If they are, then why are these issues 
not making it into company closure plans? There must be mechanisms to ensure that (1) impact 
assessments account for the unique impacts related specifically to closure, and (2) those impacts 
related to closure are then carried over into the closure planning process to be mitigated in 
measurable, trackable ways.  
Similar questions can be asked about IBAs and the negotiations that lead to them. Do 
these private agreements account for closure in any capacity, and if so what kinds of issues are 
being addressed or left out? If IBAs do have requirements related to closure and remediation, 
what mechanisms (if any) exist to ensure that they are being translated into closure plans. Given 
regulatory shortcomings in closure planning, private agreements can be used to ensure 
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communities have their voices heard. Unfortunately, IBAs are typically confidential, and so 
evaluating their contents may be difficult or impossible in many cases.  
Knowledge about mine closure planning would also benefit from future research that 
compares mine closure plans with actual post-closure outcomes once the mine site has been 
relinquished. While certain mine closure plans examined in Chapter Three appeared to engage 
with community knowledge more effectively and genuinely, it remains to be seen if that leads to 
real, practical improvements to closure. 
5.4. Conclusion 
Mine closure and remediation in northern Canada continue to be framed as a physical 
issue of cleaning up the site and containing waste despite a substantial body of literature that 
points to more complex and interconnected social, economic, and historical issues. Given the 
history of settler colonialism and mine abandonment in northern Canada, it is crucial that closure 
and remediation planning centres the needs, values, and priorities of communities. By doing so, 
companies, governments, and communities can collaboratively produce a new generation of 
mine closure with positive outcomes for the people inheriting the post-mining landscape.  
This thesis illustrated that despite claims by government and industry that technological 
innovations and changing attitudes about social well-being, sustainability, and Indigenous rights, 
mine closure planning is falling short of best practices. Government policies and guidelines have 
largely neglected to account for community engagement and socio-economic impacts in closure 
planning, and the mine industry has poorly and inconsistently filled those gaps. The International 
Council on Mining and Metals’ Integrated Mine Closure guide (2019b) stresses the importance 
of long-term engagement and the integration of social objectives in closure, but these principles 
are not translating into actual closure planning. Companies are not involving communities in the 
159 
 
development of their closure plans early in the mine’s life, and they are not accounting for issues 
outside of the physical remediation of the site. Without clear explanations for how companies 
can implement these principals or any enforcement mechanisms from government, best practice 
guidelines remain more of a theoretical ideal than a helpful tool for practitioners. This leaves 
corporate social responsibility and SLOs as the main motivator for companies to engage 
meaningfully with communities and invest in community sustainability, which leaves these 
important aspects of mine closure planning up to the highly variable preferences and motivations 
of individual companies.  
As a result of shortcomings in provincial policies, international guidelines, and industry 
practices, mine companies and governments risk reproducing past failures. Unemployment, 
social dislocation, new and costly abandoned sites (like the Jericho and Wolverine mines, 
abandoned in 2012 and 2015 respectively), and continued distrust in the industry are all possible 
outcomes for Canada’s current generation of mines. The presence of Indigenous peoples and 
histories of settler colonialism in the North mean that the impacts felt by mining and mine 
closure are unique from those felt by southern Canadians or non-Indigenous populations 
elsewhere in the world.  
However, the insights gained from this research are applicable globally. The ICMM 
presents Canada as a leader in many of the good mine closure practices included in its best 
practices guide (ICMM, 2019), and the Canadian Government regularly boasts of its global 
leadership in mine remediation (see Government of Canada, 2019; Government of Canada, 
1996). Despite this common belief that Canada is a global leader, though, there remain 
significant gaps in both government regulations and industry practices in mine remediation 
within the country. As this thesis has shown, communities are not consistently included in mine 
160 
 
closure planning, nor are they adequately protected from the often long-term, harmful impacts 
frequently caused by mine closure. Canadian mining law is also comparable to those found in 
other, similarly developed nations like the USA, EU, and Australia in terms of both 
environmental regulations and community and Indigenous engagement (Blommerde, Taplin & 
Simitkuaq, 2015; Garcia, 2008; Kabir et al., 2015; Otto, 2009), meaning there are many countries 
outside of Canada that can benefit from the insight provided by this research. Being inclusive of 
more voices, grounding closure planning in the real context of where operations are taking place, 
and setting clear, explicit goals for mitigating negative socio-economic impacts are goals that all 
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Appendix I: Interview Consent Form 
 
 
Informed Consent Form for Research 
 
Title: Arctic Mine Closure Strategies and Company-Community Relationships: 
Examining the Application of Inuit Knowledge in Closure Planning in 
Nunavik, Québec  
Researcher(s): Miranda Monosky, MA student, Department of Geography, Memorial 
University of Newfoundland, mnmonosky@mun.ca, 604 997 6679  
Supervisor(s):   Dr. Arn Keeling, Professor, Department of Geography, Memorial 
University of Newfoundland, akeeling@mun.ca, 709 864 8990 
 
You are invited to take part in a research project entitled “Arctic Mine Closure Strategies and 
Company-Community Relationships: Examining the Application of Inuit Knowledge in Closure 
Planning in Nunavik, Québec.” 
This form is part of the process of informed consent.  It should give you the basic idea of what 
the research is about and what your participation will involve.  It also describes your right to 
withdraw from the study.  In order to decide whether you wish to participate in this research 
study, you should understand enough about its risks and benefits to be able to make an informed 
decision. Please take time to read this carefully and to understand the information given to you.  
Please contact the researcher, Miranda Monosky, if you have any questions about the study or 
would like more information before you consent. 
It is entirely up to you to decide whether to take part in this research.  If you choose not to take 
part in this research or if you decide to withdraw from the research once it has started, there will 
be no negative consequences for you, now or in the future. 
 
Introduction: 
I am a graduate student in Geography at Memorial University of Newfoundland. As part of my 
Master’s thesis, I am conducting research under the supervision of Dr. Arn Keeling, which is 
funded through the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC). My 
research aims to understand the regional and provincial regulatory framework that controls mine 
closure plans and processes in Nunavik, as well as standard practices within the mine industry 




Purpose of Study: 
The purpose of this research is to understand the challenges and opportunities for incorporating 
Inuit knowledge into mine closure plans in Nunavik. Given the negative outcomes of mine 
closure that have been documented in the Canadian North, it is important to understand what is 
being done to ensure community involvement in the process of mine closure planning and where 
there is room for improvement. My goal is to understand what knowledge government and 
industry has on mine closure planning and its impacts, how they are working towards mitigating 
these impacts, and how they are making space for Inuit participation in mine closure planning.  
 
What You Will Do in this Study: 
If you wish to take part in this research, you will be asked to participate in an interview with the 
researcher, Miranda Monosky. During the interview, you will be asked questions about your 
knowledge of mine closure impacts and risks, mitigation strategies, and Inuit engagement in 
mine closure planning.  
 
Length of Time: 
The length of this interview will vary depending on the depth of discussion and your personal 
knowledge about the topics being discussed. It is expected, though, that interviews will take 
approximately one hour.  
 
Withdrawal from the Study: 
You may stop the interview for any reason at any time. Your decision to stop the interview or 
remove any of your responses will not negatively impact you or your relationship with the 
researcher, Memorial University, or other groups associated with this project. If you choose to 
withdraw, in part or in full, any recordings or notes from the interview will be destroyed.  
 
If you choose to withdraw after the interview has been conducted, you may contact the 
researcher by phone (604 997 6679) or email (mnmonosky@mun.ca) and your data will be 
destroyed as soon as possible. You may choose to withdraw your interview until April 30, 2020, 
at which point the data analysis phase of the research will be completed.  
 
Possible Benefits: 
Your participation in this research will benefit: 
a) The province of Québec and the region of Nunavik. This research will increase 
knowledge about mine closure planning processes, which will aid government and industry 
in developing and improving policies and practices for creating mine closure plans that 
adequately protect the environment and nearby communities.  
b) The scientific/scholarly community. Your participation will help to fill a gap that exists 
in scholarly research by providing information about the regional political and industry 
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systems in Québec, and how Inuit are being engaged with in the process of developing 
mine closure plans.  
 
Possible Risks: 
There are no foreseeable physical, emotional, or financial risks associated with your participation 
in this research. However, should any of the interview questions elicit negative emotions or make 
you feel uncomfortable you are encouraged to stop the interview.  
 
Confidentiality: 
The ethical duty of confidentiality includes safeguarding participants’ identities, personal 
information, and data from unauthorized access, use, or disclosure.  
All information you supply during this research will be confidential. Unless you give consent 
otherwise, your name will not appear in any report or publication of the research. Your identity, 
personal information, and data you provide will be safeguarded from unauthorized access or 
disclosure. Your personal information will be recorded separately from the data collected and 
your identity will be coded.  
 
Anonymity: 
Anonymity refers to protecting participants’ identifying characteristics, such as name or 
description of physical appearance. Our purpose is not to collect any private information about 
you. While some interview questions may address personal involvement or knowledge (i.e. what 
is your involvement in mine closure planning?), in all cases the emphasis will be on issues of 
mine closure planning and policies and not on personal or private information.  
You will be asked to give your informed consent to have your name recorded and used in any 
reports or publications that may come from this research, but this is not a requirement to 
participate in an interview. Should you choose to remain anonymous, your name will not be 
recorded or included in any writing that comes from this research. After the interview and before 
data is compiled into a final report/thesis, you will be sent a copy of your transcribed interview 
for you to review and, if you choose, change or retract any information. 
Individuals involved in Northern mining and the governing of Nunavik and Québec represent a 
relatively small group, and thus it may not be possible to guarantee anonymity. Despite efforts to 
ensure anonymity, it may be possible for readers to identify you in future publications/reports if 
you are one of few people within your organization or company that can speak to mine closure in 
the North. Please be aware of this risk before participating in this interview. However, if you do 
choose to participate and wish to remain anonymous, every reasonable effort will be made to 
ensure your anonymity. You will not be identified in publications without your explicit 
permission.  
 
Recording of Data: 
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If you consent, the researcher will be using an audio recording device to record this interview. 
You do not have to consent to this aspect of the interview. Should you choose not to have the 
interview recorded, the researcher will only take written notes.  
 
Use, Access, Ownership, and Storage of Data: 
Digital recordings and transcribed interviews will be stored securely on a password protected 
computer. Any hard copies of notes or transcribed interviews will be kept in the supervisor’s (Dr. 
Arn Keeling) office in a locked filing cabinet. Only the primary researcher (Miranda Monosky) 
and supervisor (Dr. Arn Keeling) will have access to this data. There are no plans to archive this 
data or make it available to other researchers. If this changes in the future, you will be contacted 
for additional consent. Data will be kept for a minimum of five years, as required by Memorial 
University’s policy on Integrity in Scholarly Research.  
 
Reporting of Results: 
Interview audio recordings and transcribed interviews will not be distributed, sold, or 
disseminated in any way, though selected quotes may be used in future publications, with 
permission. Upon completion, my MA thesis will be available at Memorial University’s Queen 
Elizabeth II library, and can be accessed online at: 
http://collections.mun.ca/cdm/search/collection/theses. 
 
Sharing of Results with Participants: 
You will be sent the transcribed version of this interview for your review. You may choose to 
have any information removed or refuse permission for use of the transcript. Individual 
participants and regional/provincial authorities will be provided a copy of the thesis that will 
result from this research. Results will also be communicated through presentations, posters, and 




You are welcome to ask questions before, during, or after your participation in this research. If 
you would like more information about this study, please contact: Miranda Monosky, 




The proposal for this research has been reviewed by the Interdisciplinary Committee on Ethics in 
Human Research and found to be in compliance with Memorial University’s ethics policy.  If 
you have ethical concerns about the research, such as the way you have been treated or your 
rights as a participant, you may contact the Chairperson of the ICEHR at icehr@mun.ca or by 





Your signature on this form means that: 
• You have read the information about the research. 
• You have been able to ask questions about this study. 
• You are satisfied with the answers to all your questions. 
• You understand what the study is about and what you will be doing. 
• You understand that you are free to withdraw participation in the study without having to 
give a reason, and that doing so will not affect you now or in the future.   
• You understand that if you choose to end participation during data collection, any data 
collected from you up to that point will be retained by the researcher, unless you indicate 
otherwise.  
• You understand that if you choose to withdraw after data collection has ended, your data 
can be removed from the study up to April 30, 2020 
 
I agree to be audio-recorded    Yes   
     No 
I agree to the use of direct quotations     Yes   
     No 
I allow my name to be identified in any publications 
resulting from this study  
 Yes   
     No 
 
By signing this form, you do not give up your legal rights and do not release the researchers from 
their professional responsibilities. 
 
Your Signature Confirms:  
       I have read what this study is about and understood the risks and benefits.  I have had                
adequate time to think about this and had the opportunity to ask questions and my 
questions have been answered. 
  I agree to participate in the research project understanding the risks and contributions of 
my participation, that my participation is voluntary, and that I may end my participation. 
 




 _____________________________   _____________________________ 





I have explained this study to the best of my ability.  I invited questions and gave answers.  I 
believe that the participant fully understands what is involved in being in the study, any potential 




______________________________   _____________________________ 





Appendix II: Sample Interview Questions 
 
Introduction and Context 
1. What is your email address, so I can send you a copy of the consent form for your records 
and can later send you a copy of this transcribed interview? 
 
2. Begin by introducing the interviewee  
a. What is your role within your organization? 
b. What is the role of your organization within Nunavik? 
 
3. How have you/your organization been involved in mine closure planning, policy 
development, or enforcement?  
Knowledge of Mine Closure and its Impacts 
4. What do you know about the positive and negative impacts of mine closure in the 
Northern Canada? Are there any specific examples you know of? 
a. How might a community benefit from mining? 
b. What negative impacts might a community experience? 
 
5. What do you know about the social, cultural, and economic impacts of mine closure?  
 
6. What do you believe are the most pressing risks associated with mine closure? 
 
7. What would an ideal, successful mine closure scenario look like? What would the 
environmental look like? What would nearby communities look like? 
 
8. Do you see mining as a core part of Nunavik’s long-term economic development? 
a. Does mine closure ever factor into development plans? 
 
9. Is there anyone within your organization that specializes in monitoring the social and 
economic impacts of mine activities? 
Mine Closure Policy Development and Enforcement 
10. What are the major regional systems and policies that mine companies have to abide by 
in regard to mine closure? I.e. processes that are in addition to the regulations created by 
the government of Québec. 
 
11. What freedom does your organization have to develop new policies that mine companies 
have to follow, given that it is within the province of Québec?  
 
12. What power does your organization or other regional governing bodies in Nunavik have 




13. Does the KEQC have to approve of a mine closure plan? 
a. The first one? The last one? All of them? 
 
14. Does a mine closure plan have to go through public consultations? 
 
15. If a mine closes and does not fulfill the promises made in its closure plan, what can your 
organization or other regional governing bodies in Nunavik do to hold them accountable? 
 
16. Are you familiar with the financial securities in place that require mine companies to set 
aside a certain amount of money for closure? 
a. If yes: Do you know the details of how those securities work? Like how the dollar 
amount is calculated, who holds on to the money, and how it’s distributed after 
closure? 
b. If yes: Are you confident that this system will work in the case of mine 
abandonment or bankruptcy? 
 
17. What makes closure different today compared to how it was 40 years ago? How will the 
closure of Raglan and Canadian Royalties be different from Asbestos Hill? 
a. How are regulations different? 
b. How have company practices changed? 
c. Has the presence of regional authorities resulting from the JBNQA made a 
difference? 
 
18. What changes would you like to see in terms of policies and guidelines in Nunavik to 
address mine closure impacts? In Québec?  
Inuit Engagement in Mine Closure 
19. What is the value in having Inuit involved in planning for mine closure? 
 
20. Is your organization involved in facilitating that involvement? 
 
21. What would successful community participation in mine closure planning look like to 




Appendix III: Research Summary for Recruitment 
 
Arctic Mine Closure Strategies and Company-Community Relationships: 
Examining the Application of Inuit Knowledge in Closure Planning in 
Nunavik, Québec 
 
Research Goal: To examine the process of mine closure planning in Nunavik, and the role of Inuit 
participation in that process.  
About the Researcher: My name is Miranda Monosky and I am a graduate student in geography 
studying at Memorial University in St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador, under the supervision of 
Dr. Arn Keeling and supported by the Toward Environmentally Responsible Resource Extraction 
Network (TERRE-NET). I am from British Columbia and completed a Bachelor of Arts degree at the 
University of the Fraser Valley where I developed an interest in environmental management and 
historical and contemporary Indigenous issues. 
Proposed Research: The purpose of my research is to understand how mine closure planning is 
governed in Nunavik, what standard industry practices for mine closure are, and what knowledge and 
attitudes about mine closure exist within government organizations and mine companies. I am also 
interested in understanding the ways that Inuit are being engaged with in the process of mine closure 
planning in Nunavik.  
Research Questions:  
1. What do regional governments and industry actors know about the impacts of mine closure? 
2. What legislative power do regional governing bodies in Nunavik have to control the process 
of mine closure planning? 
3. What are the highest priority concerns for different stakeholders? How do they think these 
concerns should be addressed? 
4. How do these factors and different understandings facilitate or limit Inuit participation in 
mine closure planning? 
Research Activities: Data collection for this research will have three main components. First, I will 
be reviewing mine closure plans from across Northern Canada to understand common industry 
practices in mine closure. Second, I will conduct semi-structured interviews with local, regional, and 
provincial governments and Inuit organizations as well as employees of mine companies that have 
operations in the North. Finally, I will be attending and participating in the Raglan closure 
subcommittee meetings, held three times a year, to observe how they are approaching mine closure 
and Inuit participation in that process. This research will contribute to a deeper understanding of 
mine closure practices in the North, both from an industry and government perspective, which can 
lead to improved mine closure plans that better reflect the needs, values, and priorities of Northern 
communities. 
Contact Information 




Phone: 1 (604) 997 6679  
